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1.1 Cost Allocation Problems and Game Theory
There are many economic settings in which a group of agents wishes to undertake a
joint enterprise in order to save costs. Doctors, for example, look for colleagues to
share an office in order to save from rent, equipment and secretarial help. Individuals
or firms wish to jointly invest in common networks such as communication networks
and distribution channels. Similarly, countries wish to collaborate in order to solve
environmental or security problems. The success of such enterprises often relies on
agreements on how to share the cost savings generated. That is, joint enterprises
require a cost allocation mechanism that is efficient, fair and provides incentives to
each agent (and also to each group of agents) involved to agree upon.
An economic approach one can take to analyze joint cost savings problems is by
means of cooperative game theory.
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that provides tools for analyzing
situations in which the actions of each involved party (called a player) have an effect
on the outcome which is of interest to all. The competition between firms or politi-
cal parties, the conflict between a boss and a worker, war and peace/disarmament/
environmental negotiations between countries, cooperation of producers sharing com-
mon production facilities and so on, all provide examples of these situations, i.e.,
games. As illustrated in the examples above, the mutual interdependence among the
players is the essence of a game and what makes game theory a useful tool for the anal-
ysis of the behavior of interacting decision-makers. The book Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is regarded by many
as the starting point of game theory. As the title of the book of von Neumann and
Morgenstern reveals the intention of the authors was to provide a new kind of math-
ematics for economic analysis. Indeed, starting from the late sixties, game theory is
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being applied to explain the behavior of firms and individuals in a wide range of eco-
nomic situations. Nor is economics alone: operations research, accounting, finance,
law, marketing, political science and sociology are beginning similar experiences.
Game Theory can be roughly divided into two broad areas: non-cooperative (or
strategic) and cooperative (or coalitional) game theory. Generally speaking, non-
cooperative game theory focuses on those situations where the competitive nature
of interaction is dominant and players make choices which are based only on their
perceived self-interest.
By contrast, the cooperative game theory models those situations in which cooper-
ative behavior is the central feature of social or economic interaction. In a cooperative
game, players can reach formal joint agreements, such as legally binding arrangements
to act as a single entity. A cooperative game typically abstracts itself away from nego-
tiations to reach agreements and mechanisms the players use to enforce agreements.
Rather it describes only the physical outcomes that can jointly be achieved by each
group of players. For this reason, cooperative game theory can be considered as a
structural theory. The most commonly used model in the theory of cooperative games
is the model of transferable utility games. A transferable utility game, or a TU-game,
describes the monetary value that each group of players can achieve by most efficient
means.
Generally, the focus in the analysis of a TU-game is on the allocation of the
value that is achieved by the grand coalition of all players, where the values of the
subcoalitions serve as a benchmark. The literature on TU-games has proposed many
solution concepts each with its own appealing properties. Most important of these
solution concepts are the core (Gillies, 1953), the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the
nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the compromise value (Tijs, 1981).
The central issue of this monograph is to address cost allocation problems arising
from sequencing problems and connection problems. Sequencing problems consider a
group of agents who are waiting to be served in a facility and focuses on the problem
of the allocation of the cost savings that can be obtained by switching from an initial
service order to an optimal one. Connection problems consider the cost allocation
problems arising from situations in which a group of agents wishes to collaborate and
jointly invest in the construction or the maintenance of a common network. Both
of these problems appear in a great number of diverse economic settings. Allocating
patients to surgery rooms, scheduling of computer programs on servers or jobs in
shop-floor on machines are common examples of sequencing problems while a group
of villagers that has to construct and pay pipelines from their respective houses to a
water supplier is a common example of connection problems.
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The methods we use in this monograph to analyze the cost allocation problems
arising from sequencing and connection problems mainly rely on models of TU-games.
The following example illustrates how a cost allocation problem arising from a simple
sequencing situation can be modeled and analyzed by a TU-game.
Example 1.1.1 Consider 3 companies each of which has a broken tool that has to be
repaired by a maintenance service in order for the companies to restart production.
The number of hours (processing time) required to repair each of these three tools
is given in Table 1.1. For example, the processing time required to repair the tool
company 1 2 3
processing time in hours 3 1 2
cost coefficient in 1,000s of euros 3 2 6
Table 1.1: Processing times and cost coefficients in Example 1.1.1
of company 2 is 1 hour. Suppose that according to a first-come-first-serve principle,
the tool of company 1 will be repaired first, followed by company 2, and, finally,
company 3 (See Figure 1.1). Waiting until the reparation of the tool is costly for
the companies because of the production that is lost meanwhile. Moreover, lost
production in different companies may have different values per time unit. This is
reflected by the cost coefficients in Table 1.1. For example, if the company that owns
tool 2 has to wait 3 hours till it can restart production again, then the costs for this
company will be 3 · 2, 000 = 6, 000 euros. Similarly, the total costs to repair the tools















6 3 2 
6 4 3 
tool 1 tool 3 tool 2 service initial order 
tool 3 tool 1 tool 2 service optimal order 
Figure 1.1: The initial order and the optimal order in Example 1.1.1
checked that this order is not optimal, i.e., it does not minimize the total costs. The
unique optimal order in this situation is 3,2,1 (See Figure 1.1) and the associated total
costs equal 2 · 6, 000 + 3 · 2, 000 + 6 · 3, 000 = 36, 000 euros. Hence, if all companies
cooperate, they can decrease the total costs from 53,000 to 36,000 euros. Assume
now that company 1 and 2 come together to discuss their possibilities to achieve
cost savings without the help of company 3. Obviously, they could switch positions
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without changing the waiting time of company 3. It can be checked that if companies
1 and 2 switch places then their total costs will be 1 ·2, 000+4 ·3, 000 = 14, 000 euros
and this is the minimum amount for companies 1 and 2. Now, consider companies
1 and 3. Since an initial processing order is established, company 2 might have the
opportunity to prevent the switching between companies 1 and 3. Or, it might be
that company 2 can only veto this switch if the processing time of company 3 is
larger than the processing time of company 1. Hence, whether to allow the switching
between companies 1 and 3 or under which conditions to allow the switching between
companies 1 and 3 are important modeling decisions. For this situation, we take the
perspective that companies 1 and 3 cannot switch positions without the cooperation
of company 2. Hence, companies 1 and 3 cannot generate any cost savings on their
own. The minimal costs for each group of companies are depicted in Table 1.2.
group {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
minimal total costs
in 1,000s of euros 9 8 36 14 45 42 36
Table 1.2: The minimal total costs for each group of companies in Example 1.1.1
We can also consider the cost savings that each group of companies achieve when
they cooperate. Consider again companies 1 and 2. Their total costs with respect to
the initial order equal 17,000 euros. We showed that the minimum total costs these
companies can achieve equal 14,000 euros. Hence, when they cooperate they save
3,000 euros. The maximal cost savings for each group of companies is depicted in
Table 1.3.
group {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
maximal cost savings
in 1,000s of euros 0 0 0 3 0 2 17
Table 1.3: The maximal cost savings for each group of companies in Example 1.1.1
Now we can start looking for a solution for the allocation problem at hand by
taking the values of the subcoalitions as a benchmark. An important property of a
cost allocation is that it has to provide incentives to each agent and to each group of
agents involved to agree upon. For instance, the allocation 8,000 euros for company 1,
7,000 euros for company 2 and 21,000 euros for company 3 does not give companies 1
and 2 the required incentives to participate in the cost savings project. For, together
companies 1 and 2 are charged 15,000 euros whereas they could achieve total costs of
14,000 euros on their own. In other words, this cost allocation is not stable, because
companies 1 and 2 will not accept it. This notion of stability is the main idea behind
the solution concept known as core.
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A core allocation is the one that gives every group of players an incentive to par-
ticipate by allocating them more than what the group could achieve on its own. The
core of our cost game, which is represented in Figure 1.2, is the set of all allocations
(x1, x2, x3) satisfying the following constraints:
x1 + x2 + x3 = 36, 000.
x1 + x2 ≤ 14, 000.
x1 + x3 ≤ 45, 000.
x2 + x3 ≤ 42, 000.
x1 ≤ 9, 000.
x2 ≤ 8, 000.
x3 ≤ 36, 000.
A solution satisfying the constraints above is (1500, 5500, 29000). ⋄
Figure 1.2: Core of the cost game in Example 1.1.1
Although the core of the game associated with the sequencing problem in Example
1.1.1 is non-empty, the core of TU-games need not be non-empty in general. Since
core stability is a compulsory condition for the viability of a cost allocation, emptiness
or non-emptiness of the core is an essential feature of the games associated with cost
allocation problems. Hence, the first challenge in the cooperative analysis of cost
allocation problems is to explore whether the core of the associated TU-games are
non-empty in general. And if the core of the associated games can be empty, then the
challenge is to explore for the conditions that guarantee the existence of allocations
that satisfy core stability.
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The sequencing problem in Example 1.1.1 also demonstrates the combinatorial
nature of these problems. Given the cost functions of the players involved in a se-
quencing situation, the problem of finding an optimal order that minimizes the total
costs of the grand coalition (or of sub-groups of players) is a combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem. As examples of other studies that focus on the interplay between the
optimization of costs of a project and the allocation of costs among the participants
of the project we mention: minimum cost spanning tree games and spanning network
games (cf. Claus and Kleitman, 1973; Bird, 1976; Megiddo, 1978; Granot and Huber-
man, 1981), linear programming games (cf. Owen, 1975), flow games (cf. Kalai and
Zemel, 1982), traveling salesman games (cf. Potters et al., 1992), Chinese postman
games (cf. Granot et al., 1999), sequencing games (cf. Curiel et al., 1989) and project
games (cf. Estevez-Fernandez et al., 2007). This kind of problems have been baptized
as operations research games in the survey Borm et al. (2001).
1.2 Overview
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the analysis of cost allocation problems arising from specific
sequencing situations. In sequencing situations, there exists a set of clients each
having one job to be processed on a (number of) machine(s). The clients incur costs
that depend on the completion time of their jobs. Assuming that there is an initial
order on the jobs, two problems arise in these situations: How to find an optimal
processing order which minimizes the total costs and how to distribute these cost
savings obtained by changing the initial order to an optimal order in a fair way. Game
theoretic analysis of this “fairness” problem in sequencing situations was initiated by
Curiel et al. (1989). This study considered one machine sequencing situations and
tackled the problem of the distribution of the maximal cost savings by analyzing
the corresponding cooperative sequencing games. It was shown that these games are
convex and hence balanced, i.e, there are allocations of the cost savings which are
stable in the sense that no coalition of clients can receive a larger payoff by rearranging
the position of their own jobs in an admissible way. Moreover, Curiel et al. (1989)
proposed an allocation rule, the so called equal gain splitting rule for these one-
machine sequencing situations and provided an axiomatical characterization of this
rule. The following studies in this strand of literature have extended the basic model
by considering restrictions on the jobs (e.g., ready times, due dates), by allowing more
general cost functions for the clients or by considering multiple-machine sequencing
situations. A common feature of all these studies is that the analysis is restricted to
manufacturing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a
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time. However, in many manufacturing/service systems, operations are carried out
by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs.
In Section 2.1, we extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation
problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch ma-
chines. First, we consider batch sequencing situations: sequencing situations which
consist of a single batch machine where the batch machine’s capacity is defined as
the maximum number of jobs that can be processed at any one time. It is shown
that the cooperative games corresponding to batch sequencing situations are convex
and an expression for the Shapley value of these games is provided. We also consider
extensions of the equal gain splitting rule and the split core (Hamers et al., 1996) for
these sequencing situations and provide axiomatic characterizations of these solution
concepts. Second, we analyze relaxed batch sequencing games by considering relax-
ations in the notion of admissibility of reorderings and prove that these games are
also balanced. Third, we analyze various aspects of flow-shop sequencing situations
which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we provide two cases in which
the cooperative game arising from the flow-shop sequencing situation is equal to the
game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to one specific machine in
the flow-shop.
Another common assumption in the analysis of sequencing games as initiated by
Curiel et al. (1989) is that no set-up time (i.e, the delays required for reconfiguration
or preparation of a machine or a system) is incurred prior to the processing of the
jobs. This assumption requires that set-up times are negligible or can be included
in processing times. However, in real industry, if a machine has to manufacture
different types of products, then a significant set-up time is almost always required
(See for example Pinedo, 2005). Moreover, recent studies in the scheduling literature
show that explicit incorporation of set-up times in scheduling decisions results in
tremendous cost savings (See Allahverdi et al., 2008).
In Section 2.2, we analyze the cost allocation problems arising from so-called fam-
ily sequencing situations. In family sequencing situations, jobs are partitioned into
families according to their similarities. A job does not require a set-up when following
another job from the same family. A set-up time, known as a family set-up time, is
required when a job follows a member of some other family. Family sequencing situ-
ations have gained considerable attention in the scheduling literature and we refer to
Allahverdi et al. (2008) for a review of this literature. Following the ideas in Curiel
et al. (1989), we associate cooperative games with family sequencing situations by
defining the worth of a coalition as the maximum savings it can obtain by means of
an admissible rearrangement. We show that the cooperative games associated with
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family sequencing problems have non-empty cores. This result is obtained by showing
that a specific marginal vector of the game is a core element.
In Chapter 3 we analyze cost allocation problems arising from connection prob-
lems, i.e., economic settings in which a set of agents wishes to collaborate and jointly
invest in the construction/maintenance of a common network. We look at two such
problems in particular: minimum cost spanning tree problems, which consider a set of
agents each of whom has to establish a connection to a source and highway problems
which consider a set of agents each of whom has to establish a connection between a
starting point and a destination point.
Imagine a group of villagers that has to construct and pay pipelines from their
respective houses to a water supplier. Each villager could choose to build a direct
link to the supplier, but such a decision would likely be highly inefficient. Instead, it
may be cheaper for some villagers to connect directly to the supplier, whereas others
could connect indirectly via links to neighboring villagers. Indeed, in these situa-
tions a configuration of links that minimizes the total cost of connection is provided
by a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) and hence these situations are called mcst
situations. Once the agents in a mcst situation agree on which mcst to construct,
the second problem they jointly face is the allocation of the costs of this mcst in a
fair way. This type of cost allocation problems was first introduced in the economics
literature by Claus and Kleitman (1973). The seminal paper by Bird (1976) pro-
vided the first game theoretical treatment of this problem by associating a coalitional
game with transferable utility to mcst problems. Many division rules have been pro-
posed in the literature as appropriate cost allocations for mcst problems. Recently, it
has been shown that the equal remaining obligations rule (Feltkamp et al., 1994) for
mcst problems satisfies many appealing properties (e.g., cost monotonicity, popula-
tion monotonicity, equal treatment) and can be obtained with different approaches.
Moreover, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) showed that other rules in the litera-
ture fail to satisfy some properties that are satisfied by the equal remaining obligations
rule.
The original definition of equal remaining obligations rule by Feltkamp et al.
(1994) consists of a step-by-step procedure: Kruskal’s algorithm (Kruskal, 1956) is
employed to construct an mcst and at each step of the algorithm the cost of the
constructed edge is divided among agents who make use of the edge with respect to
a prespecified scheme. In Section 3.2, we present a new approach to obtain the equal
remaining obligations rule and hence provide yet another support for this important
rule. For this aim, first, we define the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure
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which leads to an mcst for the problem and also a cost sharing allocation where each
agent pays the edge which he chose to construct in the procedure. Then, we show
that the equal remaining obligations rule can be obtained as the average of the cost
allocations provided by a vertex oriented construct and charge procedure for each
order of players. Moreover, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we investigate the extensions
of the results obtained in Section 3.2 for minimum cost spanning forest situations
(cf. Rosenthal, 1987) and mcst situations with two sources, respectively. For both of
these situations, we first show that both Kruskal’s algorithm and the vertex oriented
construct and charge procedure can be defined in a way that they yield efficient
algorithms. Second, we extend the definition of equal remaining obligations rule to
these multi-source situations and prove that equal remaining obligations rule can
again be obtained as the average of the cost allocations provided by vertex oriented
construct and charge procedures.
Most of the current literature on the allocation of costs in connection problems
focuses on the mcst problems or its variants. A common feature of these problems is
that each agent in the problem has to establish a connection with a nonempty subset
of the available sources in the network. However, in some connection situations, there
is no particular point that every agent in the problem has to be connected to. For
example, the users of a highway network need a connection only between their entry
and exit points in the network.
Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006) address the problem of fair allocation of the con-
struction costs of a highway network. For this aim, they formally consider high-
way problems and analyze the corresponding cooperative cost games called highway
games. In a highway problem, the possibilities regarding the construction of the high-
way network are determined by a connected graph. The set of vertices of the graph
represents the potential entry and exit points and the edges in the graph represent the
possible highway connections that can be constructed. Given a highway problem, a
corresponding highway game is defined as a cooperative cost game which associates to
each coalition of players the total cost of the cheapest selection of edges in the graph
which connects the entry and exit point of every member of the coalition. Mosquera
and Zarzuelo (2006) restricted attention to highway problems in which the underlying
graph is a tree. In this setting, there is only one path between an entry and exit point.
In Section 3.5, we study highway problems in which the underlying graphs are
weakly cyclic, i.e., connected graphs for which every edge in the graph is contained
in at most one cycle. First, we focus on the question for which class of graphs the
corresponding games are always concave. For this aim, a graph G is defined to be
highway-game concave if for each highway problem in which G is the underlying graph
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the corresponding highway game is concave. We prove that a graph is highway-game
concave if and only if it is weakly triangular. Then we focus on the balancedness of
highway games induced by weakly cyclic graphs. It was shown by Kuipers (1997) that
highway games induced by cyclic graphs need not be balanced in general. However,
we prove that highway games on weakly cyclic graphs are balanced.
In Chapter 4, we consider the formation of coalitions through sequences of binding
bilateral agreements.
Studies on coalition formation in many real-life contexts like voting situations
and international trade negotiations suggest that cooperation of all related parties
can hardly be achieved through simultaneous acceptance of an agreement. Hence, a
basic policy recommendation in these situations is to broaden a coalition step by step
through a sequence of binding bilateral agreements. For a coalition formed through
binding bilateral agreements can grow larger by making use of the commitment/
synergy already attained by the coalition to facilitate the persuasion of one of the
outsider parties to enter the coalition.
Chapter 4 focuses on the formation of coalitions through sequences of binding
bilateral agreements in voting situations. In voting situations, voters’ incentive to
form coalitions arises from their will to increase their power to affect the outcome of
the voting process. If we model these situations by simple transferable utility games
and assume that each voter’s voting power is predicted by an appropriate power index,
then the sequences of binding bilateral agreements which result in the formation of
the grand coalition boils down to the notion of population monotonic path schemes
for simple games. A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a
sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a
scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called
population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition
grows. First, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every
path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at
hand. We show that the existence of veto players, i.e., a subgroup of voters whose
unanimous agreement is necessary to pass a decision, is required for the existence
of population monotonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa. Moreover, a Shapley
path scheme is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that
is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition of the game. We
also show that each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and
only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. We further show
how to extend these results to the probabilistic values, generalizations of the Shapley
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value introduced by Weber (1988).
1.3 Preliminaries on Cooperative Games
This section provides a brief introduction to some basic concepts in cooperative game
theory.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of players. A coalition is a set of players S ⊂ N
and N is sometimes called the grand coalition.
A cooperative transferable utility game (a TU-game) in characteristic function form
is a pair (N, v) where v is a mapping, v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. For any coalition
S ⊂ N , v(S) is called the worth of coalition S and is interpreted as the optimal
monetary amount the coalition S can jointly generate on itself without any help of
players in N\S. Given a TU-game (N, v) and S ∈ 2N , the restriction of v to S (a
subgame of v) is denoted by v|S and is defined by v|S(T ) = v(T ) for every T ⊂ S. We
denote the set of TU-games with player set N by GN .
A TU-game can reflect rewards or costs. A reward game will be denoted by a
map v and a cost game will be denoted by a map c. The following definitions and
properties refer to reward games.
A game v ∈ GN is monotonic if v(T ) ≥ v(S) for every S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T ; it
is called superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N with T ∩ S = ∅
and it is called convex if a player’s marginal contribution does not decrease if he
joins a larger coalition, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) for every i ∈ N
and S, T ⊂ N\{i} with S ⊂ T . Equivalently, a TU-game v ∈ GN is convex if
v(T ) + v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ S) + v(T ∩ S) for every S, T ⊂ N .
An element x ∈ RN is called an allocation. We say that x ∈ RN is an imputation
if it satisfies the following two properties:
(i) Efficiency :
∑
i∈N xi = v(N).
(ii) Individual rationality : xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N .
The core (Gillies, 1953) of a TU-game v ∈ GN is denoted by Core(v) and is
defined as the set of efficient payoff vectors for which no coalition has an incentive
to split off from the grand coalition, i.e., Core(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2
N}.
A balanced set B is a collection of subsets S of N with the property that there
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for every balanced set B and for every corresponding set of weights (λS)S∈B. Bon-
dereva (1963) and Shapley (1967) independently proved that a TU-game v ∈ GN is
balanced if and only if its core is nonempty. It is well-known that convex games are
balanced and hence have nonempty cores. A game is said to be totally balanced if
every subgame is balanced, i.e., every subgame has a nonempty core.
An order on the set of players is a bijection σ : N → {1, ..., n}. We denote the set
of all orders on N by Π(N). Given an order σ ∈ Π(N) the set of predecessors of a
player i ∈ N with respect to σ is defined as P (σ, i) = {j ∈ N |σ(j) < σ(i)}. Similarly,
the set of successors of i with respect to σ is defined as S(σ, i) = {j ∈ N |σ(j) > σ(i)}.
We denote by P̄ (σ, i) and S̄(σ, i), the sets P (σ, i)∪{i} and S(σ, i)∪{i}, respectively.
The marginal vector of (N, v) corresponding to order σ ∈ Π(N), mσ(v) is defined
to be the vector with ith coordinate equal to v(P̄ (σ, i)) − v(P (σ, i)).
A coalition S ⊂ N is called connected with respect to σ if for all i, j ∈ S and
k ∈ N such that σ(i) < σ(k) < σ(j) it holds that k ∈ S. We denote with con(σ) the
set of coalitions that are connected with respect to σ. For a coalition S, S\σ is the
set of σ-components of S, a σ-component of S being a maximally connected subset
of S with respect to σ.
Let σ ∈ Π(N). We call a TU-game (N, v) σ-component additive if it satisfies the
following three conditions:
(i) v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,




Le Breton et al. (1992) showed that σ−component additive games are balanced.
For any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}, the unanimity game uS is defined by uS(T ) = 1 if
S ⊂ T and uS(T ) = 0 for all other coalitions T . It is well known that every cooperative









|S|−|T |v(T ) for every S ⊂ N (cf. Shapley, 1953).
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A function F : GN → RN is called a value. A value F is efficient if for all v ∈ GN ,
∑
i∈N Fi(v) = v(N). A player i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) if v(S ∪{i}) = v(S) for
every S ⊂ N\{i}. F is said to satisfy the null player property if for any v ∈ GN and
any null player i ∈ N in v, Fi(v) = 0. F is said to satisfy the null player out property
(cf. Derks and Haller, 1999) if elimination of a null player does not affect the value
of the other players, i.e., Fi(v) = Fi(v|N\{j}) for all i, j ∈ N and all v ∈ G
N such that
j is a null player in v and i 6= j.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is one of the most important solution concepts
in cooperative game theory and has been studied extensively. The Shapley value of
a game can be calculated by making use of the decomposition of a cooperative game
into unanimity games. More precisely, given a cooperative game (N, v) such that
v =
∑







for every i ∈ N .
An allocation scheme specifies how to distribute the worth of every coalition among





for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Naturally, every efficient value for TU-games defines an
allocation scheme where the allocation for every coalition is obtained by applying the
value to the corresponding subgame. The allocation scheme in which the Shapley
value is used as an allocation vector is called the Shapley allocation scheme.
Sprumont (1990) introduced the notion of population monotonic allocation schemes.
The notion of population monotonicity requires that the share allocated to every
player increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger. Formally, an allo-
cation scheme (xS)S∈2N\{∅} for the game v ∈ G




for every S, T ⊂ N such that S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.
Observe that if (xS)S∈2N\{∅} is a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS),
then xS is a core element of the corresponding subgame v|S (cf. Sprumont, 1990) for
every S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
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for every S ⊂ N .
Consequently, the properties and solution concepts for cooperative cost games can
be derived from the definitions given above. The equivalent of a superadditive game
for a cost game is a subadditive game. A cost game is concave if and only if its




In this chapter, which is based on Çiftçi et al. (2008) and Çiftçi et al. (2009a), we
consider cost allocation problems arising from specific types of sequencing situations.
Game theoretic analysis of the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing
situations is initiated by Curiel et al. (1989) . This study considered one machine
sequencing situations in which a finite number of agents, each having one job, are
queued in front of a machine waiting for their jobs to be processed. Agents have
linear cost functions and each group of agents is allowed to obtain cost savings by
reordering their jobs. The problem of the distribution of the maximal cost savings
is tackled by analyzing corresponding cooperative sequencing games. It was shown
that these games are convex and hence balanced. Curiel et al. (1989) also proposed
the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule for these one-machine sequencing situations and
provided an axiomatical characterization of this rule.
The following studies in this strand of literature have extended the basic model by
considering ready times (Hamers et al., 1995) , due dates (Borm et al., 2002) , prece-
dence relations (Hamers et al., 2005) and controllable processing times (van Velzen,
2006). In each of these papers, convexity of the corresponding class of games or of
some special sub-classes is established. Curiel et al. (1993) considered a larger class
of sequencing situations by allowing more general cost functions for the agents. It was
shown that these games are not convex in general but core elements do exist. The
β-rule was proposed as an extension of the EGS rule. This rule was shown to yield
outcomes in the core of the corresponding games. Hamers et al. (1996) introduced
the split core, a generalization of the EGS rule and provided an axiomatical charac-
terization. Other papers have investigated multiple-machine sequencing situations.
van den Nouweland et al. (1992) considered sequencing situations in flow-shops while
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Hamers et al. (1999) and Slikker (2005) studied sequencing situations with multiple
parallel machines.
The manufacturing/service systems considered in all studies above consist only
of machines which can process no more than one job at a time. Although these
models are realistic for many existing manufacturing systems, there are also various
systems which include batch machines: machines that can simultaneously process
multiple jobs (a batch) subject to the capacity of the machine. Typically, the capac-
ity of a batch machine is related to the number, weight or size of jobs placed in a
batch. Transportation of the semi-finished jobs from one machine to another or the
delivery of the finished jobs to the customers/warehouses (cf. Lee and Chen, 2001)
constitute very common examples of batch machines in manufacturing systems since
transporters, i.e., the machines in these operations usually carry a batch of jobs at the
same time. Other well-known examples include heat-treat ovens which can process
multiple jobs with the same processing requirement (temperature, processing time
etc.) simultaneously in a batch (cf. Lee et al., 1992) and also numerically controlled
(NC) routers which cut a stack of metal sheets simultaneously during the cutting op-
eration (cf. Ahmadi et al., 1992). We refer to Webster and Baker (1995) and Potts
and Kovalyov (2000) for a review of the scheduling literature on batch sequencing.
In Section 2.1, we present a first game theoretical analysis of sequencing situations
with batch machines. From Section 2.1.1 to Section 2.1.4, we consider batch sequenc-
ing situations. In a batch sequencing situation, a machine’s capacity is the maximum
number of jobs that can be processed at any one time and it is assumed that the
time required to process the jobs in any batch is fixed and independent of the number
of the jobs in the batch. We introduce in Section 2.1.1 batch sequencing situations
with a single batch machine. These situations give rise to the class of so-called batch
sequencing games. It is shown in Section 2.1.2 that these games are convex. In partic-
ular, we show that these games can be written as a non-negative linear combination
of unanimity games. This observation also leads to an expression for the Shapley
value of these games. We consider extensions of the equal gain splitting rule and the
split core and provide axiomatic characterizations of these solution concepts by using
efficiency, symmetry and consistency axioms along the lines of Suijs et al. (1997) and
Gerichhausen and Hamers (2008).
Our definition of batch sequencing games follows the standard approach of Curiel
et al. (1989) and assumes that the worth of a coalition is the maximal cost sav-
ings that it can obtain by “admissible” rearrangements of its members’ positions in
the queue. In an admissible rearrangement, two members of a coalition who have
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a non-member between them may not change positions. The rationale behind this
assumption is that, since an initial order of jobs is established, the non-members who
are placed in between two members of a coalition have the right to object to these
two players jumping over them. Curiel et al. (1993) argued that the set of admissible
rearrangements is too restrictive because a player may not object other players jump-
ing over him if he is not hurt by this change. For the classical sequencing situations
involving machines that can process only one job at a time, van Velzen and Hamers
(2003) and Slikker (2006) considered relaxed sequencing games by considering specific
relaxations of the set of admissible rearrangements and focused on the balancedness
of the corresponding sequencing games. Similarly, we consider in Section 2.1.3 relaxed
batch sequencing games which allow for rearrangements in which two members of a
coalition can switch places by jumping over non-members. The non-members are not
hurt by such rearrangements since the completion time of a batch is independent of
the jobs placed in the batch. We show that these games can be written as a sum of
specific assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik, 1972) and hence are balanced. It
is also seen that relaxed batch sequencing games are not convex in general.
In Section 2.1.4 we consider batch sequencing situations in flow-shops which con-
sist of a sequence of finitely many batch machines. We show that when each batch
machine has the same batch size or when each batch machine has the same batch
processing time, the associated cooperative batch sequencing game is equal to the
batch sequencing game corresponding one particular batch machine in the flow-shop.
Hence, the games corresponding to these two special classes are convex. However, it is
also shown that the games corresponding to batch sequencing situations in flow-shops
are not convex in general.
Many practical scheduling/sequencing situations involve set-up times, i.e., the
intermediate delays between processing of successive jobs required to prepare the
machine for the following job (e.g., delays required to change/adjust tooling or to clean
a machine). A common assumption in the analysis of sequencing games as initiated
by Curiel et al. (1989) is that no set-up time is incurred prior to the processing
of the jobs. This assumption requires that set-up times are negligible or can be
included in processing times. However, recent studies in the scheduling literature
show that explicit incorporation of set-up times in scheduling decisions results in
tremendous cost savings in various real world manufacturing/service systems that
are characterized by significant set-up times. We refer to Allahverdi et al. (1999)
and Allahverdi et al. (2008) for a review of the scheduling literature with set-up
considerations.
In particular, so-called family sequencing problems have received considerable
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attention in the scheduling literature with set-up considerations1. These problems
consider situations where the jobs can be classified into distinct families with respect
to their production requirements such as the required tooling or container size. Since
the members of the same family have the same production requirements, a job does
not require a set-up when following another job from the same family, but a “family
set-up time” is required when it follows a member of another family. An example of
a specific application of family sequencing problems is a production line of colored
plastics (cf. Potts and Van Wassenhove, 1992). Customer orders can be divided into
color groups. A set-up is required when switching from a job of one color to a job of
another color.
In Section 2.2, we analyze the cost allocation problems arising from family se-
quencing problems. Similarly to Curiel et al. (1989), we assume that there exists
an initial order on the jobs and associate cooperative games with family sequencing
problems by defining the worth of a coalition as the maximum savings it can obtain
by means of an admissible rearrangement. We show that family sequencing games are
balanced. This result is obtained by showing that the marginal which corresponds to
the initial order belongs to the core of the game. It is also seen that the corresponding
games need not be convex in general.
2.1 Batch Sequencing and Cooperation
In this section, we consider the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situa-
tions with batch machines. Section 2.1.1 describes batch sequencing situations with a
single batch machine. Section 2.1.2 introduces and analyzes the corresponding batch
sequencing games. Section 2.1.3 analyzes relaxed batch sequencing games. Section
2.1.4 introduces and analyzes flow-shop batch sequencing situations and correspond-
ing games.
2.1.1 Batch Sequencing Situations
In a batch sequencing situation a finite number of agents, each having one job, are
queued in front of a single batch machine, waiting for their jobs to be processed. The
set of agents is denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The machine can process one batch of
jobs at one time. At most z ∈ Z++ jobs can be placed in one batch. Each batch
is processed in t time units which is independent of the number of jobs placed in
1See Potts and Van Wassenhove (1992), Webster and Baker (1995) and Liaee and Emmons (1997)
for a review of scheduling literature on family sequencing problems.
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the batch. We assume that there is an initial order σ0 ∈ Π(N) on the agents before
the processing of the machine starts. Specifically, σ0(i) = j means that agent i is in
position j. For each agent i ∈ N , the costs of spending time in the system is assumed
to be linear and the corresponding cost function ci : R+ → R is defined by ci(k) = αik
with αi > 0.
A batch sequencing situation is denoted by Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) where σ0 ∈
Π(N), α = (αi)i∈N ∈ R
N
++, z ∈ Z++ and t ∈ R++.
In a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t), it can easily be observed
that as long as there is a sufficient number of jobs to fill up a batch, it is profitable
to run full batches of size z on the machine. Hence, the first z jobs are placed in
the first batch to be processed by the machine, the following z jobs are placed in






gives the number of the batch that the job of agent i is placed in2.







The total costs of all agents if the jobs are processed according to the order σ
equal
∑
i∈N αiC(σ, i). By reordering the jobs with respect to σ0 the total costs can
be reduced. Since the number of possible orderings of jobs is finite, there exists
an order for which total costs are minimized. We call such an order optimal. The
following proposition establishes the optimality of an HWCF (highest waiting cost
first) order: a processing order in which jobs are processed in nonincreasing order of
cost parameters αi.
Proposition 2.1.1 An HWCF order is optimal for every batch sequencing situation.
Proposition 2.1.1 is a direct consequence of the independence of the batch process-
ing time from the composition of each batch and can be proved by using a straight-
forward argument based on adjacent pairwise interchanges. Notice that the optimal
order is unique up to reorderings of the jobs in the same batch and up to reorderings
of the jobs of the agents with the same cost parameter.
2.1.2 Batch Sequencing Games
For a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t), the costs of a coalition S
with respect to a processing order σ equal
∑
i∈S αiC(σ, i). We want to determine the
maximal cost savings of a coalition S when its members decide to cooperate. For
this aim, we have to define which reorderings of the jobs of coalition S are admissible
2⌈q⌉ denotes the smallest integer which is greater than or equal to q for any real number q ∈ R.
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with respect to the initial order. In this section, we follow the approach of Curiel
et al. (1989) and assume that an order σ is admissible for S with respect to σ0 if
P (σ, j) = P (σ0, j) for all j ∈ N\S. The set of admissible reorderings of a coalition
S is denoted by A(S).
The value of a coalition S is defined as the maximum cost savings coalition S can
achieve by means of an admissible reordering. Formally, the batch sequencing game


















for every S ⊂ N .
Clearly, batch sequencing games are monotonic and superadditive. Notice that,
by definition of an admissible ordering, a coalition S can obtain cost savings only by
changing positions within σ0-components. Hence, the value of a coalition S is equal




further that one-person coalitions can not generate any cost savings, i.e., v({i}) = 0
for every i ∈ N . So, batch sequencing games are σ0-component additive and hence
they are balanced.
In the following, we will denote by σS ∈ Π(N) an ordering which is attained from
σ0 by reordering the members in each σ0-component of a coalition S with respect to
the HWCF rule, i.e., σS(i) = σ0(i) for every i ∈ N\S and σS(i) < σS(j) for every
T ∈ S\σ0 and every i, j ∈ T such that αi > αj. Clearly, σS ∈ A(S). Moreover,
it follows by Proposition 2.1.1 and the σ0-component additivity of batch sequencing















for every S ⊂ N .
Example 2.1.1 Consider the batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) where
N = {1, 2, ..., 7}, z = 2, α = (1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12) and t = 1. Assume that σ0 is given by
σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N and consider the coalition S = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7}. It can easily
















= α2(1 − 2) + α3(2 − 1) + α5(3 − 4) + α6(3 − 3) + α7(4 − 3) = 5.
⋄
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 σ0
1 3 2 4 7 6 5 σS
Figure 2.1: The orders σ0 and σS in Example 2.1.1
In the following, we will show that batch sequencing games can be written as a
nonnegative linear combination of unanimity games. For this aim, we first need the
following notation and two lemmas.
Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and let (N, v) be the
corresponding batch sequencing game. For any coalition T ⊂ N , we will denote the
member of T which stands in front of the other members of T with respect to σ0 by
f(T ) and the member which stands behind the other members of T by l(T ), i.e.,
f(T ) = argmini∈T σ0(i) and l(T ) = argmaxi∈T σ0(i).
For every agent i ∈ N and an order σ ∈ Π(N), the number of the batch that the job






= k. Also we denote by (N, vσS) the batch sequencing game corresponding
to the batch sequencing situation (N, σS, α, z, t) for any S ⊂ N .
Lemma 2.1.1 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and T, S ⊂
N such that S ⊂ T . Then,
v(T ) = v(S) + vσS(T ).
Proof.


























































where the second equality follows from the fact that σ0(i) = σS(i) for every i ∈ T\S.
¤
We will also make use of the following lemma, proved by Borm et al. (2002),
which explicitly describes the coefficients in the unique linear decomposition of a
σ0-component additive game into unanimity games.
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Lemma 2.1.2 (Borm et al., 2002, Proposition 1) Let (N, v) be a σ0-component
additive game and let
∑
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition of (N, v) into unanimity
games. Then, for every coalition S ⊂ N
λS =
{
v(S) − v(S\{f(S)}) − v(S\{l(S)}) + v(S\{f(S), l(S)}), if S ∈ con(σ0),
0, otherwise.
In the following proposition, we show that in case of batch sequencing games the
formula provided by Lemma 2.1.2 boils down to an expression in terms of the differ-
ences between certain players’ waiting cost parameters. More specifically, Proposition
2.1.2 reveals that the coefficient of a connected coalition S is equal to the sum of dif-
ferences between the weight of the last player of a batch with respect to σS and the
weight of the first player of the subsequent batch with respect to σS over all batches
that are crossed by both the first and the last players of S with respect to σ0 when
the order changes from σ0 to σS.
Proposition 2.1.2 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation. Let
(N, v) be the corresponding batch sequencing game and let
∑
S⊂N λSuS be the linear













(kz+1)), if bσS(l(S)) < bσS(f(S)),
0, otherwise.
Proof. Let S ⊂ N be a connected coalition with respect to σ0. Let us denote f(S)
by i, l(S) by j and S\{f(S), l(S)} by S ′. By using Lemmas 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we obtain
λS = v(S) − v(S\{i}) − v(S\{j}) + v(S
′),
= (vσS\{i}(S) + v(S\{i})) − v(S\{i}) − (vσS′ (S\{j}) + v(S
′)) + v(S ′),
= vσS\{i}(S) − vσS′ (S\{j}).

































(kz+1) for every k such that bσ0(i) ≤ k <



















(kz+1) for all k such that bσS (j) ≤ k < bσS (i). But, then λS = 0.
Assume now that bσS(j) < bσS(i). Observe that bσS(i) is either equal to bσS\{j}(i)



























(kz+1) for every k such that bσS(j) ≤ k < bσS(i).
Assume lastly that bσS(i) = bσS\{j}(i) + 1. Let’s denote bσS\{j}(i) by k̄. Then,
obviously, αi = ασ−1
S
































We illustrate the expression provided by Proposition 2.1.2 in the following exam-
ple.
Example 2.1.2 Take the batch sequencing situation Γ(N) considered in Example
2.1.1. Let (N, v) be the batch sequencing game corresponding to Γ(N) and consider
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 σ0
6 5 4 3 2 1 7 σS
Figure 2.2: The orders σ0 and σS in Example 2.1.2
the coalition S = {1, 2, ..., 6}. We will calculate λS, the coefficient corresponding to S
in the decomposition of (N, v) into unanimity games. Obviously, f(S) = 1, l(S) = 6
and σS = (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 7) (See Figure 2.2).
Observe that the job of agent 1 is processed in the third batch and the job of
agent 6 is processed in the first batch with respect to σS. That is bσS(l(S)) =










= (α5 − α4) + (α3 − α2) = (8 − 6) + (4 − 3) = 3.
The whole decomposition of (N, v) into unanimity games is provided below:
v = u{2,3} + 2u{4,5} + 3u{6,7} + 2u{1,2,3} + 2u{2,3,4} + 2u{3,4,5} + u{4,5,6} + u{5,6,7}
+u{1,2,3,4} + 3u{2,3,4,5} + 2u{3,4,5,6} + 5u{4,5,6,7} + 4uN\{6,7} + 3uN\{1,7}
+3uN\{1,2} + 3uN\{7} + 6uN\{1} + 5uN .
⋄
Proposition 2.1.2 reveals that batch sequencing games are nonnegative combinations
of unanimity games. Since unanimity games are convex, this establishes the convexity
of the batch sequencing games. As a side result, we also obtain an expression of the
Shapley value of batch sequencing games.
Theorem 2.1.1 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and let
(N, v) be the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then,
(i) (N, v) is convex.
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In the remainder of this section, we introduce and characterize a non-aggregated
equal gain splitting (EGS) solution and a non-aggregated split core (SPC) for batch
sequencing situations. Non-aggregated solutions, which are first introduced by Suijs
et al. (1997) for classical sequencing situations, can be considered as a specification of
all components of the total reward an agent obtains. In our setting, a non-aggregated
solution Ψ is a map assigning to each batch sequencing situation Γ(N) a matrix
W ∈ RN×N+ , where an element wij of W represents the nonnegative gain assigned
to agent i for cooperating with agent j. The aggregated solution corresponding to
W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)) can be found by multiplying W with the vector eN of all ones in RN .
Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and (N, v) be the cor-
responding batch sequencing game. Also let
∑
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition
of (N, v) into unanimity games. For any i, j ∈ N , let [i, j] be the set of all players in
between i and j with respect to σ0, i.e.,
[i, j] = {k ∈ N |min{σ0(i), σ0(j)} ≤ σ0(k) ≤ max{σ0(i), σ0(j)}} .
The non-aggregated equal gain splitting solution EGS assigns to each batch sequenc-




for every i, j ∈ N .
Example 2.1.3 Consider the batch sequencing situation of Example 2.1.1. Recall
that the decomposition of the corresponding batch sequencing game into unanimity
games is provided in Example 2.1.2. By making use of this decomposition, the equal











































































The non-aggregated split core SPC assigns to each batch sequencing situation
Γ(N) a nonempty subset SPC(Γ(N)) ⊂ RN×N+ such that
GS(Γ(N))ij + GS(Γ(N))ji = λ[i,j]
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for each gain splitting matrix GS(Γ(N)) ∈ SPC(Γ(N)) and every i, j ∈ N .
Now we introduce the notions of dummy agents and reduced batch sequencing
situations that will be used for the axiomatizations of the EGS solution and the SPC
for batch sequencing situations.
Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation. An agent i ∈ N is
called a dummy agent in Γ(N) if b(i) = bσS(i) for every S ⊂ N with i ∈ S, i.e., job of
agent i stays in its initial batch no matter which coalition of agents i cooperates with.
Roughly speaking, a batch sequencing situation reduced to a connected coalition
S ∈ con(σ0) is a batch sequencing situation obtained when the agents outside S are
replaced with dummy agents. Formally, a reduced batch sequencing situation with
respect to S is described by Γ|S(N) = (N, σ0, β, z, t) where β = (βi)i∈N ∈ R
N
+ is such
that βi = αi for every i ∈ S and
βj =
{




, if j > l(S),
for every agent j ∈ N\S.
Let Ψ be a non-aggregated solution for batch sequencing situations. We consider
the following three properties of Ψ.






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σN , i)) ,
for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N).
• Symmetry: Ψ is symmetric if Ψ(Γ(N)) is a symmetric matrix for all batch
sequencing situations Γ(N).
• Consistency: Ψ is consistent if for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N) and
all S ∈ con(σ0) the following is satisfied:
Ψ(Γ(N))ij = Ψ(Γ|S(N))ij for every i, j ∈ S.
The efficiency axiom states that the total amount allocated to the agents is equal
to the maximal total cost savings that the agents can jointly obtain. Symmetry
states that the (extra) gain two agents can obtain is equally divided among the two
agents. Consistency states that connected coalitions obtain the same division if they
renegotiate on the basis of the same solution concept to the reduced situation with
outside dummies.
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In Theorem 2.1.2 we will characterize the EGS solution with the three properties
mentioned above. For the proof, we need the following lemma which states that, for
non-aggregate solutions that satisfy both efficiency and consistency, the total amount
allocated to connected coalitions must be equal to the maximal total cost savings
that these coalitions can achieve.
Lemma 2.1.3 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and let Ψ







αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS , i)) ,
for every S ∈ con(σ0).






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS , i)) .






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS , i)) ,
since all agents outside S are dummy agents in Γ|S(N). On the other hand, consis-





















since Ψ(Γ|S(N))ij ≥ 0 for every i, j ∈ N .






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS , i)) .
Clearly, S 6= N and there exists S1, S2 ∈ con(σ0) ∪ {∅} such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and












αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σT , i)) ,
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where the equality follows from Ψ being efficient and the inequality follows from the


















αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS2 , i)) .




i∈S αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS, i)) leads to a contradiction. ¤
Theorem 2.1.2 The EGS solution is the unique non-aggregated solution satisfying
efficiency, symmetry and consistency.
Proof. Obviously, EGS satisfies efficiency, symmetry and consistency.
Now let Ψ be a nonempty solution which satisfies efficiency, symmetry and con-
sistency. Pick a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t). We will show that
Ψ(Γ(N))ij is uniquely determined for every i, j ∈ N with induction to the number
|σ0(j) − σ0(i)|.
Pick i, j ∈ N . Assume first that |σ0(j)−σ0(i)| = 0. Then, i = j and Ψ(Γ(N))ij =
0 = EGS(Γ(N))ij by Lemma 2.1.3. Now, assume that Ψ(Γ(N))ij = EGS(Γ(N))ij for
every i, j ∈ N with |σ0(j)− σ0(i)| ≤ k for some k ∈ {0, ..., n− 2}. Pick i, j ∈ N such
that |σ0(j) − σ0(i)| = k + 1. Let S = [i, j]. Then,
Ψ(Γ(N))ij + Ψ(Γ(N))ji =
∑
i∈S











where the first equality follows from Lemma 2.1.3 and the second equality follows
from the fact that |σ0(p) − σ0(r)| ≤ k for every (p, r) ∈ S × S\{(i, j), (j, i)} and the
induction assumption.
Then Ψ(Γ(N))ij +Ψ(Γ(N))ji is determined uniquely. Consequently, by symmetry,
Ψ is uniquely determined and hence Ψ(Γ(N)) = EGS(Γ(N)). ¤
We show in the following proposition that, for every batch sequencing situation
Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t), the aggregated EGS solution EGS(Γ(N)) · e
N is equal to the
average of the two marginal vectors of the batch sequencing game corresponding to
Γ(N), the one belonging to the initial order σ0 and the one belonging to the inverse
order of σ0.
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Proposition 2.1.3 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and
let (N, v) be the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then,











S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition of (N, v) into unanimity games
































= EGS(Γ(N))i · e
N ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that λT = 0 for every T ⊂ N which
is not connected with respect to σ0. ¤
Comparing the aggregated version of the EGS rule with the Shapley value of
batch sequencing games, we see that while the Shapley value takes the average of
all the marginal vectors of the game, the aggregated version of the EGS rule takes
the average of only two marginals. Since batch sequencing games are convex, each
marginal of these games belongs to the core. Hence, as we highlight in the following
theorem, EGS(Γ(N)) · eN belongs to the core of batch sequencing games.
Theorem 2.1.3 Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and let
(N, v) be the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then, EGS(Γ(N)) · eN belongs to
the core of (N, v).
Now we turn to a characterization of the non-aggregated split core SPC. Let
D(Γ(N)) be the set of dummy players in a batch sequencing situation Γ(N). Let Ψ
be a non-aggregated solution concept that assigns to each batch sequencing situation
Γ(N) a non-empty subset of RN×N+ . Consider the following three axioms for Ψ.






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σN , i)) ,
for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N) and all W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)).
• Consistency: Ψ is consistent if for all batch sequencing situations Γ(N), all
W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)) and all S ∈ con(σ0) the following is satisfied:
There exists W ′ ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)) such that Wij = W
′
ij for every i, j ∈ S.
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• Converse consistency: Ψ is converse consistent if for all batch sequencing






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σN , i))
the following statement is true:
If for every S ∈ con(σ0)\N with D(Γ(N)) ( D(Γ|S(N)) there exists
W ′ ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)) such that Wij = W
′
ij for every i, j ∈ S, then W ∈
Ψ(Γ(N)).
The efficiency and the consistency properties are the extensions of their previous
definitions to the case of a correspondence. Converse consistency means that if each
restriction of a feasible gain splitting matrix (a matrix which allocates the maximal
cost savings to the agents) to a connected coalition of agents coincides with an element
of the solution of the corresponding reduced situation, then this gain splitting matrix
must also be an element of the solution of the original situation. Note that for the
converse consistency property only reductions to connected coalitions that enlarge
the set of dummy players are allowed.
In the following we will characterize the SPC solution with the properties men-
tioned above. For this aim, we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.4 Let Γ(N) be a batch sequencing situation and Ψ be a multi-valued non-
aggregate solution for batch sequencing situations. If Ψ is both efficient and consistent,






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σS , i)) .
The proof runs similar with the proof of Lemma 2.1.3 and hence it is omitted.
Theorem 2.1.4 The non-aggregated split core SPC is the unique non-empty solution
satisfying efficiency, consistency and converse consistency.
Proof. Obviously, SPC satisfies efficiency and consistency. For converse consis-
tency, take a batch sequencing situation Γ(N). Let (N, v) be the batch sequenc-
ing game corresponding to Γ(N) and
∑
S⊂N λSuS be the linear decomposition of




i∈N αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σN , i)) and there exists W
′ ∈ SPC(Γ|S(N)) such that Wij =
W ′ij for every i, j ∈ S for every S ∈ con(σ0)\N with D(Γ(N)) ( D(Γ|S(N)).
Let i = argmini∈N\D(Γ(N))σ0(i) and ī = argmaxi∈N\D(Γ(N))σ0(i). Let S = [i, ī],
S1 = S\{i} and S2 = S\{̄i}. Firstly, by Lemma 2.1.4, Wij = Wji = 0 for every i 6∈ S
and every j ∈ N . Now, consider the reduced batching situations Γ|S1(N) and Γ|S2(N).
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Observe that both D(Γ(N)) ( D(Γ|S1(N)) and D(Γ(N) ( D(Γ|S2(N). Then, there
exists W 1 ∈ SPC(Γ|S1(N)) and W
2 ∈ SPC(Γ|S2(N)) such that Wij = W
1
ij for every
i, j ∈ S1 and Wij = W
2
ij for every i, j ∈ S2. By consistency of SPC we know that
Wij + Wji =
{
W 1ij + W
1
ji = λ[i,j], if i, j ∈ S1,
W 2ij + W
2
ji = λ[i,j], if i, j ∈ S2.
Hence, for all pairs (i, j) except (i, ī) and (̄i, i), Wij + Wji = λ[i,j]. Then, Lemma
2.1.4 implies that Wi,̄i + Wī,i = λ[i,̄i]. Hence, W ∈ SPC(Γ(N)).
Now let Ψ be a nonempty solution which satisfies efficiency, consistency and con-
verse consistency. Pick W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)). We will show that W ∈ SPC(Γ(N)).
Pick i, j ∈ N such that ||σ0(j) − σ0(i)|| = 0. Then, i = j and by Lemma 2.1.4
Wij = Wji = 0 and hence Wij + Wji = λ[i,j]. Now, assume that Wij + Wji = λ[i,j] for
every i, j ∈ N with ||σ0(j) − σ0(i)|| ≤ k for some k ∈ {0, ..., n − 2}. Pick i, j ∈ N
such that ||σ0(j) − σ0(i)|| = k + 1. Let S = [i, j]. Then,
Wij + Wji =
∑
i∈S











where the first equality follows from Lemma 2.1.4; the second equality follows from
the fact that ||σ0(p) − σ0(r)|| ≤ k for every (p, r) ∈ S × S\{(i, j), (j, i)} and the
induction assumption. Therefore W ∈ SPC(Γ(N)). This establishes that Ψ(Γ(N)) ⊂
SPC(Γ(N)).
Now we show that SPC(Γ(N)) ⊂ Ψ(Γ(N)). Pick a batch sequencing situation
Γ(N) and W ∈ SPC(Γ(N)). Since SPC is consistent, for every S ∈ con(σ0), there
exists Y S ∈ SPC(Γ|S(N)) such that Y
S
ij = Wij for every i, j ∈ S. We are going
to show that Y S ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)) by induction on |S|. Assume first that |S| = 1, i.e.,
S = {i} for some i ∈ N . Then, Ψ(Γ|S(N)) = [0] = Y
S since both SPC and Ψ are
efficient.
Now assume that Y S ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)) for every S ∈ con(σ0) with |S| < k and pick S ∈
con(σ0) with |S| = k. Then, pick T ∈ con(σ0). We denote a reduction of Γ|S(N) to T
by Γ|S,T (N). Assume that T ∈ con(σ0) is such that D(Γ|S(N)) ( D(Γ|S,T (N)). First
consider the case T ∩ S 6= ∅. Then, firstly, T 6⊃ S since D(Γ|S(N)) ( D(Γ|S,T (N)).
Since all agents in N\S are dummy agents in Γ|S,T (N), there exists Γ|T∩S(N) a
reduction of Γ(N) to T ∩ S which is equal to Γ|S,T (N). But, then, since |T ∩ S| < k,
Y T∩S ∈ Ψ(Γ|T∩S(N)) = Ψ(Γ|S,T (N)).
Now consider the case T ⊂ N\S. Again since SPC is consistent, for every T ∈
con(σ0) there exists Z




ij for every i, j ∈ T . Then,
since all agents in N\S are dummy agents in Γ|S,T (N), Z
S = [0] = Ψ(Γ|S,T (N)).
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Then for every T ∈ con(σ0) with D(Γ|S(N)) ( D(Γ|S,T (N)), there exists Z ∈
Ψ(Γ|S,T (N)) such that Y
S
ij = Zij for every i, j ∈ T . Then, since Ψ satisfies converse
consistency, Y S ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)).
So, we proved that for every S ∈ con(σ0) such that D(Γ(N)) ( D(Γ|S(N)),
Y S ∈ Ψ(Γ|S(N)). Then, W ∈ Ψ(Γ(N)) since Ψ satisfies converse consistency. So we
can conclude that SPC(Γ(N)) ⊂ Ψ(Γ(N)). ¤
2.1.3 Relaxed Batch Sequencing Games
In Section 2.1.2, we associated with a one machine batch sequencing situation a
cooperative game. The value of a coalition S was defined as the maximal cost savings
which the coalition can obtain by admissible rearrangements, i.e., the rearrangements
which reorder the jobs in each component (with respect to the initial order) of S.
In this section, we introduce and analyze relaxed batch sequencing games, a class
of games arising from batch sequencing situations where a coalition can also obtain
savings by switching positions of agents that belong to different components of the
coalition. We show that relaxed batch sequencing games are equal to the sum of
specific assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik, 1972). Hence, these games are
balanced. However, it is shown that relaxed batch sequencing games are not convex
in general.
Let Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation. While defining the
associated batch sequencing game in the previous section, we adapted the common
assumption in the sequencing games literature and defined the value of a coalition
S as the maximal cost savings that it can obtain by switching places within σ0-
components. The rationale behind this assumption is that a player not in S has the
right to object to jobs in S jumping over him. In classical sequencing situations where
the machine can process only one job at a time and the agents may require different
processing times, a player not in S will certainly object to jobs in S jumping over him
if he will end up with jobs in front of him that have a longer processing time than he
had in the initial order. In batch sequencing situations however, the completion time
of a player outside S is not affected if two players in different σ0-components of S
switch places since the completion time of a batch is independent of the jobs placed
in the batch. Hence, the players outside S may not object to such rearrangements by
S.
In this section, we follow this “optimistic” assumption and introduce relaxed batch
sequencing games which allow for rearrangements in which players that belong to
different σ0-components of a disconnected coalition can switch places. Formally, an
order σ ∈ Π(N) is called R-admissible for coalition S if σ(j) = σ0(j) for all j ∈ N\S.
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We denote the set of R-admissible reorderings for a coalition S by AR(S). Obviously,
A(S) ⊂ AR(S).
By defining the value of a coalition S as the maximum cost savings coalition S can
achieve by means of an R-admissible reordering, we define the relaxed batch sequencing






αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σ, i))
}
, (2.4)
for every S ⊂ N .
Example 2.1.4 Consider the batch sequencing situation given in Example 2.1.1 and
the coalition S = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7}. It can easily be observed that σ∗S = (1, 7, 6, 4, 5, 3, 2)
is an optimal rearrangement for S in AR(S). The orders σ0 and σ
∗
S are depicted in
Figure 2.3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 σ0
1 7 6 4 5 3 2 σ∗S
Figure 2.3: The orders σ0 and σ
∗
S in Example 2.1.4




αi (C(σ0, i) − C(σ
∗
S, i))
= α2(1 − 4) + α3(2 − 3) + α5(3 − 3) + α6(3 − 2) + α7(4 − 1) = 32.
⋄
Clearly, (N, vR) is monotonic and superadditive. Also observe that, for every
coalition S ⊂ N , an order in which the players in S are arranged in order of non-
increasing αi is an optimal admissible order for S. We denote such an order by σ
∗
S.
That is, for every S ⊂ N , σ∗S ∈ Π(N) is such that σ
∗





every i, j ∈ S such that αi > αj.
In the following, we show that every relaxed batch sequencing game can be written
as a sum of specific assignment games. First, we provide a brief review of assignment
games.
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Assignment games arise from bipartitite matching situations and are introduced
by Shapley and Shubik (1972) to model two sided markets with transferable utility.
Let the player set N be the union of two nonempty disjoint sets M1 and M2. For
each i ∈ M1 and j ∈ M2, the value (the joint profit) of a matched pair (i, j) is defined
by aij ≥ 0. From this situation, an assignment game (M1 ∪M2, w) is defined in the
following way. The worth of a coalition S ⊂ N is defined to be the maximum value
that S can obtain by making suitable pairs from its members and pooling the profit.
If S ∩ M1 = ∅ or S ∩ M2 = ∅, no suitable pairs can be made and hence the worth in












for all S ⊂ N , where M(S∩M1, S∩M2) denotes the set of matchings between S∩M1
and S ∩ M2. Also, a matching is called optimal for S if it maximizes the gain of the
coalition S.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) proved that the core of an assignment game (M1 ∪
M2, w) is nonempty.
Theorem 2.1.5 (Shapley and Shubik, 1972, Theorem 2) Let (M1 ∪ M2, w) be
an assignment game. Then Core(w) 6= ∅.
Let (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation. For any coalition S ⊂ N and





− 1}, we denote by L(S, k) the set of players in S which
are placed in batch k or in the batches in front of batch k with respect to the initial
order σ0, i.e., L(S, k) = {i ∈ S|bσ0(i) ≤ k}. We denote by U(S, k) the set of players in
S which are placed in batches behind batch k, i.e., U(S, k) = {i ∈ S|bσ0(i) > k}. Also
let aij = max{0, αj−αi} for every i ∈ L(N, k) and every j ∈ U(N, k). For every batch





− 1}, we call the assignment game (L(N, k)∪U(N, k), wk) the
kth assignment game associated with the batch sequencing situation (N, σ0, α, z, t).
It can readily be observed that for each assignment game (L(N, k)∪U(N, k), wk)
associated with the batch sequencing situation (N, σ0, α, z, t), the characteristic func-
tion wk can be expressed as follows:
wk(S) =
∑




i∈S:bσ0 (i)≤k and bσ∗S
(i)>k
αi, (2.6)






In the following theorem, we show that the relaxed batch sequencing game (N, vR)
corresponding to a batch sequencing situation Γ(N) is equal to the sum of the assign-
ment games associated with Γ(N). Since assignment games are balanced, this result
also establihes the balancedness of relaxed batch sequencing games.
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Theorem 2.1.6 Let (N, σ0, α, z, t) be a batch sequencing situation and let (N, vR)
be the corresponding relaxed batch sequencing game. Also let (L(N, k) ∪ U(N, k), wk)












for every S ⊂ N and hence (N, vR) is balanced.


























αi(bσ0(i) − bσ∗S(i)) = vR(S).
¤
However, a relaxed batch sequencing game need not be convex in general. This is
illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.1.5 Consider the following batch sequencing situation (N, σ0, α, z, t) where
N={1,2,3,4}, α = (1, 3, 6, 9), z = 2, t = 1 and σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N . It can easily
be observed that vR(N) = 11, vR({1, 2, 3}) = 5, vR({1, 2, 4}) = 8 and vR({1, 2}) = 0.
So, (N, vR) is not convex:
vR(N) − vR({1, 2, 3}) < vR({1, 2, 4}) − vR({1, 2}).
⋄
2.1.4 Flow-Shop Batch Sequencing Games
Flow-shop batch sequencing (FSBS) situations consist of a sequence of finitely many
batch machines B1, B2, ..., Bm and a finite number of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} each
having one job to be processed in the order B1, B2, ..., Bm. Each batch machine Bk
has a batch size of zk and processes a batch in tk time units independent of the
number of jobs placed in the batch. As it is the case in batch sequencing situations
on a single batch machine, we assume that there is an initial order σ0 on the jobs
before the processing of the jobs on the flow-shop begins. That is if agent i is in
front of agent j in the queue, then at all machines in the flow-shop, the job of agent
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i has to be processed before the job of agent j is processed or together with the job
of agent j in the same batch. An FSBS situation as described above is denoted by
Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t) where M = {1, 2, ...,m} and m ∈ Z++ is the number
of batch machines in the flow-shop, σ0 ∈ Π(N), α = (αi)i∈N ∈ R
N




For every FSBS situation, a production schedule τ fixes for every agent i and
for every machine k a starting time Ti,k(τ) of the job of agent i at machine k. A
production schedule is feasible if it conforms to the batch capacity constraints of the
machines, to the order of the flow-shop and to the order on the jobs. Formally, we
call a production schedule feasible with respect to the order σ ∈ Π(N) if it satisfies
the following:
(i) Ti,k(τ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ M .
(ii) Ti,k(τ) + tk ≤ Ti,k+1(τ) for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ M .
(iii) If σ(i) ≤ σ(j), then Ti,k(τ) ≤ Tj,k(τ) for all i, j ∈ N and all k ∈ M .
(iv) |{i ∈ N |Ti,k(τ) = s}| ≤ zk for all k ∈ M and s ≥ 0.
(v) If Ti,k(τ) 6= Tj,k(τ), then |Ti,k(τ) − Tj,k(τ)| ≥ tk for all i, j ∈ N and all k ∈ M .
We denote by Fi,k(τ) the time at which machine k finishes the processing of the
batch in which job i is placed, i.e., Fi,k(τ) = Ti,k(τ) + tk. Then, the completion time
Ci(τ) of job i under production schedule τ is Fi,m(τ). The total costs of all agents if
the jobs are processed according to the production schedule τ equal
∑
i∈N αiFi,m(τ).
Example 2.1.6 Consider the following FSBS Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t) where
N = {1, ..., 5}, M = {1, 2}, σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N , α = (1, 7, 1, 1, 1), z = (1, 2) and
t = (1, 5). In Figure 2.4, we depict two feasible production schedules with respect to
the initial order σ0: τ0 and τ1.
It can easily be observed that with respect to both schedules, every job is immedi-
ately processed by B1 as soon as B1 is available. If the jobs are processed with respect
to production schedule τ0, then F1,1(τ0) = T1,2(τ0) = 1. That is job 1’s processing at
B2 starts as soon as its processing at B1 ends. If the jobs are processed with respect
to production schedule τ1, then F1,1(τ1) = 1 and T1,2(τ1) = T2,2(τ1) = 2. That is, with
respect to production schedule τ1, although job 1 is available for processing at B2 at
time one, it waits for one time unit for job 2 to become available for B2 and at time
two their processing by B2 starts together in the same batch. ⋄
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τ0 :
B1 :
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
B2 :




0 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
B2 :
2 7 12 170
1,2 3,4 5
Figure 2.4: Two feasible schedules for the flow-shop situation in Example 2.1.6
Finding an optimal schedule for a general FSBS situation is still an open problem3.
However, as we establish in the following proposition, there always exists an optimal
schedule which processes the jobs according to the HWCF-sequence σN and runs full
batches in the first batch machine.
Proposition 2.1.4 For every FSBS situation Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t), there
exists an optimal schedule τ such that
(i) τ is a feasible schedule with respect to σN .
(ii) τ runs full batches of size z1 in the first batch machine.
We note that Proposition 2.1.4 can easily be proved by using a simple interchange
argument.
Observe that there can be more than one production schedule which is feasible
with respect to the initial order in an FSBS situation. We assume in this section that,
in the initial case, i.e., when the agents do not cooperate, the corresponding initial
production schedule is the one in which no agent waits for another because waiting
for other jobs, without any further compensation, to get processed together in the
same batch will only increase the costs of the agent. That is the initial production
schedule is the one which is feasible with respect to σ0 and satisfies the condition
that every job which is ready to be processed at a machine is processed as soon as
the machine is also available. We denote the initial production schedule in flow-shop
3For an FSBS situation with two machines and equal waiting time parameters, Ahmadi et al.
(1992) showed that the problem of finding the optimal schedule can be solved within O(N3) opera-
tions.
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batch sequencing situations by τ0 (Note that the production schedule τ0 in Example
2.1.6 indeed fits this description.).
Next, for a coalition of cooperating agents, we must decide on which production
schedule rearrangements are admissible. We assume that a coalition S can choose
any production schedule which is feasible with respect to an order σ ∈ A(S) as long
as they do not harm the players outside S. Formally, a production schedule τ is
admissible for coalition S if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) τ is a feasible production schedule with respect to an order in A(S).
(ii) Fi,m(τ) ≤ Fi,m(τ0) for all i ∈ N\S.
4
The set of admissible production schedules for S is denoted by APS(S).
We define the value of a coalition S as the maximum cost savings coalition S
can achieve by means of an admissible production schedule. Formally, a flow-shop
batch sequencing game (N,w) corresponding to a flow-shop batch sequencing situa-





αi(Fi,m(τ0) − Fi,m(τ)), (2.7)
for every S ⊂ N .
Using a simple interchange argument, it can be shown that there exists an optimal
admissible production schedule for S which is feasible with respect to σS. Recall that
σS is an ordering which is attained from σ0 by reordering the members in each σ0-
component of a coalition S with respect to the HWCF rule.
Clearly, FSBS games are monotonic and superadditive. However, as illustrated
by the following example, FSBS games are neither σ0-component additive nor convex
in general.
Example 2.1.7 Consider the flow-shop batch sequencing situation Γ(N,M) given in
Example 2.1.6 and the coalition S = {1, 3, 4, 5}. The initial production schedule, τ0 is
also given in Example 2.1.6. Notice that S can not create savings just by reordering
4Condition (ii) enables agents to wait for other agents’ jobs in order to get processed together
in the same batch. That is agents can create savings both by reordering their jobs and also by
waiting for some other jobs. Another option for admissibility of a rearrangement could be to require
that Fi,m(τ) = Fi,m(τ0) for all i ∈ N\S. Under this more restrictive condition, waiting would no
longer be possible in a flow-shop batch sequencing situation, i.e., the agents could create savings
only by reordering their jobs. We want to remark that, under this more restrictive condition, the
results obtained for single machine batch sequencing games can easily be extended to corresponding
flow-shop batch sequencing games.
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the jobs since αi = αj for every i, j ∈ S. However, observe that τ1 in Example 2.1.6
is an admissible production schedule for S (since F2,2(τ1) < F2,2(τ0)) and the cost
savings obtained if S uses τ1 is:
∑
i∈S




= (6 − 7) + (11 − 12) + (16 − 12) + (16 − 17) = 1.
So, when agent 1 waits for agent 2, the only agent outside S, agent 2 profits from
an earlier completion time, agents 3 and 5 are harmed indirectly but agent 4 profits.
As a result, S could obtain cost savings of 1. Actually, τ1 is the optimal production
schedule for S, i.e., w(S) = 1.
For T ∈ 2N\{S} one finds that: w(T ) = 30 for every T ⊃ {1, 2} and w(T ) = 0
otherwise.
Observe that this FSBS game is not convex:
0 = w(N) − w({1, 2, 3, 4}) < w({1, 3, 4, 5}) − w({1, 3, 4}) = 1.
(N,w) is not σ0-component additive either: {1} and {3, 4, 5} are the σ0-components
of {1, 3, 4, 5}, but
1 = w({1, 3, 4, 5}) 6= w({1}) + w({3, 4, 5}) = 0.
⋄
In the following, we will examine two particular FSBS situations: situations where
all batch machines have the same batch size and situations where all batch machines
have the same batch processing time. First, it is shown that, in both of these situa-
tions, an optimal order for a coalition of agents can be obtained by reordering the jobs
of the agents. That is although waiting for other jobs to produce savings is allowed
in our model, in these FSBS situations it need not be employed by the coalitions to
obtain maximal cost savings. Second, it is shown that the FSBS games arising from
these situations are equal to the game arising from the “bottleneck” machine in the
flow-shop: the machine with the highest batch processing time when all machines
have the same batch capacity and the machine with the minimum batch capacity
when all machines have the same batch processing time.
We need the following notation in order to present our results. Consider an FSBS
situation Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t). We denote by Pk the sum of the first k
machines’ batch processing times, by t̄ the maximum batch processing time and by z̄
the minimum batch size, i.e., Pk =
∑k
p=1 tp, t̄ = max{tk|k ∈ M} and z̄ = min{zk|k ∈
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M}. Lastly, we denote by τσ the production schedule which is obtained from τ0 only
by reordering the agents with respect to σ. That is
Tσ−1(p),k(τσ) = Tσ−10 (p),k(τ0)
for every p ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and k ∈ M .
Proposition 2.1.5 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t) be an FSBS situation. If zk = z
for every k ∈ M or if tk = t for every k ∈ M , then τσS is an optimal production
schedule for every S ⊂ N .
Proof. First assume that zk = z for every k ∈ M and consider the initial production
schedule τ0. Observe that with respect to τ0 first z jobs in the initial order σ0 are
processed together in the first batch in each machine; the second z jobs in σ0 are
processed together in the second batch in each machine and so on. Since the initial
production schedule τ0 runs full batches in each machine in the flow-shop, waiting
for other jobs is not an option for the players. We know that there exists an optimal
production schedule for every coalition S which is feasible with respect to σS. Then,
clearly, τσS is an optimal production schedule for any coalition S ⊂ N .
Now assume that tk = t for every k ∈ M and consider the initial production
schedule τ0. Observe that τ0 may run batches with less jobs than full capacity and
the jobs in these batches have the option to wait for other jobs to get processed to-
gether in the same batch. However, observe that it is not possible to decrease the
completion times of the other jobs by waiting for them, because the batch processing
time of each machine is the same. That is the coalitions can not produce savings
through waiting for other jobs. We know that there exists an optimal production
schedule which is feasible with respect to σS for every coalition S. Then, since wait-
ing is not profitable, τσS is an optimal production schedule for any coalition S ⊂ N . ¤
In Theorem 2.1.7 we show that in both of these FSBS situations the corresponding
FSBS games are equal to the batch sequencing game corresponding to the bottleneck
machine in the flow-shop. For the proof, we need the following lemma which states
that in both of these FSBS situations the completion time of a job is determined up
to a constant by the bottleneck machine.
Lemma 2.1.5 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t) be an FSBS situation.





− 1)t̄ for every i ∈ N
and every σ ∈ Π(N).
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− 1)t for every i ∈ N
and every σ ∈ Π(N).





= 1. Clearly, i is
processed in the first batch by each machine and Fi,k(τσ) = Pk for every k ∈ M .





= 2, i.e., j is processed in the second batch by each
machine. Let t̄[1,k] be the maximum batch processing time among the first k machines,
i.e., t̄[1,k] = max{tl|l ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}}. We will show, by induction on k, that







t̄[1,k] = Pk + t̄[1,k].
When k = 1, the assertion holds trivially. So, assume that the assertion holds for
every k < l. Then, Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + t̄[1,l−1].
Now, if tl < t̄[1,l−1], then t̄[1,l] = t̄[1,l−1] and
Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + t̄[1,l−1] > Pl−1 + tl = Pl = Fi,l(τσ),
i.e., the second batch’s processing at machine l − 1 finishes after the first batch’s
processing finishes at machine l. Hence, the second batch immediately starts to be
processed by machine l at time Fj,l−1(τσ). So,
Fj,l(τσ) = Fj,l−1(τσ) + tl = Pl−1 + t̄[1,l−1] + tl = Pl + t̄[1,l].
If tl ≥ t̄[1,l−1], then t̄[1,l] = tl. Also we have that
Fj,l−1(τσ) = Pl−1 + t̄[1,l−1] ≤ Pl−1 + tl = Fi,l(τσ).
That is the second batch’s processing at machine l−1 finishes before the first batch’s
processing finishes at machine l. Hence, the second batch starts to be processed by
machine l at time Fi,l(τσ). So, Fj,l(τσ) = Fi,l(τσ) + tl = Pl + tl = Pl + t̄[1,l].
Now, one can repeat the whole argument given above for a job which is processed
in the third batch by each machine, then for the fourth batch and so on to prove that





− 1)t̄ for every i ∈ N .
(ii) can be proven similarly. ¤
Theorem 2.1.7 Let Γ(N,M) = (N,M, σ0, α, z, t) be an FSBS situation and (N,w)
be the corresponding flow-shop batch sequencing game.
(i) Let zk = z for every k ∈ M . Define Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z, t̄) to be the batch
sequencing situation corresponding to the bottleneck batch machine and let (N, v)
be the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then, v = w.
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(ii) Let tk = t for every k ∈ M . Define Γ(N) = (N, σ0, α, z̄, t) to be the batch
sequencing situation corresponding to the bottleneck batch machine and let (N, v)
be the corresponding batch sequencing game. Then, v = w.
Proof. (i). We know by Lemma 2.1.5 that











for every S ⊂ N and every i ∈ N . Moreover, we know by Proposition 2.1.5 that in




































for every S ⊂ N .
(ii) can be proven similarly. ¤
2.2 Family Sequencing and Cooperation
In this section, we consider cost allocation problems arising from family sequencing
situations. In a family sequencing situation, the jobs can be partitioned into distinct
families. No set-up is required between the jobs of the same family. However, the
family set-up time is required when a job is preceded by a job of a different family
or if there is no preceding job. Section 2.2.1 formally describes family sequencing
situations. Section 2.2.2 introduces and analyzes the corresponding family sequencing
games. We prove that family sequencing games are balanced by showing that a specific
marginal vector belongs to the core of these games. It is also seen that these games
need not be convex even under specific restrictions of the model considered.
2.2.1 Family Sequencing Situations
In this section, we consider a one machine sequencing situation in which a finite num-
ber of agents, each having one job, are queued in front of a machine, waiting for their
jobs to be processed. The machine in the situation is of classical type which can
handle at most one job at a time. The set of agents is denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
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The jobs can be partitioned into f families with respect to their production require-
ments. Let F = {1, 2, ..., f} be the set of families. A family function F : N → F
associates to each agent i ∈ N the family F(i) that his job belongs to. We denote
with nk the number of agents whose jobs are in family k. It is assumed that there
is an initial processing order σ0 on the agents before the processing of the machine
starts. If a job in family k follows a job of the same family, then it does not require
a set-up. However, the family set-up time sk is required if it is preceded by a job of
a different family or if there is no preceding job. Observe that the set-up times are
sequence independent, i.e., they are independent of the family of the preceding job.
We assume that each job of the same family requires the same processing time which
is denoted by pk for every family k ∈ F . For each agent i ∈ N , the costs of spending
time in the system is assumed to be linear in the completion time of the job and
the corresponding cost function ci : R+ → R is defined by ci(t) = αit with αi > 0.
Lastly, we assume that the agents having jobs of the same family have the same cost
parameter, i.e., if F(i) = F(j), then αi = αj for every i, j ∈ N .
A one machine sequencing situation as described above is called a family sequenc-
ing situation and is denoted by Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) where σ0 ∈ Π(N) and
s, p, α ∈ RF++.
In a family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α), the completion time









where xσ,j equals 1 if the job j will require a set-up when jobs are processed with
respect to σ and 0 otherwise. Observe that C(σ, i) is the sum of processing times for
the first σ(i) jobs plus any set-ups that occurred.
The total costs of all agents if the jobs are processed according to the order σ
equal
∑
i∈N αF(i)C(σ, i). By reordering the jobs with respect to σ0 the total costs can
be reduced. We call an order optimal if it minimizes the total costs. It was proven
by Santos and Magazine (1985) and, independently, by Dobson et al. (1987) that a
highest urgency comes first (HUCF) order, an order which processes the jobs of the
same family together as a group (consecutively) and processes these family groups in
nonincreasing order of the family-specific urgency index uk defined by uk =
nkαk
sk+nkpk
is optimal for family sequencing situations.
Theorem 2.2.1 For every family sequencing situation an HUCF order is optimal.
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2.2.2 Family Sequencing Games
For a family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α), the costs of a coalition
T with respect to a processing order σ equal
∑
i∈T αF(i)C(σ, i). We want to determine
the maximal cost savings of a coalition T when its members decide to cooperate. For
this aim, we have to define which reorderings of the jobs of coalition T are admissible
with respect to the initial order. We assume that an order σ ∈ Π(N) is admissible
for a coalition T with respect to σ0 if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) P (σ, j) = P (σ0, j) for all j ∈ N\T .
(ii) C(σ, i) ≤ C(σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\T .
Condition (i) is the standard admissibility requirement that a coalition T can pro-
duce cost savings only by changing positions within σ0-components. However, in a
family sequencing situation, a coalition may hurt the players outside the coalition
by reordering its players in a way that increases the total time required for set-ups.
Hence, we also adopt condition (ii) which guarantees that T cannot not harm the
players outside T . The set of admissible reorderings of a coalition T is denoted by
A(T ).
The value of a coalition T is defined as the maximum cost savings coalition T can
achieve by means of an admissible reordering. Formally, the family sequencing game
(N, v) corresponding to a family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) is
defined by





αF(i) (C(σ0, i) − C(σ, i))
}
, (2.8)
for every T ⊂ N .
The family sequencing games are illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.2.1 Consider the family sequencing situation (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and F = {1, 2}. Assume that F(1) = F(4) = F(5) = 1 and
F(2) = F(3) = 2. Assume also that σ0 is given by σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N ,






, respectively. Hence, an HUCF order processes first the jobs in family
1 and then the jobs in family 2. In Figure 2.5, we depict the production schedules
corresponding to an HUCF order σN and σ0.
Consider now the coalition T = {1, 2, 3}. Observe that the order σT = (2, 3, 1, 4, 5)
is an admissible order for T with respect to σ0: P (σT , j) = P (σ0, j) for all j ∈ N\T
and both C(σT , 4) < C(σ0, 4) and C(σT , 5) < C(σ0, 5). Figure 2.5 also depicts the
2.2. Family Sequencing and Cooperation 45
σN :
σ0 : s1 p1 s2 p2 p2 s1 p1 p1
0
1
5 10 12 14 15 19 23
C(σ0, 1)
C(σ0, 2)
C(σ0, 3) C(σ0, 4) C(σ0, 5)
s1 p1 p1 p1 s2 p2 p2
0 5 9 13 18 20 22
C(σ0, 1) C(σ0, 4) C(σ0, 5) C(σ0, 2)
C(σ0, 3)
σT : s2 p2 p2 s1 p1 p1 p1
0 5 7 9 10 14 18 22
C(σT , 2)
C(σT , 3) C(σT , 1) C(σT , 4) C(σT , 5)
Figure 2.5: The production schedules corresponding to the orders σ0, σN and σT in
Example 2.2.1




αF(i)(C(σ0, i) − C(σT , i)) =
∑
i∈T
(C(σ0, i) − C(σT , i))
= (5 − 14) + (12 − 7) + (14 − 9) = 1.
Actually, σT is the optimal processing order for T , i.e., v(T ) = 1. Notice that σT
processes the jobs in family 2 first although with respect to the optimal order for the
grand coalition jobs in family 1 are processed first.
Consider now the coalition Q = {1, 2, 3, 5}. Clearly, σT is an admissible order for
Q. The cost savings obtained if Q uses σT is:
∑
i∈Q
αF(i)(C(σ0, i) − C(σT , i)) =
∑
i∈Q
(C(σ0, i) − C(σT , i))
= v(T ) + (23 − 22) = 2.
That is when the agents 1,2 and 3 reorder themselves from σ0 to σT , agent 5
profits from an earlier completion time. Actually, σT is also an optimal processing
order for Q. Hence v(Q) = 2. The complete family sequencing game (N, v) is given
by: v(N) = v({2, 3, 4, 5}) = 4, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = 2,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1 and v(T ′) = 0 for every remaining coalition T ′ ∈ 2N .
Observe that this game is not convex:
v(N) − v({2, 3, 4, 5}) = 0 < 1 = v({1, 2, 3}) − v({2, 3}).
(N, v) is not σ0-component additive either: {1, 2, 3} and {5} are the σ0-components
of {1, 2, 3, 5}, but v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 2 6= 1 = v({1, 2, 3}) + v({5}). ⋄
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Example 2.2.1 illustrated that family sequencing games need not be convex in
general. The following example shows that a family sequencing game need not be
convex even when the set-up times and the processing times are equal and the jobs
of the same family are consequtive in the initial order.
Example 2.2.2 Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation
with N = {1, 2, ..., 9} and F = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Assume that F(1) = 1, F(2) = F(3) = 2,
F(4) = ... = F(8) = 3 and F(9) = 4. Assume also that σ0 is given by σ0(i) = i for
every i ∈ N , s = (1, 1, 1, 1), p = (1, 1, 1, 1) and α = (100, 2, 4, 1). Finally, let (N, v)
be the family sequencing game corresponding to Σ(N).
Let Q = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, R = Q ∪ {9}. It can be observed that v(Q) = 0,
v(R) = 5 and v(Q ∪ {2}) = v(R ∪ {2}). Then, (N, v) is not convex since
v(Q ∪ {2}) − v(Q) > v(R ∪ {2}) − v(R).
⋄
As illustrated in Example 2.2.1, family sequencing games are in general not σ0-
component additive in spite of the fact that a coalition can only change the posi-
tions of its members who belong to the same σ0-component of the coalition. The
reason that we lose σ0-component additivity although we use a similar admissibility
requirement to Curiel et al. (1989) is that the members of a coalition can affect
the completion times of the members (and also the non-members) behind them by
changing the total set-up time required to process the jobs. This property of family
sequencing situations is in line with sequencing situations with controllable processing
times (cf. van Velzen, 2006) where the players can affect the completion times of the
players behind them by employing additional resources to reduce the time required
to process their jobs.
In the following we will prove balancedness of family sequencing games by showing
that the marginal corresponding to the initial order belongs to the core of these games.
Let T ⊂ N and σ ∈ Π(N). We will denote the member of T which stands in front
of the other members of T in the order σ by f(σ, T ) and the member which stands
behind the other members of T by l(σ, T ), i.e.,
f(σ, T ) = arg min
i∈T
σ(i) and l(σ, T ) = arg max
i∈T
σ(i).
We will call f(σ, T ) (l(σ, T )) the first player of T (the last player of T ) with respect
to σ. We will denote by P (σ, T ) (S(σ, T )) the set of players which stand in front of
(behind) every member of T in the order σ, i.e.,
P (σ, T ) = {i ∈ N |σ(i) < min
j∈T
σ(j)} and S(σ, T ) = {i ∈ N |σ(i) > max
j∈T
σ(j)}.
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Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation. For every
T ⊂ N and σ ∈ Π(N), we denote by g(σ, T ) the cost savings obtained by T when the
production order is changed from σ0 to σ, i.e.,
g(σ, T ) =
∑
i∈T
αF(i) ( C(σ0, i) − C(σ, i)) .
Let σ ∈ Π(N). We call a set of jobs R that are processed between two set-ups
when the jobs are processed with respect to σ, a run of σ. Naturally, all jobs in the
same run are of the same family. A run which consists of jobs of family k is called a
run of family k. Given a connected coalition T ∈ con(σ), a run R of σ is said to start
in T (end in T ) if f(σ,R) ∈ T (if l(σ,R) ∈ T ). Run R is said to start in front of T
(end behind T ) if f(σ,R) ∈ P (σ, T ) (l(σ,R) ∈ S(σ, T )). We call a run R of σ which
starts in T the last run that starts in T with respect to σ if it includes l(σ, T ). With
σ′ ∈ Π(N), σ′ is said to split a run R of σ if there does not exist a run R′ of σ′ with
R ⊂ R′.
Since a σ0-component of a coalition can affect the completion times of the mem-
bers of another σ0-component behind it, it is generally not easy to find an optimal
admissible processing order for coalitions. Nevertheless, there are useful properties
regarding the structure of the optimal admissible orders. In the following proposition
we show that, in every family sequencing situation, there exist optimal admissible
orders for coalitions that process the jobs of the same family consecutively like the
optimal order for the grand coalition.
Proposition 2.2.1 Let (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation and let
T ∈ 2N\{∅}. Then, there exists an optimal admissible order for T which processes
all jobs of the same family within a σ0-component of T consecutively.
Proof. Let T\σ0 = {T1, T2, ..., Tl} be such that Ty ⊂ P (σ0, Ty+1) for every y ∈
{1, ..., l − 1}. Let σ ∈ A(T ) be optimal for T .
Assume that with respect to σ, family k jobs in Ty (y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}) are processed
in different runs. Let K1 (K2) be the set of family k jobs in Ty that belong to the
first run (second run). Let M be the set of jobs (of other families) that are placed
in between K1 and K2 with respect to σ. Also let τ =
∑
i∈M(xσ,isF(i) + pF(i)). That
is, τ is the time to process and set-up all jobs in M when they are processed with
respect to σ. Let i1 = f(σ,K1), i2 = f(σ,K2) and m = f(σ,M).
Now consider the processing order σ′ ∈ Π(N) which is obtained from σ by moving
all jobs in K1 to the head of K2. Figure 2.6 depicts the orders σ and σ
′. We will
show that σ′ is an optimal admissible order for T . Notice that we are done when we
show that σ′ is an optimal admissible order for T , since this proves that we can join
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two job groups of the same family that belong to the same σ0-component of T but
are processed in separate runs without decreasing the the total cost savings achieved




K1 K2 M σ: 
M  K2 K1 σ': 
K1 M  K2 σ'': 
Figure 2.6: The orders σ, σ′ and σ′′ in the proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Let us first show that σ′ is an admissible order for T . Clearly, P (σ′, j) = P (σ, j) =
P (σ0, j) for all j ∈ N\T . So, we need to show that C(σ
′, i) ≤ C(σ0, i) for every
i ∈ N\T . Since σ is an admissible order, it is sufficient to show that C(σ′, i) ≤ C(σ, i)
for every i ∈ N\T . Observe that xσ′,j = xσ,j for every j ∈ N\{i1, i2,m}. Hence,
C(σ′, i) = C(σ, i) for every i ∈ P (σ,K1) and

















for every i ∈ S(σ,M).
Obviously, xσ,m = xσ,i2 = 1, xσ′,i1 = 1, xσ′,i2 = 0. Observe that xσ,i1 and xσ′,m can
either be 0 or 1. Assume first that xσ,i1 = 0, i.e., l(σ, P (σ,K1)) is of family k. Then,
clearly, xσ′,m = 1 and therefore
C(σ, i) − C(σ′, i) = (0 − 1)sF(i1) + (1 − 1)sF(m) + (1 − 0)sF(i2) = 0,
for every i ∈ S(σ,M).
Assume now that xσ,i1 = 1, i.e., l(σ, P (σ,K1)) is of a different family than k. Now,
if l(σ, P (σ,K1)) is in the same family with m then xσ′,m = 0. But, if l(σ, P (σ,K1))
belongs to a different family than the one m belongs to, then xσ′,m = 1. Therefore,
C(σ, i) − C(σ′, i) ≥ (1 − 1)sF(i1) + (1 − 1)sF(m) + (1 − 0)sF(i2) = sk,
for every i ∈ S(σ,M). Hence, σ′ ∈ A(T ).
Now consider the cost savings g(σ′, T ) obtained by T by switching from σ0 to σ
′
and suppose that g(σ′, T ) is strictly less than v(T ). We will show that this contradicts
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with the optimality of σ. Observe that
0 > g(σ′, T ) − v(T ) =
∑
i∈T


















where the last inequality follows from the fact that C(σ′, i) = C(σ, i) for every
i ∈ P (σ,K1) and C(σ, i) − C(σ
′, i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S(σ,M).
It can also be observed that
C(σ, i) − C(σ′, i) =
∑
j∈K1
(xσ,jsF(j) + pF(j)) + (xσ,m − xσ′,m)sF(m)
= |K1|pk + xσ,i1sk + (xσ,m − xσ′,m)sF(m)
= |K1|pk + xσ,i1sk + (1 − xσ′,m)sF(m) ≥ |K1|pk, (2.10)
for every i ∈ M and
C(σ, i) − C(σ′, i) = −
∑
j∈M
(xσ′,jsF(j) + pF(j)) − (xσ′,i1 − xσ,i1)sk ≥ −(τ + sk), (2.11)
for every i ∈ K1 since
∑
j∈M
(xσ′,jsF(j) + pF(j)) =
{
τ, if xσ′,m = 1,
τ − sF(m), if xσ′,m = 0.




















αF(i) − (τ + sk)αk < 0. (2.12)
Next consider the processing order σ′′ ∈ Π(N) which is obtained from σ by moving
all jobs in K2 to the tail of K1. Figure 2.6 also depicts σ
′′. Let us first show that
σ′′ is an admissible order for T . Obviously, P (σ′′, i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T .
Since σ is an admissible order, it is sufficient to show that C(σ′′, i) ≤ C(σ, i) for every
i ∈ N\T . Let h = f(σ, S(σ,K2)). It can be observed that xσ′′,i = xσ,i for every
i ∈ N\{i2, h}. Hence, C(σ
′′, i) = C(σ, i) for every i ∈ P (σ,M) and
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for every i ∈ S(σ,K2).
Clearly, xσ,i2 = 1 and xσ′′,i2 = 0. However, xσ,h can either be 0 or 1. Assume




(xσ,i − xσ′′,i)sF(i) = (1 − 0)sF(i2) + (0 − 1)sF(h) = (1 − 0)sk + (0 − 1)sk = 0.
Assume now that xσ,h = 1. Then,
∑
i∈{i2,h}
(xσ,i − xσ′′,i)sF(i) ≥ (1 − 0)sk + (1 − 1)sF(h) = sk
and we can conclude that σ′′ ∈ A(T ).
Observe now that
C(σ, i) − C(σ′′, i) =
{
τ + sk, if i ∈ K2,
−|K2|pk, if i ∈ M.
Then,
g(σ′′, T ) − v(T ) =
∑
i∈T
























where the first inequality follows from the fact that C(σ′′, i) = C(σ, i) for every
i ∈ P (σ,M) and C(σ, i)−C(σ′′, i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S(σ,K2) while the last inequality
is implied by inequality (2.12). However, this establishes a contradiction with the
optimality of σ. ¤
Next we focus on the structure of the optimal admissible orders for specific coali-
tions that are connected with respect to the initial order.
Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation. For every





where nT,k is the number of family k jobs in T .
Assume now that F(l(σ0, T )) = k̄. The tail-adjusted family urgency index u
′
T,k
for T is defined as
u′T,k =
{





, if k = k̄.
Then an order σ ∈ Π(N) is called an HUCF order for T if
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(i) P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T and
(ii) it processes all jobs of T that belong to the same family consecutively and
processes these family groups in non-increasing order of the family urgency
index uT,k.
Then an order σ ∈ Π(N) is called a tail-adjusted HUCF order for T if
(i) P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T and
(ii) it processes all jobs of T that belong to the same family consecutively and
processes these family groups in non-increasing order of the tail-adjusted family
urgency index u′T,k.
Notice that a tail-adjusted HUCF order for T can be obtained from an HUCF order
for T by taking the family k̄ jobs behind all other family groups.
In the following proposition, we show that for coalitions that are connected with
respect to σ0 and contain the first player in the order σ0, either an HUCF order or a
tail-adjusted HUCF order is optimal.
Proposition 2.2.2 Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation
and T ∈ con(σ0) with σ
−1
0 (1) ∈ T . Then,
(i) If an HUCF order for T is admissible, then it is optimal for T .
(ii) If an HUCF order for T is not admissible, then a tail-adjusted HUCF order for
T is optimal for T .
It can easily be observed that (i) immediately follows from Theorem 2.2.1 and
Proposition 2.2.1. If an HUCF order σ is not admissible for T , then, by switching
from σ0 to σ, T must increase the total set-up time required to process the jobs. In
other words, σ must split some runs of σ0. It can be observed that the only run that
can be splitted by switching from σ0 to σ is the last run that starts in T with respect
to σ0. Moreover, since this run is splitted, it must end behind T with respect to σ0.
Then, a tail-adjusted HUCF order for T is an admissible order for T , since it does not
split any runs of σ0. The optimality of the tail-adjusted HUCF order is also implied
by Theorem 2.2.1 and Proposition 2.2.1.
The following example illustrates the optimality of HUCF orders for coalitions
that are connected with respect to σ0 and contain the first player in the order σ0.
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Example 2.2.3 Consider the family sequencing situation (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and F = {1, 2}. Assume that F(1) = F(4) = F(5) = 1 and
F(2) = F(3) = 2. Assume also that σ0 is given by σ0(i) = i for every i ∈ N ,
s = (1, 5), p = (4, 2) and α = (1, 2). Consider first the coalition T = {1, 2, 3}. The







Then, an HUCF order for T is given by σT = (2, 3, 1, 4, 5). σT is an admissible
order for T with respect to σ0 since P (σT , i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T and
both C(σT , 4) < C(σ0, 4) and C(σT , 5) < C(σ0, 5). Then, by Proposition 2.2.2, σT is
optimal for T .




and uT ′,2 =
2
7
. Then, σT ′ = (2, 1, 3, 4, 5) is the HUCF order for T
′. However,
σT ′ is not admissible for T
′: It splits the run of σ0 that consists of jobs 2 and 3 and as
a result C(σT ′ , i) = C(σ0, i) + 5 for every i ∈ {3, 4, 5}. Observe that the initial order
σ0 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is the tail-adjusted HUCF order for T
′ and by Proposition 2.2.2, it
is optimal for T ′. ⋄
Now we are ready to prove that the marginal vector of a family sequencing game
that corresponds to the initial order belongs to the core of the game.
Theorem 2.2.2 Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation
and (N, v) be the corresponding sequencing game. Then, mσ0(v) ∈ Core(v).
Proof. Let T\σ0 = {T1, T2, ..., Tl} be such that Ty ⊂ P (σ0, Ty+1) for every y ∈
{1, ..., l − 1}. Let σ ∈ A(T ) be optimal for T .





















it is sufficient to show that
∑
i∈Ty
mσ0i (v) ≥ g(σ, Ty) for every y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}.
Pick y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. Let D = P (σ0, Ty) and E = D ∪ Ty. Notice that σ
−1




mσ0i (v) = v(E) − v(D). It remains to show that
v(E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) ≥ 0.
We denote by σ|Ty and by σ
′ the orders defined by
σ|Ty(i) =
{
σ(i), if i ∈ Ty,
σ0(i), otherwise,













Notice that σ′ is an admissible order for E.
Let π be an optimal admissible order for D. Since σ−10 (1) ∈ D, we can assume
that π is either an HUCF order for D or a tail-adjusted HUCF order for D. Let







π(i), if i ∈ D,
σ|Ty(i), if i ∈ Ty,
σ0(i), otherwise.
Observe that P (σ0, i) = P (µ, i) for every i ∈ N\E.
It can be observed that
g(µ, E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) =
∑
i∈E
αF(i) ( C(σ0, i) − C(µ, i)) −
∑
i∈D










C(σ′, i) − C(µ, i)
)
, (2.14)
where the last equality follows from the fact that C(σ, i) = C(σ′, i) for every i ∈ Ty
and C(π, i) = C(µ, i) for every i ∈ D.
Let iy be the first player of Ty with respect to σ|Ty . Assume that iy is of family k.
Observe that for every i ∈ S(σ0, D)
















sF(j)(xσ′,j − xµ,j) + sk(xσ′,iy − xµ,iy)
≥ sk(xσ′,iy − xµ,iy), (2.15)
where the second equality follows from the fact that P̄ (σ′, i) = P̄ (µ, i) for every
i ∈ S(σ0, D) and xσ′,i = xµ,i for every i ∈ S(σ0, D)\{iy} and the inequality follows
from the fact that, with respect to µ, the members of D are processed with respect
to π which is an HUCF or a tail-adjusted HUCF order for D and these orders require
the minimum total set-up time to process the jobs in D.
Then by equation (2.14) and inequality (2.15),
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If xσ′,iy − xµ,iy ≥ 0, then by inequality (2.15) and admissibility of σ
′, C(σ0, i) ≥
C(σ′, i) ≥ C(µ, i) for every i ∈ S(σ0, D). Hence, µ is an admissible order for E.
Moreover, by inequality (2.16),
v(E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) ≥ g(µ, E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) ≥ 0.
So, we can assume in the following that xσ′,iy = 0 and xµ,iy = 1.
First, by inequalities (2.15) and (2.16)
C(σ′, i) − C(µ, i) ≥ −sk, for every i ∈ S(σ0, D) and (2.17)




Since xσ′,iy = 0, F(iy) = F(l(σ
′, D)) = k. Observe that l(σ′, D) = l(σ0, D).
Moreover, since xµ,iy = 1, F(l(µ,D)) = F(l(π,D)) 6= k. Then π can not be a
tail-adjusted HUCF order for D because the last player of D with respect to a tail-
adjusted HUCF order for D must be of family k, the family of l(σ0, D). So, π is an
HUCF order for D which splits the last run of D with respect to σ|Ty .
Let K1 (K2) be the set of family k jobs in D (Ty) that belong to the last run of
D with respect to σ|Ty . Since π splits the last run of D with respect to σ|Ty , K1 and
K2 are processed in two different runs of µ. Let R1 (R2) be the run of µ that K1
(K2) belongs to. Also let M be the set of jobs (of other families) that are placed in
between R1 and K2 with respect to µ. Figure 2.7 depicts the order µ. Let τ be the
time to process and set-up all jobs in M when they are processed with respect to µ,
i.e., τ =
∑
i∈M(xµ,isF(i) + pF(i)). 
D Ty 


















Figure 2.7: The orders π, π′, µ and µ′ in the proof of Theorem 2.2.2
Claim 1: ταk − pk
∑
i∈M αF(i) ≥ 0.
Proof of Claim 1. Consider π′ the tail-adjusted HUCF order for D obtained
from π by taking R1 the group of family k jobs in D behind M . Figure 2.7 also
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depicts orders π and π′. Since π′ is a tail-adjusted HUCF order for D, it is admissible
for D.
Observe that






0, if i ∈ D\(M ∪ R1),
τ, if i ∈ R1,
−(sk + |R1|pk), if i ∈ M.
Therefore,












C(π′, i) − C(π, i)
)















where the last inequality follows from the fact that π is an optimal admissible order










Now consider the order µ′ which is obtained from µ by moving all jobs in K2 to
the tail of R1. Figure 2.7 also depicts the order µ
′.
Claim 2: µ′ is an admissible order for E and




Observe that if Claim 2 is true, then we are done:
v(E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) ≥ g(µ




αF(i) + g(µ, E) − v(D) − g(σ, Ty) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from the admissibility of µ′ and the last inequality
follows from inequality (2.18) and Claim 2.
Proof of Claim 2. Let jy be the job which is preceded by l(µ,K2) in the order
µ. Observe that xµ′,i = xµ,i for every i ∈ N\{iy, jy}. Hence, C(µ, i) = C(µ
′, i) for
56 Chapter 2. Sequencing Situations and Cooperation
every i ∈ P (µ,M) and
C(µ, i) − C(µ′, i) =
∑
j∈P̄ (µ,i)







(xµ,j − xµ′,j)sF(j), (2.19)
for every i ∈ S(µ,K2).
Obviously, xµ,iy = 1, xµ′,iy = 0. Observe that xµ,jy can either be 0 or 1.
Case 1: xµ,jy = 1. Then,
C(µ, i) − C(µ′, i) ≥ (1 − 0)sF(iy) + (1 − 1)sF(jy) = sk,
for every i ∈ S(µ,K2). Moreover, we know by inequality (2.17) that C(σ
′, i) −
C(µ, i) ≥ −sk for every i ∈ S(µ
′, E) and σ′ is an admissible order for E. Hence, µ′ is
also an admissible order for E since
C(σ0, i) − C(µ
′, i) ≥ C(σ′, i) − C(µ′, i) ≥ C(σ′, i) − C(µ, i) + sk ≥ 0,
for every i ∈ S(σ0, E).
Observe also that
C(µ, i) − C(µ′, i) =
{
τ + sk, if i ∈ K2,
|K2|pk, if i ∈ M.
(2.20)
Therefore,














































where the second equality follows from the fact that C(µ, i) = C(µ′, i) for every
i ∈ P (µ,M); the last but one inequality follows from equation (2.20) and the fact
that C(µ, i)−C(µ′, i) is at least sk for every i ∈ Ty\K2 and the last inequality follows
by Claim 1.
Case 2: xµ,jy = 0.
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Observe first that xµ,jy = 0 only when R2 ends behind Ty. We know that the first
job of R2 with respect to µ is iy, the first job of Ty with respect to σ|Ty . Since R2
ends behind Ty with respect to µ, every job in Ty must belong to R2, i.e., each job in
Ty is of family k and K2 = Ty. Moreover, then jy is the first player of S(σ0, Ty).
Observe also that since each job in Ty is of family k, C(π, i) = C(µ, i) for every
i ∈ S(σ0, E) and hence C(µ, i) = C(π, i) ≤ C(σ0, i), i.e., µ is also an admissible order
for E.
Consider now the order µ′. We know that xµ,iy = 1, xµ′,iy = 0 and xµ,jy = 0.
Observe that xµ′,jy = 1 since the last job of M with respect to µ
′ belongs to a
different family than k. Then by equation (2.19)
C(µ, i) − C(µ′, i) =
∑
j∈{iy ,jy}
(xµ,j − xµ′,j)sF(j) = 0, (2.22)
for every i ∈ S(µ,E). And hence µ′ is also an admissible order for E.
Moreover,


















where the equality follows by equation (2.20) and the inequality follows by Claim 1. ¤
As mentioned before, sequencing situations with controllable processing times (cf.
van Velzen, 2006) are in the same spirit with family sequencing situations, because,
in both types of sequencing situations, admissible reorderings of connected coalitions
can affect the completion times of the players behind them. van Velzen (2006) ana-
lyzed the sequencing games corresponding to sequencing situations with controllable
processing times and proved that many marginal vectors of these games are core ele-
ments. This result was obtained by showing that the sequencing games corresponding
to sequencing situations with controllable processing times are permutationally con-
vex with respect to many orders on the set of players. Permutational convexity (cf.
Granot and Huberman, 1982) with respect to an order σ ∈ Π(N) is a well-known
sufficient condition for the marginal vector of a cooperative game that corresponds
to σ to be a core element. Formally, a TU-game (N, v) is said to be permutationally
convex with respect to σ ∈ Π(N) if
v(P̄ (σ, i) ∪ T ) − v(P̄ (σ, i)) ≤ v(P̄ (σ, j) ∪ T ) − v(P̄ (σ, j)),
for every i, j ∈ N with σ(i) < σ(j) and T ⊂ S(σ, j).
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In the following example, we show that family sequencing games need not be
permutationally convex with respect to the initial order although the corresponding
marginal is an element of the core.
Example 2.2.4 Consider the family sequencing situation (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and F = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Assume that F(1) = F(3) = 1, F(2) = 2,
F(4) = F(5) = 3 and F(6) = 4. Assume also that σ0 is given by σ0(i) = i for every
i ∈ N , s = (2, 2, 1, 5), p = (1, 2, 2, 5) and α = (10, 10, 10, 1). Finally, let (N, v) be the
family sequencing game corresponding to Σ(N).
Consider the coalitions Q = {1, 2, 3}, Q′ = {1, 2, 3, 6}, R = {1, 2, 3, 4} and R′ =






. Hence, σQ =
(1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6) is an HUCF order for Q. It can easily be observed that σQ is admissible
for Q. Then, by Proposition 2.2.2, σQ is optimal for Q.










σR = (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6) is an HUCF order for R. It can easily be observed that σR is
admissible for R. Then, by Proposition 2.2.2, σR is optimal for R.
Observe also that σQ is an optimal admissible order for Q
′ and σR is an optimal
admissible order for R′. Then, (N, v) is not permutationally convex with respect to
σ0 since
2 = v(Q′) − v(Q) > v(R′) − v(R) = 1.
⋄
In several sequencing games considered in the literature, both the marginal vector
corresponding to the initial order σ0 and the marginal vector corresponding to the
inverse order of σ0 are core elements (e.g., Curiel et al., 1989; Çiftçi et al., 2008;
Curiel et al., 1993). In the following example, we show that the marginal vector
corresponding to the inverse order of σ0 need not belong to the core of a family
sequencing game.
Example 2.2.5 Consider the family sequencing situation (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) with
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and F = {1, 2}. Assume that F(1) = F(3) = 1 and F(2) = F(4) = 2.




and α = (1, 10). Finally, let (N, v) be the family sequencing game corresponding to
Σ(N).
The complete family sequencing game (N, v) is given by v(N) = 62, v({1, 2, 3}) =
18, v({1, 2, 4}) = 36, v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = v({3, 4}) = 27, v({1, 2}) = 16 and
v(T ) = 0 for every remaining coalition T ⊂ N . Then, mσ
−1











Networks play an important role in modern economic life. Transportation networks
(airlines, railroads, shipping services, postal services) provide us the means to com-
mute and to deliver products. Communication networks (internet, telephone, broad-
cast television, radio) allow us to conduct the necessary transactions required for
daily economic activities and energy networks (electric power transmission and dis-
tribution, water, natural gas and petroleum pipelines) help to provide the energy
and resources required to maintain all of these activities. In this chapter, which is
based on Çiftçi and Tijs (2009) and Çiftçi et al. (2007), we consider the problem of
allocating the construction costs of networks in an interactive cooperative setting.
In Section 3.2, we focus on the problem of allocating the construction costs of
networks arising in minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems. These problems
consider a group of agents, each of whom has to be connected to a source, either
directly or via other agents. One example would be a situation where villagers have
to construct and pay pipelines from their respective houses to a water supplier. This
type of cost allocation problems was first introduced in the economics literature by
Claus and Kleitman (1973). The seminal paper by Bird (1976) provided the first
game theoretical treatment of this problem by associating a coalitional game with
transferable utility to mcst problems. Then, solution concepts of cooperative game
theory were implemented and subsequently proposed as appropriate cost allocations
for mcst problems by several studies: Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984) analyzed
the core and the nucleolus; Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value.
Cost allocation rules for mcst problems can also be defined directly without con-
sidering the underlying cost game. In particular, one can make use of an algorithm
to construct an mcst and allocate the cost of each edge constructed by the algorithm
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among the agents by following an appropriate method. Cost allocation rules which
follow such a procedure are baptized construct and charge rules in Moretti et al.
(2005). Construct and charge rules proposed in the literature mainly focus on the
two well-known algorithms, Kruskal’s algorithm (Kruskal, 1956) and Prim’s algorithm
(Prim, 1957), for constructing an mcst. In particular, the Bird rule (Bird, 1976) and
the extended Bird rule (Dutta and Kar, 2004) rely on Prim’s algorithm while the
equal remaining obligations rule (ERO) (Feltkamp et al., 1994) and obligation rules
(Tijs et al., 2006) rely on Kruskal’s algorithm.
Recent contributions to the literature on cost allocation in mcst situations revealed
the fact that ERO satisfies many appealing properties: Branzei et al. (2004) and
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005a) obtained axiomatic characterizations of ERO
which are based on properties such as additivity and equal treatment. Tijs et al.
(2006) showed that obligation rules (and hence ERO) satisfy appealing population
monotonicity and cost monotonicity properties. Norde et al. (2004) showed that
an allocation scheme which is obtained by using ERO as an allocation vector is
population monotonic. Moreover, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007a) showed that
other rules in the literature fail to satisfy some properties that are satisfied by ERO.
They also provided an axiomatic characterization of ERO based on monotonicity
properties.
The original definition of ERO by Feltkamp et al. (1994) consists of a step-by-step
procedure: Kruskal’s algorithm is employed to construct an mcst and at each step
of the algorithm the cost of the constructed edge is divided among agents who make
use of the edge with respect to a prespecified scheme. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2005b) provided two different approaches to obtain ERO. They showed that ERO
can be obtained as the average of cost allocations provided by a procedure associated
with the irreducible matrix of the mcst situation and also with a procedure which
computes the part of the cost of edges in an mcst that every agent has to pay.
Moreover, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005b, 2007a) showed that Shapley values of
the so-called optimistic game associated with an mcst situation and of the coalitional
game associated with the irreducible matrix are both equal to ERO.
In Section 3.2 we present a new approach to obtain ERO and hence provide yet
another support for this important rule. For this aim, we consider a construct and
charge procedure, which we call the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure
(voccp). This procedure leads to an mcst and a cost sharing allocation where each
agent pays the edge which she chose to construct in the procedure. Postponing a
precise definition to the following sections, voccp can be explained as follows. Voccp
works in steps. At each step of the procedure one agent constructs one edge and the
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agent who is going to construct an edge is determined by making use of an order
on the set of agents. That is, at each step of the procedure, the first agent in the
order who has not yet constructed an edge constructs and pays the cheapest edge
which connects the component that the agent belongs to with another component.
The main result of our study is that ERO can be obtained as the average of the cost
allocations provided by voccp over all orders on the set of agents.
The vertex oriented approach differs from the original approach to obtain ERO
in the following ways. First, while at each step of voccp an agent constructs the
cheapest allowed edge, Kruskal’s algorithm selects and adds edges to the spanning
tree in increasing order of their costs. That is Kruskal’s algorithm is an edge oriented
algorithm. Second, ERO distributes the cost of an edge constructed by Kruskal’s
algorithm via a prespecified scheme. However, with our approach, the cost assigned
to an agent is determined as the average of her own choices in each run of the voccp.
Our new approach thus provides a new interpretation for ERO. Now ERO can be
interpreted as an expected value of the cost allocations provided by voccp for each
order on the set of agents and where the orders on the set of agents have equal
probability.
In Section 3.3 we investigate extensions of the results obtained in Section 3.2 for
mcst situations on a multisource extension of mcst situations, minimum cost spanning
forest situations (cf. Rosenthal, 1987). A minimum cost spanning forest situation
allows for more than one source, each source providing identical services. The users’
objective is still to build a minimum-cost network (which is a forest in this case)
which connects each of them to at least one source and to allocate its cost fairly. The
availability of different identical sources may be interpreted as the existence of several
suppliers which compete according to the costs of links connecting them to the users.
We first show that both Kruskal’s algorithm and voccp can be defined for minimum
cost spanning forest situations in a way that they yield efficient algorithms. Second,
we extend the definition of ERO to this multisource situation and prove that ERO
can again be obtained as the average of the cost allocations provided by voccp.
Section 3.4 investigates the extensions of the results obtained in Section 3.2 for
mcst situations with two sources. In a minimum cost spanning tree problem with
two sources, there exist exactly two sources which may provide identical or different
services and the users have to build a minimum-cost network which connects each of
them to both of the sources. The optimal network in this multisource situation is
again an mcst. Hence, Kruskal’s algorithm is also an efficient algorithm for these mcst
situations. We first propose an equal remaining obligations rule for mcst situations
with two sources. Then we extend voccp to these multisource situations and prove
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that ERO can again be obtained as the average of the cost allocations provided by
voccp.
In Section 3.5 we consider Highway Problems and the corresponding cooperative
cost games called highway games which were introduced by Mosquera and Zarzuelo
(2006) to address the problem of fair allocation of the construction costs of a highway
network. In a highway problem, the possibilities regarding the construction of a high-
way network are determined by a connected graph. The set of vertices of the graph
represents the potential entry and exit points and edges in the graph represent the
possible highway connections that can be constructed. Each edge in the graph has an
associated cost which in general will depend on its length or the geographical proper-
ties that may affect the construction costs of the highway. Each player in a highway
problem has to establish a connection between two given vertices in the graph, i.e.,
between his entry and exit point. Given a highway problem, a corresponding highway
game is defined as a cooperative cost game which associates to each coalition of play-
ers the total cost of the cheapest selection of edges in the graph which connects the
entry and exit point of every member of the coalition. Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006)
restricted attention to highway problems in which the underlying graph is a tree. For
complete graphs, highway problems are a special type of minimum cost forest (mcf)
problems as introduced by Kuipers (1997). Mcf problems are generalizations of mcst
problems which allow for more than one source, where each source offers a different
type of service and each customer has to be connected with a given nonempty subset
of the available sources.
In this study, we analyze highway problems in which the underlying graphs are
weakly cyclic. A graph is called weakly cyclic if it is connected and every edge
in the graph is contained in at most one cycle. In particular, these graphs may
contain cycles and hence, there will exist multiple paths between some entry and exit
points. Note that, in this setting, a coalition of players can further reduce the joint
construction costs by an optimal coordination of paths to construct. That is, the
joint minimal cost of a coalition is now obtained as a result of solving a combinatorial
optimization problem. Hence highway games induced by weakly cyclic graphs belong
to the research area of operations research games which focuses on the interplay
between the optimization of costs of a project and the allocation of costs among
the participants of the project. From among the numerous studies on this topic, we
mention minimum cost spanning tree games (Granot and Huberman, 1981), traveling
salesman games (Potters et al., 1992), Chinese postman games (Granot et al., 1999),
sequencing games (Curiel et al., 1989) and project games (Estevez-Fernandez et al.,
2007). An overview of operations research games can be found in Borm et al. (2001).
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We start our analysis of highway games that are induced by weakly cyclic graphs
by investigating their concavity properties in Section 3.5.2. We proceed as Herer and
Penn (1995) in the setting of traveling salesman problems and Granot et al. (1999)
for Chinese postman problems, and focus on the question for which class of graphs
the corresponding games are always concave. We define a graph to be highway game-
concave (HG-concave), if for every player set, for every choice of entry and exit points
for the players and for every cost specification, the corresponding highway game is
concave. The main result of this section is that a graph is HG-concave if and only if
it is weakly triangular. Here, a graph is called weakly triangular if it is weakly cyclic
and, moreover, if every cycle is a triangle, i.e., every cycle is composed of precisely
three edges.
In Section 3.5.3 we investigate the core of the highway games. Highway games
induced by trees are always balanced. For general highway games induced by graphs
which allow for multiple paths between vertices, the core can be empty. We prove
that highway games induced by weakly cyclic graphs are balanced.
3.1 Preliminaries
This section recalls basic notions from graph theory which will be used throughout
this chapter.
A graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a nonempty and finite set of vertices and
E ⊂ EV = {{u, v}|u, v ∈ V, u 6= v} is a set of edges. (V,EV ) is called the complete
graph on V . An edge {u, v} ∈ EV is said to connect vertices u and v and u, v are
called the end vertices of the edge {u, v}. Also we say that an edge is incident with
its end vertices (and vice versa).
A subgraph of G = (V,E) is a graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) with ∅ 6= V ′ ⊂ V and E ′ ⊂
EV ′ ∩ E. If G
′ is a subgraph of G, then we say that G contains G′. If a subgraph
G′ = (V ′, E ′) of G = (V,E) is such that E ′ = EV ′ ∩ E, then we say that V
′ induces
G′ in G and write G′ = G[V ′].
A path P of length k ≥ 1 is a graph (V,E) with
V = {v1, ..., vk+1}, |V | = k + 1 and E = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, ..., {vk, vk+1}},
and is often abbreviated by P = v1v2...vk+1; it is also referred as a path from v1 to
vk+1.
A cycle C of length k ≥ 3 is a graph (V,E) with
V = {v1, ..., vk}, |V | = k and E = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, ..., {vk−1, vk}, {vk, v1}}
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and is often abbreviated by C = v1v2...vkv1.
Two vertices u, v ∈ V are called connected in G if u = v or if G contains a path
between u and v as a subgraph. A graph G is called connected if every pair of distinct
vertices of G is connected in G. If G = (V,E) is connected, an edge e ∈ E is called
a bridge in G if the graph (V,E\{e}) is not connected. The notion of connectedness
induces an equivalence relation on the vertex set V . Thus there is a partition of V into
nonempty subsets V1, V2, ..., Vk such that two vertices u and v are connected if and
only if both u and v belong to the same set Vi. The subgraphs G[V1], G[V2], ..., G[Vk]
are called components of G. We denote by Gu the component of G to which vertex u
belongs.
An acyclic graph, i.e., a graph which does not contain cycles is called a forest. A
connected forest is called a tree. Notice that the components of a forest are all trees,
i.e., a forest is a disjoint union of trees. A subgraph G′ = (V ′, E ′) of G = (V,E) is
called a spanning tree of G if it is a tree with V ′ = V . A connected graph is called
weakly cyclic if every edge in the graph is contained in at most one cycle 1. A weakly
cyclic graph is called weakly triangular if every cycle in G has length 3.
Given a graph G = (V,E), an edge e ∈ EV \E and an edge e
′ ∈ E, we denote by
G + e the graph (V,E ∪ {e}) and by G − e′ the graph (V,E\{e′}).
In the following we do not always distinguish strictly between a graph and its
vertex or its edge set. For example, we may write v ∈ G (rather than v ∈ V ) or e ∈ G
(rather than e ∈ E).
3.1.1 Minimum cost spanning tree situations
Mcst situations involve a group of agents who have to be connected to a supplier
of a service (source). Every mcst situation can be represented by a triple (N, 0, w),
where N = {1, ..., n} is the agent set and 0 represents the source. In the following,
we denote by N ′ the set N ∪ {0}. The function w : EN ′ → R+ is called a weight
function and associates with each edge e ∈ EN ′ the weight w(e) which represents the
cost of constructing e. If w(e) ∈ {0, 1} for every e ∈ EN ′ , then the weight function w
is called a simple weight function and the mcst situation (N, 0, w) is called a simple
mcst situation. Obviously, the minimum cost network that would connect all agents
to the source has to form a spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′). Therefore, given an mcst
problem (N, 0, w), we are interested in finding a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) of
(N, 0, w). Formally, the cost of a spanning tree, Γ is given by w(Γ) =
∑
e∈E(Γ) w(e) and
1The name “weakly cyclic” graph is not a standard graph theoretical term. It was first introduced
in the context of Chinese postman games in Granot et al. (1999) and was maintained in subsequent
related papers. Weakly cyclic graphs are also called cactus graphs.
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Γ is called an mcst if it satisfies w(Γ) = min{w(Γ′)|Γ′ is a spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′)}.
Observe that an mcst situation with agent set N , (N, 0, w), can be identified with
the weight function, w. Hence, we will denote the set of mcst situations with agent
set N as WN = R
EN′
+ .
Example 3.1.1 Assume that three villages have to be connected to a water supplier
directly or via the other villages. The cost of constructing water pipelines between
the villages and between the villages and the water supplier are given in Figure 3.1.











Figure 3.1: An mcst situation (left side) and a related mcst (right side)
An mcst in this mcst situation is the tree with edges {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {0, 1} with cost
190.
We will use the following well-known results in graph theory:
Property 3.1.1 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation and let Γ be a subgraph of (N ′, EN ′).
Then,
(1) Γ is a spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′) if and only if Γ has n edges and does not
contain cycles.
(2) A spanning tree Γ of (N ′, EN ′) is an mcst of (N, 0, w) if and only if w(e) ≥
w(e′) for every e ∈ EN ′\E(Γ) and every e
′ ∈ C, where C is the unique cycle in Γ+ e.
3.1.2 Algorithms for mcst situations
The first problem that arises in mcst situations is how to find an mcst. The operations
research literature on mcst problems has provided many algorithmic solutions to
the problem and has discussed the computational properties of these solutions. An
historic overview of the algorithms provided for the mcst problem can be found in
Graham and Hell (1985). In this section, we briefly introduce the two most famous
algorithms, Kruskal’s algorithm (Kruskal, 1956) and Prim’s algorithm (Prim, 1957).
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Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation. A minimum cost spanning tree for (N, 0, w)
can be obtained in the following two ways.
Prim’s Algorithm: In the first iteration a cheapest edge which connects
the source with an agent is constructed. In every subsequent iteration
of Prim’s algorithm, a cheapest edge which connects an agent who is
not connected to the source yet with either the source or another agent
which is already connected to the source in the previous iterations of the
algorithm is constructed. In every step of the algorithm, precisely one
agent gets connected with the source. So, the algorithm results in an
mcst after |N | steps.
Kruskal’s Algorithm: Kruskal’s algorithm selects and adds edges to
the spanning tree in increasing order of their costs such that an edge is
added only if it does not create a cycle with the previously added edges.
Example 3.1.2 Consider the mcst situation (N, 0, w) with N = {1, 2, 3} and w as
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Prim’s algorithm first constructs the edge {0, 1} since it is the cheapest of all edges
that connect an agent with the source. Then the algorithm selects {1, 2} and finally
{1, 3} resulting in the mcst with the set of edges {{0, 1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}.
Kruskal’s algorithm first constructs the cheapest edge {1, 2} and then the second
cheapest edge {1, 3}. The third cheapest edge is {2, 3}. However, this edge is not
constructed by the algorithm since it creates a cycle with the previously constructed
edges. At the third step of the algorithm, the edge {0, 1} is constructed resulting in
the mcst with the set of edges {{0, 1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}. ⋄
3.2 A Vertex Oriented Approach to ERO for MCST
Situations
In this section, we prove that ERO can be obtained as the average of the cost alloca-
tions provided by voccp for every order on the set of agents. Section 3.2.1 introduces
ERO formally. Section 3.2.2 introduces another class of construct and charge proce-
dures, the P σ-rules (where σ is an order on the set of agents) introduced by Branzei
et al. (2004). These procedures are also based on Kruskal’s algorithm and they will be
utilized while proving that ERO can be obtained as the average of the cost allocations
provided by voccp. Section 3.2.3 introduces voccp and also analyzes its algorithmic
properties. Section 3.2.4 proves our main results. Finally, Section 3.2.5 investigates
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the connections between voccp and the so-called optimistic game associated with an
mcst situation (cf. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007a).
3.2.1 ERO for cost sharing in mcst situations
Feltkamp et al. (1994) introduced ERO to solve the cost sharing problem related to
mcst situations. In the following, we will provide the notation and the definitions
required to introduce ERO.
Let Π(EN ′) stand for the set of all bijections π : {1, ..., |EN ′ |} → EN ′ . Obviously,
for each mcst situation (N, 0, w), there exists a bijection π ∈ Π(EN ′) that orders
edges in increasing order with respect to their costs, i.e., w(π(1)) ≤ w(π(2)) ≤ ... ≤
w(π(|EN ′|)). The column vector (w(π(1)), w(π(2)), ..., w(π(|EN ′|)))
t is denoted by
wπ.
For any π ∈ Π(EN ′), one can define the set K
π = {w ∈ WN |w(π(1)) ≤ w(π(2)) ≤
... ≤ w(π(|EN ′|))}, i.e., the set of weight functions which result in the same increasing
order on the set of edges with respect to their costs. It can easily be observed that
Kπ is a cone in WN . Obviously,
⋃
π∈Π(EN′ )
Kπ = WN . For each π ∈ Π(EN ′), the set
of simple weight functions eπ,k ∈ Kπ defined by
eπ,k(π(1)) = eπ,k(π(2)) = ... = eπ,k(π(k − 1)) = 0
eπ,k(π(k)) = eπ,k(π(k + 1)) = ... = eπ,k(π(|EN ′|)) = 1,
for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |EN ′ |} forms a basis of K
π. That is each weight function w ∈ Kπ
can be written as a unique linear combination of these simple weight functions as





(w(π(k)) − w(π(k − 1)))eπ,k
)
. (3.1)
We introduce ERO in two steps. First a rule EROπ is defined on each cone Kπ
and then it is proved that these EROπ rules can be extended to the whole cone of
mcst situations.
Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation and π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
π. In
order to define EROπ on Kπ, we will consider Kruskal’s algorithm when it selects
edges with respect to order π. The EROπ-rule distributes the cost of edges that
are constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm among the agents whose connectivity, i.e.,
the number of nodes in N that an agent is connected to, increases with the con-
struction of the edge. To do so, we will consider a sequence of |EN ′|+1 graphs:
(N ′, F π,0), (N ′, F π,1), ..., (N ′, F π,|EN′ |) such that F π,0 = ∅ and F π,k = F π,k−1 ∪ {π(k)}
for every k ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}. In the following, for the sake of simplicity, we will denote
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the graphs (N ′, F π,k) shortly by F π,k, i.e., by their edge sets. The connectivity of an
agent i in graph F π,k is denoted by ni(F
π,k). Note that ni(F
π,k) = 1 when i is not
connected to any other agent in N in F π,k. The connection vectors bπ,k ∈ RN are
defined for each k ∈ {0, 1, ..., |EN ′ |} by
bπ,ki =
{





for each i ∈ N . EROπ will distribute the cost of a Kruskal edge proportionally to
the change in the connection vectors resulting from the introduction of the edge by
the algorithm.
The contribution matrix with respect to π ∈ Π(EN ′) is the matrix M
π ∈ RN×EN′
where rows correspond to agents and columns to edges. It lists the change in the
connectivity of the agents, i.e., the k-th column of Mπ equals
Mπek = bπ,k−1 − bπ,k (3.3)
for each k ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}. Here e
k stands for the column vector defined as eki = 1 if
i = k and eki = 0 for each i ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}\{k}.
Observe that the zero columns in Mπ correspond to edges which are not con-
structed by Kruskal’s algorithm. Moreover, each column Mπek with (Mπek)i 6= 0
for some i ∈ N corresponds to the edge π(k) constructed at stage k in the Kruskal
algorithm. Notice that the sum of the elements of such a column equals 1. Then,
(Mπek)i (i ∈ N), the difference between i’s connectivity resulting from the construc-
tion of π(k), represents the fraction of the cost of the edge π(k) to be paid by agent
i. Notice also that the sum of elements of each row of Mπ equals 1.
We are now ready to define the rule EROπ on Kπ.
Definition 3.2.1 For each π ∈ Π(EN ′), ERO
π is defined as the map EROπ : Kπ →
RN , where EROπ(w) = Mπwπ for each mcst situation w in the cone Kπ.
If in an mcst (N, 0, w), some edges have the same cost then we know that there
exist multiple orders that are compatible with w, i.e., there exist π, π′ ∈ Π(EN ′) such
that w ∈ Kπ ∩ Kπ
′
. Then, for all orders compatible with edges, the corresponding
EROπ rule can be utilized to distribute the cost of the mcst obtained. So, the impor-
tant question that arises at this point is whether different EROπ rules corresponding
to different orders that are compatible with an mcst situation lead to the same cost
allocation or not. The following lemma shows that although the allocation of the
cost of a single edge by different EROπ rules may change with respect to the order
of edges under consideration, the allocation of the total cost of all edges with same
cost is the same regardless of the order considered.
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Lemma 3.2.1 (Branzei et al., 2004, Lemma 1) Let π ∈ Π(EN ′), w ∈ K
π. Assume
that wπt = w
π
t+1 for some t ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |−1}. Then for the ordering π
′ ∈ Π(EN ′) such
that π′(t) = π(t+1), π′(t+1) = π(t) and π′(i) = π(i) for every i ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}\{t, t+
1}, we have that w ∈ Kπ
′
and EROπ(w) = EROπ
′
(w).
Hence, for every order π that a weight function w is compatible with, EROπ(w)
results in the same allocation.
Proposition 3.2.1 (Branzei et al., 2004, Proposition 1) Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst
situation. Then, EROπ(w) = EROπ
′




Proposition 3.2.1 implies that EROπ rules can be extended to the whole cone of
mcst situations as one ERO rule.
Definition 3.2.2 ERO is defined as the map ERO : WN → RN , where
ERO(w) = EROπ(w) = Mπwπ (3.4)
for every w ∈ WN and π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π.
Example 3.2.1 Consider the mcst situation (N, 0, w) with N = {1, 2, 3} and w as
depicted in Figure 3.1. Then w ∈ Kπ, with π(1) = {1, 2}, π(2) = {1, 3}, π(3) =
{2, 3}, π(4) = {0, 1}, π(5) = {0, 3} and π(6) = {0, 2}.
The sequence of the graphs F π,k formed by Kruskal’s algorithm and the corre-
sponding connection vectors are given in Table 3.1.
F π,k bπ,k
∅ (1, 1, 1)t
















{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}} (0, 0, 0)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}, {0, 3}} (0, 0, 0)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}, {0, 3}, {0, 2}} (0, 0, 0)t
Table 3.1: Graphs formed in each step of Kruskal’s algorithm and the corresponding con-
nection vectors in Example 3.2.1.
























Finally, wπ = (40, 60, 70, 90, 100, 150)t. Hence, ERO(w) = Mπwπ = (60, 60, 70)t. ⋄
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It follows by the definition of ERO that it satisfies the Cone-wise Positive Lin-
earity property (cf. Branzei et al., 2004). That is
ERO(αw + α′w′) = αERO(w) + α′ERO(w′),
for every π ∈ Π(EN ′), for every w,w
′ ∈ Kπ and for every α, α′ ≥ 0. Hence ERO(w)
can also be calculated by making use of the linear decomposition of w into simple






(w(π(k)) − w(π(k − 1)))ERO(eπ,k)
)
, (3.5)
for every w ∈ WN and π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π.
3.2.2 P σ-rules for mcst situations
In this section we present a class of construct and charge rules, the P σ-rules which
are introduced by Branzei et al. (2004).
Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation with w ∈ Kπ. We denote by Π(N) the set of all
orders σ : {1, 2, ..., n} → N , where σ(k) = i means that agent i is in the k-th position
with respect to σ. Moreover, for every σ ∈ Π(N), we say that i ∈ N is the last agent
in F π,ti with respect to σ, if σ
−1(i) ≥ σ−1(j) for every agent j ∈ F π,ti . Recall here that
F π,t denotes the graph obtained after adding the t cheapest edges (with respect to π)
during Kruskal’s algorithm and F π,ti is the component of F
π,t which contains agent i.
P σ-rules (σ ∈ Π(N)) are closely related with ERO and to present this rule we
follow the same plan used for ERO. Analogously to Definition 3.2.1, for each π ∈
Π(EN ′), we first define a rule P
σ,π on cone Kπ by P σ,π(w) = Mσ,πwπ for each mcst
situation w ∈ Kπ. Similarly to the definition of the contribution matrix Mπ for








for every k ∈ {0, 1, ..., |EN ′ |} and every i ∈ N.
A variant of Lemma 3.2.1 holds also for rules P σ,π. Hence, similarly to EROπ-
rules, for every order π that a weight function w is compatible with, P σ,π(w) also
results in the same allocation. This enables us to define a P σ-rule over all mcst
situations.
Definition 3.2.3 P σ is defined as the map P σ : WN → RN , where
P σ(w) = P σ,π(w) = Mσ,πwπ (3.6)
for every σ ∈ Π(N), w ∈ WN and π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π.
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Example 3.2.2 Consider the mcst situation (N, 0, w) with N = {1, 2, 3} and w as
depicted in Figure 3.1. Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N . Example
3.2.1 provides an order π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π and in Table 3.1 we already
provided the sequence of graphs F π,k formed by Kruskal’s algorithm. In Table 3.2,
we provide the corresponding bσ(F π,k) vectors. Then the corresponding matrix Mσ,π
F π,k bσ(F π,k)
∅ (1, 1, 1)t
{{1, 2}} (0, 1, 1)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}} (0, 0, 1)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} (0, 0, 1)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}} (0, 0, 0)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}, {0, 3}} (0, 0, 0)t
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 1}, {0, 3}, {0, 2}} (0, 0, 0)t
Table 3.2: Graphs formed in each step of Kruskal’s algorithm and the corresponding






1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0





Recall that wπ = (40, 60, 70, 90, 100, 150)t. Hence, P σ(w) = Mσ,πwπ = (40, 60, 90)t. ⋄
There is an important connection between ERO and P σ-rules. Tijs et al. (2006)
proved that ERO is the average of the P σ-rules over all possible orderings of agents.







In the following proposition we prove that if P σ is utilized in an mcst situation,
then every agent pays for one edge of the mcst constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm.
Proposition 3.2.3 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation, π ∈ Π(EN ′) with w ∈ K
π and
σ ∈ Π(N). Then P σ(w) assigns each agent the cost of one of the edges of the mcst
constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm.
Proof. First let us show that P σ does not assign any cost for the edges not con-
structed by the algorithm. For this aim consider a column Mσ,πek that correspond to
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an edge π(k) which is not constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm. Since π(k) is not con-
structed it must create a cycle with the previously constructed edges in F π,k and hence
does not affect vectors bσ(F π,k), i.e., bσ(F π,k−1) = bσ(F π,k) and hence Mσ,πek = 0. So,
P σ does not allocate any cost for the edges not constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm.
Now consider a column Mσ,πek that corresponds to an edge π(k) constructed by
Kruskal’s algorithm. Since it is constructed it must connect two disjoint components
in F π,k−1, let’s say F1 and F2. Let us denote the last agent in F1 with respect to σ
by i and the one in F2 by j. Assume without loss of generality that σ
−1(i) ≥ σ−1(j),
i.e., j precedes i with respect to order σ.
Now assume that the source does not belong to these components. Then we have
that bσ(F π,k−1)i = b
σ(F π,k−1)j = 1 and b
σ(F π,k−1)r = 0 for every other agent r in
F1 ∪ F2. Observe now that i is the last agent in F1 ∪ F2 with respect to σ and
0 6∈ F1 ∪ F2. Hence, b
σ(F π,k)i = 1 and b
σ(F π,k)r = 0 for every other agent r in
F1 ∪ F2. Hence, (M
σ,πek)j = 1 and (M
σ,πek)r = 0 for every other agent r ∈ N\{j}.
That is the cost of edge π(k) is assigned totally to agent j. Observe that bσ(F π,l)j = 1
for every l < k − 1 and bσ(F π,l)j = 0 for every l > k . So, agent j is not allocated
any other cost, i.e., P σ(w)j = w(π(k)).
Now assume that F1 contains the source. Then b
σ(F π,k−1)r = 0 for every agent
r ∈ F1 ∪ F2 except j. b
σ(F π,k−1)j = 1 since j is the last agent in F2 and 0 6∈ F2.
Moreover, bσ(F π,k)r = 0 for every agent r ∈ F1 ∪ F2 since 0 ∈ F1 ∪ F2. So, the cost
of edge π(k) is assigned totally to agent j. As discussed above, j is not allocated any
other cost, so P σ(w)j = w(π(k)).
One can use the arguments given above to show that if F2 contains the source,
then the cost of edge π(k) is assigned totally to agent i and i is not allocated any
other cost. So, P σ(w)i = w(π(k)) and hence we are done. ¤
In the following proposition we consider simple mcst situations and show which
agents are assigned edges that cost zero and which agents are assigned edges that
cost one by P σ(w).
Proposition 3.2.4 Let (N, 0, w) be a simple mcst situation, π ∈ Π(EN ′) with w ∈
Kπ and σ ∈ Π(N). Assume that the number of edges in EN ′ that cost zero is t. Then
P σ(w)i =
{




for every i ∈ N .
We omit the proof of Proposition 3.2.4 since it is straightforward.
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It follows by the definition of P σ that it satisfies the cone-wise positive linearity
property. Hence P σ(w) can also be calculated by making use of the linear decompo-
sition of w into simple weight functions as given in Equation 3.1. Hence





(w(π(k)) − w(π(k − 1)))P σ(eπ,k)
)
, (3.7)
for every σ ∈ Π(N), w ∈ WN and π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π.
3.2.3 The vertex oriented construct and charge procedure
In this section we introduce voccp and also analyze its algorithmic properties.
Let G = (N ′, E) be a graph on N ′. Recall that the component of G which contains
agent i is denoted by Gi. Then the set of edges which connect a vertex of this
component with a vertex of another component is given by {{u, v}|u ∈ Gi and v ∈
N ′\Gi}. We call this set the set of component reducing edges for agent i in G and
denote it by Ai(G).
Just like Kruskal’s algorithm and Prim’s algorithm, voccp is a greedy algorithm
which works on the principle of gradual merging several trees in a forest in the cheapest
possible way until an mcst is achieved. The procedure makes use of a predetermined
order on the set of agents to determine the agent who is going to construct an edge.
At each step of the procedure, the first agent in the order who has not yet constructed
an edge constructs and pays the cheapest allowed edge, i.e., the cheapest edge which
connects the tree to which he belongs to another tree of the forest obtained in the
previous iterations of the procedure.
Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation. Then voccp for mcst situations is defined
formally as follows:
(Step 1) Pick σ ∈ Π(N) .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0 = 0 (∈ RN).
(Step 3) For k = 1 to n:
Let σ(k) = i. Choose an edge eσk such that
eσk = arg min{w(e)|e ∈ Ai(G
σ,k−1)}.
Set Gσ,k = Gσ,k−1 + eσk and v
σ,k = vσ,k−1 + w(eσk)e
{i}.
(Step 4) Set Γσ = Gσ,n and vσ = vσ,n.
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Example 3.2.3 Consider the mcst situation (N, 0, w) with N = {1, 2, 3} and w as
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N . The related voccp is
described as follows:
(Step 1) Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0 = 0.
(Step 3) Step 3 consists of the following three iterations:
• k = 1: σ(1) = 1. Obviously A1(G
σ,0) = {{1, 0}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}. Then, eσ1 =
{1, 2}, Gσ,1 = (N ′, {{1, 2}}) and vσ,1 = (40, 0, 0).
• k = 2: σ(2) = 2. Note that 2 and 1 are in the same component of Gσ,1 but 3 and
0 belong to different components. So A2(G
σ,1) = {{1, 0}, {1, 3}, {2, 0}, {2, 3}}.
Then, eσ2 = {1, 3}, G
σ,2 = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}) and vσ,1 = (40, 60, 0).
• k = 3: σ(3) = 3. Note that 3 is connected with 1 and 2 in Gσ,2 and hence these
vertices belong to the same component. So A3(G
σ,2) = {{1, 0}, {2, 0}, {3, 0}}.
Then, eσ3 = {1, 0}, G
σ,3 = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 0}}) and vσ,3 = (40, 60, 90).
(Step 4) Γσ = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 0}}) and vσ = (40, 60, 90).
In Figure 3.2, we depict graphs Gσ,k obtained in step 3 of voccp related to σ. Here,
for each of these graphs, the agent who is going to construct an edge is indicated with


















Figure 3.2: Graphs obtained during voccp in Example 3.2.3
In Table 3.3 we give the construct and charge results provided by voccp for all
orderings of agents. ⋄
It’s obvious that Γσ as obtained in Step 4 of voccp related to order σ has n edges
and does not contain any cycle. Hence, it immediately follows from result (1) of
Property 3.1.1 that Γσ is a spanning tree. Observe that voccp can lead to different
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Constructed edges by Costs for
σ 1 2 3 1 2 3
(1,2,3) (1,2) (1,3) (1,0) 40 60 90
(1,3,2) (1,2) (1,0) (1,3) 40 90 60
(2,1,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,0) 60 40 90
(2,3,1) (1,0) (1,2) (1,3) 90 40 60
(3,1,2) (1,2) (1,0) (1,3) 40 90 60
(3,2,1) (1,0) (1,2) (1,3) 90 40 60
Table 3.3: Construct and charge results for the mcst situation in Figure 3.1
spanning trees. Because, at each iteration of the procedure in step 3, the agents are
allowed to choose any cheapest allowed edge. So, if a cheapest allowed edge is not
unique, the procedure may lead to different spanning trees depending on choices of
agents.
We establish in the following theorem that voccp is an efficient algorithm for mcst
problems, i.e., any spanning tree provided by voccp is an mcst of the mcst situation.
Theorem 3.2.1 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation and σ ∈ Π(N). Then, Γσ is an
mcst of (N, 0, w).
Proof. For any spanning tree T of (N ′, EN ′) other than Γ
σ denote by f(T ) the
smallest value of k such that eσk is not in T . Now suppose that Γ
σ is not an mcst and
let T be an mcst such that f(T ) is as large as possible.
Suppose that f(T ) = k, i.e., eσ1 , ..., e
σ
k−1 are in both T and Γ
σ, but that eσk is not
in T . Then, T + eσk contains a unique cycle C and obviously, C contains an edge e
′
different than eσk such that e
′ ∈ Aσ(k)(G
σ,k−1). Now, on the one hand, w(eσk) ≤ w(e
′),
since e′ is allowed for σ(k) in Gσ,k−1 and on the other hand, w(e′) ≤ w(eσk) by result
(2) in Property 3.1.1. Hence, w(e′) = w(eσk). Moreover, T
′ = (T + eσk)− e
′ is another
spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′) and w(T ) = w(T
′). So, T ′, too, is an mcst. However,
f(T ′) > f(T ), contradicting with the choice of T . Therefore, Γσ is indeed an mcst.¤
Remark 3.2.1 It can be shown that voccp solves the mcst problem in O ((n + 1)3)
time and hence has a greater (time) complexity than the well-known algorithms
Prim’s algorithm and Kruskal’s algorithm which solve the problem in O ((n + 1)2)
and O ((n + 1)log(n + 1)) time, respectively. The main reason behind the greater
time requirement is that voccp has to manipulate more information compared to
Kruskal’s algorithm and Prim’s algorithm, since it also provides a cost allocation
besides an mcst of the problem.
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We prove in Theorem 3.2.2 that every mcst in an mcst situation can be obtained
by voccp for any order of agents followed.
Theorem 3.2.2 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation and let T be an mcst. Then T can
be the result of a vertex oriented construct and charge procedure for any permutation
σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Suppose that the mcst T can not be constructed by voccp for a specific
σ ∈ Π(N). Starting with σ construct Γ by using voccp as far as possible. Then, there
exists k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that eσ1 , ..., e
σ
k−1 are in T , but that e
σ
k is not in T . Then,
T + eσk contains a unique cycle C and obviously, C contains an edge e
′ different than
eσk such that e
′ ∈ Aσ(k)(G
σ,k−1). Since σ(k) can not construct e′ although it is allowed
for σ(k) in Gσ,k−1, it follows that w(eσk) < w(e
′). But, then T ′ = T + eσk − e
′ is a
spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′) with total weight less than that of T , a contradiction. ¤
Remark 3.2.2 Theorem 3.2.2 shows that every mcst can be the result of voccp.
Subsequently, the important question that arises is whether the cost allocation pro-
vided by voccp is independent of the mcst reached. In the next section, we will see
that this is indeed the case.
3.2.4 A new approach to obtain ERO
In this section we prove the coincidence of the cost allocation provided by ERO with
the average of the cost allocations provided by voccp over all orders of agents.
We show in the following lemma that, for simple mcst situations, the cost alloca-
tion vσ provided by voccp related to order σ ∈ Π(N) is equal to P σ(w).
Lemma 3.2.2 Let (N, 0, w) be a simple mcst situation. Then vσ equals P σ(w) for
every σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Let w be a simple mcst situation. Let us denote the number of edges in EN ′
that cost zero with t. Let π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
π and let σ ∈ Π(N).
By Proposition 3.2.4, we have to show that the cost vσi assigned by voccp related
to σ to an agent i ∈ N is equal to 1 if i is the last agent in F π,ti with respect to σ and
0 6∈ F π,ti , and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Pick an agent i ∈ N . Assume that i is the kth agent with respect to order σ, i.e.,
σ(k) = i. Naturally, agent i constructs a zero-edge during voccp related to σ if there
exist zero-edges that are component reducing for agent i in Gσ,k−1.
Now, assume that 0 ∈ F π,ti . Observe then that the number of edges of a tree
which connects the vertices of F π,ti is equal to the number of agents in F
π,t
i . Hence,
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even if i is the last agent in F π,ti and all agents in F
π,t
i that precede i constructed a
zero-edge in F π,ti , i will still not be connected to some agents in F
π,t
i , i.e., there will
exist component reducing edges for agent i in Gσ,k−1 that cost 0. Hence, vσi = 0.
Assume now that 0 6∈ F π,ti . Then the number of edges of a tree which connects
the vertices of F π,ti is one less than the number of agents in F
π,t
i . If agent i is the last
agent in F π,ti with respect to σ, then all other agents in F
π,t
i that precede i with re-
spect to σ will construct a zero-edge, and hence all vertices of F π,ti will be connected in
Gσ,k−1. Hence, all component reducing edges for agent i in Gσ,k−1 cost 1, i.e., vσi = 1.¤
Lemma 3.2.2 also proves that vσ yields in a unique cost allocation independent of
the mcst reached for simple mcst situations. Hence, for every simple mcst situation
w, we can now denote by vσ(w) the unique cost allocation provided by voccp related
to order σ ∈ Π(N).
We show in the following proposition that vσ equals P σ(w) for every mcst situation
by making use of the linear decomposition of w into simple weight functions.
Proposition 3.2.5 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst situation. Then vσ equals P σ(w) for
every σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Let π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
π. We know that











(w(π(k)) − w(π(k − 1)))vσ(eπ,k)
)
,
where the second equality follows by Lemma 3.2.2.
Now let Γ be a minimum cost spanning tree of w. Then by Theorem 3.2.2 Γ can
be constructed by voccp related to order σ. Let vσ be the cost allocation provided
by voccp related to σ when it results in Γ.
It can be observed that Γ is also an mcst of every simple mcst situation eπ,k
(k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |EN ′ |}). Then again by Theorem 3.2.2, Γ can be constructed by voocp
related to σ in every simple mcst situation eπ,k. Now, consider voccp related to σ
in w and in a simple mcst situation eπ,k. Assume that voccp resulted in Γ in both
mcst situations. Then, obviously, for every iteration of the procedure k ∈ {1, ..., n},
the corresponding agent σ(k) chooses to construct the same edge of Γ in both mcst
situations w and eπ,k. But then voccp assigns the cost of the same edge to every agent
in both situations. Since this observation is true for every simple mcst situation eπ,k,
we can conclude that
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Since vσ yields in a unique cost allocation independent of the mcst reached for
any mcst situations, we can now denote by vσ(w) the unique cost allocation provided
by voccp related to order σ ∈ Π(N) for every mcst situation w ∈ WN .
We know by Proposition 3.2.2 that the average of P σ-rules over all possible orders
of agents is equal to ERO. But, since vσ(w) = P σ(w) by Proposition 3.2.5, we
can now conclude that ERO can be obtained an an average of the cost allocations
provided by voccp over all possible orders of agents.







3.2.5 Voccp and the optimistic game in mcst situations
In this section, we investigate the connections between voccp and the optimistic
transferable utility game for mcst problems (cf. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007b).
In an optimistic transferable utility game for mcst problems, the worth of a coalition
is defined as the cost of connection, assuming that the rest of agents are already
connected to the source. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005b) show that the Shapley
value of this game is equal to the cost allocation provided by ERO. It is well-known
that the Shapley value of a TU-game is equal to the average of its marginal vectors
over all orders on the set of players. We will prove in the following that for every
ordering σ of the agents, the vσ value is equal to the marginal of the game for the
same ordering.
The optimistic game for mcst situations is defined as follows. Given an mcst situa-
tion (N, 0, w) and a nonempty coalition of agents S ⊂ N , we first obtain an optimistic
mcst situation for S assuming that when the agents in S have to be connected to
the source, the agents in N\S are already connected to the source and the agents
in S can connect to the source via agents in N\S. Formally, the optimistic mcst
situation for S is the mcst situation (S, 0, wS), where wS(e) = w(e) for every e ∈ ES
and wS({i, 0}) = minj∈N ′\S w({i, j}) for every i ∈ S. That is the costs of edges that
connect agents in S are not changed in the optimistic mcst situation. However, the
cost of edges which connect an agent in S with the source are changed to be equal to
the cost of the cheapest edge which connects the agent in S with an agent outside S
or with the source in according with the assumptions of the optimistic setup.
Now the optimistic TU-game (N, v) associated with the mcst situation (N, 0, w)
is defined as v(S) = wS(Γ) where Γ is a mcst for (S, 0, wS) for every S ⊂ N with
v(∅) = 0.
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Example 3.2.4 Consider the mcst situation (N, 0, w) with N = {1, 2, 3} and w
as depicted in Figure 3.1. Consider coalition {1, 2}. In Figure 3.3 we provide the
optimistic mcst situation for {1, 2} and a related mcst. Hence the worth of coalition






Figure 3.3: The optimistic mcst situation for {1, 2} (left side) and a related mcst (right
side)
optimistic TU-game associated with (N, 0, w) is given in Table 3.4.
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
v(S) 40 40 60 100 100 100 190
Table 3.4: The optimistic TU-game in Example 3.2.4
⋄
We first consider in Lemma 3.2.3 the structure of graphs Gσ,0, Gσ,1, ..., Gσ,n that
are formed during step 3 of voccp. In particular, we focus on the tree to which the
agent that is going to construct an edge belongs and show that (i) the source 0 can
not belong to this component and (ii) all other agents in the component must have
constructed an edge in the previous iterations of the procedure.
Lemma 3.2.3 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst, σ ∈ Π(N), k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and σ(k) = i.
Then,
(i) 0 6∈ Gσ,k−1i .
(ii) σ−1(j) ≤ σ−1(i) for every j ∈ Gσ,k−1i .
Proof. (i) Suppose 0 ∈ Gσ,k−1i . We know that G
σ,k−1
i is a tree and hence the number
of vertices of Gσ,k−1i is one more than its number of edges. Then, the number of
agents that belong to this tree is equal to the number of edges of this tree and hence
all agents that belong to this tree must have constructed an edge, a contradiction
since agent i has not constructed an edge yet.
(ii) can be proven similarly. ¤
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In the following, we show that for every ordering of the agents, the cost allocation
provided by the related voccp and the related marginal vector of the optimistic game
are equal to each other.
Proposition 3.2.6 Let (N, 0, w) be an mcst. Then vσ(w) = mσ(v) for every σ ∈
Π(N).
Proof. Let σ ∈ Π(N). We denote by Sk the set of first k agents with respect to
order σ, i.e., Sk = {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k)} for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Also we denote an
mcst of the optimistic mcst situation for Sk by Γk. We will show that the total cost
of the first k edges constructed in voccp related to σ is equal to the cost of an mcst
of (Sk, 0, wSk), i.e., w(G
σ,k) = wSk(Γk) for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Pick k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. First, we know by Lemma 3.2.3 that at least one end vertex
of every edge e ∈ Gσ,k belongs to Sk. Second, if {u, v} ∈ G
σ,k is such that u ∈ Sk and
v 6∈ Sk, then {u, v} is the cheapest edge which connects u with a vertex outside Sk,
i.e., w({u, v}) = minw∈N ′\Sk w({u,w}). Hence, w({u, v}) = wSk({u, 0}), i.e., the cost
of {u, v} equals to the cost of {u, 0} the edge which connects u with the source in
(Sk, 0, wSk). Now, we construct an mcst for (Sk, 0, wSk) by using the edges in G
σ,k as
follows: For every {u, v} ∈ Gσ,k, if {u, v} ⊂ Sk then construct {u, v} in (Sk, 0, wSk);
if u ∈ Sk and v 6∈ Sk then construct {u, 0} in (Sk, 0, wSk). Let us denote the set
of edges we constructed in the mcst situation (Sk, 0, wSk) by Γ. Observe first that
wSk(Γ) = w(G
σ,k). Observe second that Γ is a spanning tree because (i) it has k
edges and (ii) it does not contain cycles since Gσ,k does not contain cycles and every
component of Gσ,k contains exactly only one vertex outside Sk. Observe lastly that
by construction of Gσ,k by voccp Γ is an mcst of (Sk, 0, wSk).
So, we have that
mσ(v)σ(k) = v(Sk) − v(Sk−1) = wSk(Γk) − wSk−1(Γk−1) = w(G
σ,k) − w(Gσ,k−1)
= w(eσk) = v
σ(w)σ(k),
for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Hence, we can conclude that mσ(v) = vσ(w). ¤
3.3 ERO and Voccp for Minimum Cost Spanning
Forest Situations
In this section we investigate extensions of the results obtained in Section 3.2 for
mcst situations on minimum cost spanning forest situations (cf. Rosenthal, 1987).
We first show that both Kruskal’s algorithm and voccp can be defined for minimum
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cost spanning forest situations in a way that they yield efficient algorithms. Second,
we extend the definition of ERO to this multisource situation and prove that ERO
can again be obtained as the average of the cost allocations provided by voccp.
In an mcsf situation, there are finitely many identical sources and agents have to
be connected to only one of them. These situations can be represented by a tuple
(N,S,w) where N = {1, ..., n} is the agent set, S = {01, 02, ..., 0s} (s ∈ N++) is the
set of available identical sources. Let us denote N ∪ S by N ′. Then w : EN ′ → R++
is a weight function on EN ′ . Given an mcsf situation (N,S,w), a spanning forest of
the graph (N ′, EN ′) is a set of trees that spans all vertices in N
′, in which each tree
contains at least one source. A minimum cost spanning forest (mcsf) is a spanning
forest with the minimum sum of weights of edges. Similar to the mcst situations with
a unique source, mcsf situations can also be identified with their weight functions.




In an mcsf situation, the availability of multiple identical sources enables agents to
form several components which are connected to different sources. Hence, the optimal
network in an mcsf situation is an mcsf. Moreover, since we consider mcsf situations
where all edges have strictly positive weights, each tree in an mcsf contains exactly
one source.
Kruskal’s algorithm for mcst situations may not result in an optimal network if
it is applied directly to mcsf situation. However, it can still be used to obtain an
mcsf by applying it to a related mcst situation as follows. Let (N,S,w) be an mcsf
situation. Now, add an additional vertex, denoted by 0, to N ′; add edges {0, i} for







w(e), if e ∈ EN ′ ,
0, if e = {0, s} for some s ∈ S,
2 max{w(e)|e ∈ EN ′}, if e = {0, i} for some i ∈ N.
We call the mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0) the mcst situation associated with (N,S,w).
Since all edges in EN ′ have strictly positive costs, in any mcst of (N
′, 0, w0), the
sources 01, ..., 0s are connected to 0 through edges {0k, 0} that cost zero. Obviously
if one removes these edges from an mcst of (N ′, 0, w0), then the graph obtained will
be an mcsf for (N,S,w). Then one can obtain an mcsf for an mcsf situation, first
by finding an mcst for the associated mcst situation and then by removing the edges
that connect the sources with 0.
Example 3.3.1 Consider the mcsf situation (N,S,w) with N = {1, 2}, S = {01, 02}
and w as depicted in Figure 3.4. The associated mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0) is also
depicted in Figure 3.4. By applying Kruskal’s algorithm to (N ′, 0, w0), one obtains
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Figure 3.4: An mcsf situation with two agents and two sources (top-left); the associated
mcst situation (top-right); the mcst Γ (bottom right) and the mcsf F (bottom left) consid-
ered in Example 3.3.1
the mcst Γ with E(Γ) = {{0, 01}, {0, 02}, {1, 01}, {2, 02}}. Then, by removing edges
{0, 01} and {0, 02} from Γ, one obtains the mcsf F with E(F ) = {{1, 01}, {2, 02}}.
The mcst Γ and the mcsf F are also depicted in Figure 3.4. ⋄
Now we can define the equal remaining obligations rule for mcsf situations by mak-
ing use of the cost allocations assigned by ERO to the associated mcst situations as
follows. Let (N,S,w) be an mcsf situation and consider ERO(w0) the cost allocation
assigned by ERO to the associated mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0). Observe that sources
01, ..., 0s are treated as agents in the associated mcst situation. Hence, ERO(w0) also
assigns costs to sources for the construction of the mcst. However, since sources are
connected to 0 with edges that cost zero, ERO(w0) does not assign any cost to the
sources, i.e, ERO(w0)s = 0 for every source s ∈ S. In particular, the cost of the mcst
in the associated mcst situation is allocated completely to the agents.
Definition 3.3.1 The equal remaining obligations rule for mcsf situations EROF is
defined as the map EROF : WF
N → RN , where
EROF(w)i = ERO(w0)i,
for every i ∈ N and w ∈ WF
N .
Example 3.3.2 Consider the mcsf situation (N,S,w) with N = {1, 2}, S = {01, 02}
and w as depicted in Figure 3.4.
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In order to calculate EROF(w), we simply have to calculate ERO for the related
mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0). Observe that w0 ∈ K
π, with π(1) = {0, 01}, π(2) = {0, 02},
π(3) = {2, 02}, π(4) = {01, 2}, π(5) = {01, 02}, π(6) = {1, 01}, π(7) = {1, 2},
π(8) = {02, 1}, π(9) = {0, 1} and π(10) = {0, 2}. The sequence of the graphs F
π,k
formed by Kruskal’s algorithm when it follows the order π and the corresponding
connection vectors, where the first two indices correspond to 01 and 02 and the third
(fourth) index correspond agent 1 (2), are given in Table 3.5 below. Hence, the
F π,k bπ,k
∅ (1, 1, 1, 1)t
{{01, 0}} (0, 1, 1, 1)
t
{{01, 0}, {02, 0}} (0, 0, 1, 1)
t
{{01, 0}, {02, 0}, {02, 2}} (0, 0, 1, 0)
t
{{01, 0}, {02, 0}, {02, 2}, {01, 2}} (0, 0, 1, 0)
t
{{01, 0}, {02, 0}, {02, 2}, {01, 2}, {01, 02}} (0, 0, 1, 0)
t




EN ′∪{0} (0, 0, 0, 0)
t
Table 3.5: Graphs formed in each step of Kruskal’s algorithm and the corresponding con-
nection vectors in Example 3.3.2








1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0








Observe that wπ0 = (0, 0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 9, 18, 18). Hence, ERO(w0) = M
πwπ0 = (0, 0, 6, 3)
t
and EROF(w) = (6, 3)
t. ⋄
In the following, we first define the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure
for mcsf situations. Then we show that voccp is an efficient algorithm for mcsf
situations. Finally, we prove that ERO for mcsf situations can be obtained as an
average of the cost allocations provided by voccp over all orders of agents.
Voccp for mcsf situations is defined formally as follows:
Let (N,S,w) be an mcsf situation.
(Step 1) Pick σ ∈ Π(N) .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0F = 0 (∈ R
N).
(Step 3) For k = 1 to n:
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Let σ(k) = i. Choose an edge eσk such that
eσk = arg min{w(e)|e ∈ Ai(G
σ,k−1)}.








(Step 4) Set F σ = Gσ,n and vσF = v
σ,n
F .
Example 3.3.3 Consider the mcsf situation (N,S,w) with N = {1, 2}, S = {01, 02}
and w as depicted in Figure 3.4.
Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N . The related voccp is
described as follows:
(Step 1) Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0F = 0.
(Step 3) Step 3 consists of the following two iterations:
• k = 1: σ(1) = 1. Obviously each edge incident with 1 is allowed for 1 in Gσ,0.
Then, eσ1 = {1, 01}; G
σ,1 = (N ′, {{1, 01}}) and v
σ,k
F = (6, 0).
• k = 2: σ(2) = 2. Since 2 is not connected with any other vertex in Gσ,1,
the allowed edges for 2 in Gσ,1 are the ones that are incident with 2. Then,
e2 = {2, 02}. G
σ,2 = (N ′, {{1, 01}, {2, 02}}) and v
σ,k
F = (6, 3).
(Step 4) F σ = (N ′, {{1, 01}, {2, 02}}) and v
σ
F = (6, 3).
Observe lastly that voccp related to the reverse order results in the same construct
and charge result. ⋄
Obviously F σ as obtained in Step 4 of voccp related to order σ does not contain
any cycles and hence is a forest. It is well known that a forest with p vertices and
k edges has p − k components. So, since F σ has n edges and n + s vertices, it must
contain s components which are trees. Recall here that s is the number of sources in
an mcsf situation. One can also observe that each of these components must contain
exactly one source. Hence, F σ is a spanning forest. Similar to the mcst case, voccp for
mcsf situations can lead to different spanning forests depending on choices of agents.
In the following theorem we first show that voccp is an efficient algorithm for
mcsf problems, i.e., any spanning forest provided by voccp is an mcsf of the mcsf
situation. Second, we show that the cost assigned by voccp to an agent in the mcsf
situation is equal to the cost assigned by voccp to the same agent in the associated
mcst situation. Let (N,S,w) be an mcsf situation. We say that an order π ∈ Π(N ′)
is compatible with the order σ ∈ Π(N) if it satisfies the condition that σ(i) < σ(j) if
and only if π(i) < π(j) for every i, j ∈ N .
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Theorem 3.3.1 Let (N,S,w) be an mcsf situation, (N ′, 0, w0) be the associated mcst
situation and π ∈ Π(N). Then
(i) F σ is an mcsf of (N,S,w) for every σ ∈ Π(N);
(ii) vσF ,i = v
π(w0)i for every order σ ∈ Π(N), every π ∈ Π(N
′) that is compatible
with σ and every i ∈ N .
Proof. First recall that the sources 01, ..., 0s are treated as agents in the associated
mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0). Let σ ∈ Π(N) and let π ∈ Π(N
′) be compatible with σ.
Consider the voccp related to order σ in the mcsf situation and the voccp related to
π in the associated mcst situation. Observe that during voccp related to π in the
associated mcst situation (N ′, 0, w0)
• Each source s ∈ S selects the edge {s, 0} because {s, 0} is always an allowed
edge for s, it costs zero and all other allowed edges have strictly positive costs.
• None of the agents selects an edge {i, 0} (i ∈ N) since these are the most
expensive edges with respect to w0.
That’s why in both procedures, voccp related to σ in mcsf situation and voccp
related to π in the associated mcst situation, each agent i ∈ N is in the same situ-
ation: They have the same options and hence they can select to construct the same
edge in both procedures. And in this case the graph found by the voccp related to σ
in the mcsf situation can also be obtained by first using voccp related to π to obtain
an mcst for the associated mcst situation and then removing the arcs (0, s), for ev-
ery s ∈ S. So, voccp is an efficient algorithm for mcsf situations and moreover, since
agents can select the same edges in both procedures vσF ,i = v
π(w0)i for every i ∈ N . ¤
Theorem 3.3.1 also proves that the cost allocation provided by voccp for the mcsf
situations is unique, i.e., is independent of the mcsf reached. Hence, we can now
denote the cost allocation provided by voccp related to σ by vσF(w).
Finally, we prove that EROF can be obtained as the average of the cost allocations
provided by voccp for every order of the agents.
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Proof. We know that EROF(w)i = EROi(w0). We also know by Theorem 3.3.1
that vσF(w)i = v
π(w0)i for every order σ ∈ Π(N), π ∈ Π(N) that is compatible with
σ and i ∈ N . Observe that for every order σ ∈ Π(N), there exists (n+s)!
n!
compatible
orders in Π(N ′). Then


















for every i ∈ N . Hence, we can conclude that EROF(w) can be obtained as the
average of the cost allocations provided by voccp over all orders of agents. ¤
3.4 ERO and Voccp for Mcst Situations with Two
Sources
In this section we investigate the extensions of the results obtained in Section 3.2 for
mcst situations in which the agents have to be connected to two sources. Section 3.4.1
proposes an equal remaining obligations rule for mcst situations with two sources.
Then in Section 3.4.2 we extend voccp to these multisource situations in a way that it
yields an efficient algorithm and prove that ERO can again be obtained as the average
of the cost allocations provided by voccp. In Section 3.4.3 we define an optimistic
transferable utility game for mcst problems with two sources and show that for every
ordering of the agents, the cost allocation provided by the related voccp is equal to
the marginal of the optimistic game for the same ordering.
In this section we consider mcst situations with two sources. In this type of mcst
situations there exists a group of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} that has to be connected to
two sources {01, 02}. These situations can be represented by a tuple (N, {01, 02}, w).
Let us denote {01, 02}∪N by N
′. Here, as before w : EN ′ → R++ is a weight function
on EN ′ . Similar to mcst situations with a unique source, mcst situations with two
sources can also be identified with their weight functions. Hence, we will denote the




The optimal network in an mcst situation with two sources is obviously an mcst of
(N ′, EN ′). Hence, Kruskal’s algorithm is an efficient algorithm for these multisource
mcst situations. It can also easily be observed that any spanning tree of (N ′, EN ′)
has n + 1 edges. That is the agents have to construct n + 1 edges in order to be
connected to both sources.
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Example 3.4.1 Consider the mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) with















Figure 3.5: An mcst situation with two sources (left side) and a related mcst
Kruskal’s algorithm first constructs the cheapest edge {02, 3}. The algorithm
continues by constructing both of the two second cheapest edges {01, 3} and {1, 2}
since neither of these edges creates a cycle with the previously constructed edges.
Next the algorithm selects the edge {01, 02} but it will not construct this edge since it
creates a cycle with the previously constructed edges {02, 3} and {01, 3}. Finally, the
algorithm selects and constructs {01, 1} resulting in the mcst with the set of edges
{{01, 1}, {1, 2}, {01, 3}, {02, 3}}. ⋄
3.4.1 ERO for cost sharing in mcst situations with two sources
In the following we will propose an equal remaining obligations rule for mcst situations
with two sources. In order to define this rule, we will follow a set-up analogous to the
set-up used for ERO in Section 3.2.1.
Let Π(EN ′), K
π and wπ (π ∈ Π(EN ′)) be defined analogously to their counterparts
in Section 3.2.1. Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources and
π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
π. Let us first define a rule EROπT on cone K
π. Similar
to ERO’s original definition in Section 3.2.1, we will again start with considering a
sequence of |EN ′ | + 1 graphs that are formed during Kruskal’s algorithm when the
algorithm follows the order π on the set of edges EN ′ : F
π,0, F π,1, ..., F π,|EN′ |. But, this
time we will define two different connection vectors and accordingly two connection
matrices as follows. Connection vectors bπ,k1 ∈ R
N and bπ,k2 ∈ R
N are defined for each
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., |EN ′ |} as
bπ,k1,i =
{
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for each i ∈ N and w ∈ WT
N .
The contribution matrices with respect to π ∈ Π(EN ′) M
π
1 ∈ R
N×EN′ and Mπ2 ∈
RN×EN′ are defined as follows. Mπ1 is the matrix which lists the change in the con-




k = (bπ,k−11 − b
π,k
1 )
for each k ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}. Similarly, M
π
2 lists the change in the connectivity of the




k = (bπ,k−12 − b
π,k
2 )
for each k ∈ {1, ..., |EN ′ |}.
It can easily be observed that the connection vector bπ,k1 and the corresponding
contribution matrix Mπ1 are straightforward extensions of their counterparts defined
for ERO (see equations 3.2 and 3.3). Similar to the contribution matrix for ERO, each
nonzero-column of Mπ1 corresponds to an edge constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm and
represents the fraction of the cost of the edge paid by each player. However, in every
mcst situation with two sources there exists one edge which is constructed by Kruskal’s
algorithm but the corresponding column in Mπ1 is a zero-column. To see this, let
F π,k be the first graph in the sequence F π,0, F π,1, ..., F π,|EN′ | in which 01 and 02 are
connected. Observe that the corresponding edge π(k) joins two separate components
in F π,k−1 one including 01 and the other including 02. Hence, π(k) is constructed by
Kruskal’s algorithm since it does not create a cycle with the previously constructed
edges. However, the column (Mπ1 e
k) is a zero column since bπ,k1,i = b
π,k−1
1,i = 0 for every
agent i that belongs to the components of F π,k−1 joined by edge π(k). So, according
to contribution matrix Mπ1 agents do not contribute for an edge which is constructed.
In order to be able to distribute the cost of edge π(k) among agents, we introduced
connection vectors bπ,t2 and the corresponding contribution matrix M
π





and every other column of matrix Mπ2 is a zero column. That is M
π
2
distributes the cost of edge π(k) equally among agents.
We are now ready to define the EROπT -value on K
π.
Definition 3.4.1 For each π ∈ Π(EN ′), ERO
π




RN , where EROπT (w) = M
π
1 w
π + Mπ2 w
π for each mcst situation with two sources w
in the cone Kπ.
A variant of Lemma 3.2.1 holds also for rules EROπT . Hence, similarly to ERO
π-
rules, for every order π that a weight function w is compatible with, EROπT also
results in the same allocation.
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π′ and hence EROπT (w) = ERO
π′
T (w) for every




This enables us to define a EROT -rule over all mcst situations with two sources.
Definition 3.4.2 The equal remaining obligations rule for mcst situations with two
sources is defined as the map EROT : WT
N → RN , where
EROT (w) = ERO
π
T (w) = M
π
1 w
π + Mπ2 w
π (3.10)
for every w ∈ WT
N and π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π.
Remark 3.4.1 The method we followed to extend ERO to mcst situations with two
sources can be summarized as: First use Mπ1 the straightforward extension of a con-
tribution matrix and then distribute the cost of the edge that Mπ1 failed to handle
equally among the agents. In the following sections we consider straightforward ex-
tensions of voccp and the optimistic game associated with mcst situations and show
that (i) EROT can be obtained as an average of the cost allocations provided by
voccp over all orders of agents and (ii) the Shapley value of the extended optimistic
game is equal to EROT . We believe that these two results provide strong support
to EROT as an appropriate extension of equal remaining obligations rule for mcst
situations with two sources.
Example 3.4.2 Consider the mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) with
N = {1, 2, 3} and w as depicted in Figure 3.5. Observe that w ∈ Kπ, with π(1) =
{02, 3}, π(2) = {01, 3}, π(3) = {1, 2}, π(4) = {01, 02} π(5) = {01, 1}, π(6) = {01, 2},
π(7) = {2, 3}, π(8) = {1, 3}, π(9) = {02, 1} and π(10) = {02, 2}.
The sequence of graphs F π,k formed by Kruskal’s algorithm when it follows the
order π on the set of edges EN ′ and corresponding connection vectors are given in
Table 3.6.
Then the contribution matrices Mπ1 and M
π





0 0 12 0
1
2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 12 0
1
2 0 0 0 0 0










0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0










π = (5 + 4
3
, 5 + 4
3
, 3 + 4
3
)t. ⋄



















{{02, 3}, {01, 3}} (1, 1, 0)
t, (0, 0, 0)t





t, (0, 0, 0)t





t, (0, 0, 0)t
{{02, 3}, {01, 3}, {1, 2}, {01, 02}, {01, 1}} (0, 0, 0)
t, (0, 0, 0)t
{{02, 3}, {01, 3}, {1, 2}, {01, 02}, {01, 1}, {01, 2}} (0, 0, 0)




EN ′ (0, 0, 0)
t, (0, 0, 0)t
Table 3.6: Graphs formed in each step of Kruskal’s algorithm and corresponding connection
vectors in Example 3.4.2
In the following we define for every mcst situation with two sources a related mcst
situation and show that there is a close relationship between the equal remaining
obligations rule of the mcst situation with two sources and the equal remaining obli-
gations rule of the related mcst situation. Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation
with two sources and let π ∈ Π(EN ′) such that w ∈ K
π. Remove the sources 01, 02
and add vertex 0. Define the weight function w0 : EN∪{0}→R+ by
w0(e) =
{
w(e), if e ∈ EN ,
min{w({u, 01}), w({u, 02})}, if e = {u, 0} for some u ∈ N.
The mcst situation (N, 0, w0) as described above is called the mcst situation associated
with (N, {01, 02}, w).
Example 3.4.3 Consider the mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) with
N = {1, 2, 3} and w as depicted in Figure 3.5. The associated mcst situation (N, 0, w0)




















Figure 3.6: An mcst situation with two sources (left side) and the associated mcst situation
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In the following lemma we show that the cost allocation provided by ERO for the




Lemma 3.4.1 Let w ∈ WT
N and π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
π. Then Mπ1 w
π =
ERO(w0).
Proof. Let π(t1), π(t2), ..., π(tn+1) be the n + 1 edges of the mcst Γ constructed
by Kruskal’s algorithm corresponding to π in w. Let π(tk) be the first edge among
them such that 01 and 02 are connected during Kruskal’s algorithm. Then the edges
in Γ\{π(tk)} = {π(t1), ..., π(tk−1), π(tk+1), ..., π(tn+1)} correspond to the non-zero
columns of Mπ1 .
Observe that the edge {01, 02} and the more expensive of the edges {i, 01}, {i, 02}
(i ∈ N) can be constructed by Kruskal’s algorithm only if it is the first edge that 01
and 02 are connected. Then every edge e ∈ Γ\{π(tk)} is either an edge that connects
two agents or is the cheaper of the two edges that connect an agent with the source.
Let us now associate with each edge π(tr) ∈ Γ\{π(tk)} an edge er ∈ EN∪{0}. If
π(tr) ⊂ N , then er = π(tr); if π(tr) is the cheaper of the two edges that connect
an agent i with a source, then er = {i, 0}. Obviously, w(π(tr)) = w0(er). Now let
Γ′ = {e1, ..., ek−1, ek+1, ...en+1}. Obviously, Γ
′ contains n edges and does not contain
any cycles. Hence, Γ′ is a spanning tree of (N,EN∪{0}). Moreover, it can easily be
shown that Γ′ is a mcst of the associated mcst situation w0 by using the fact that Γ
is a mcst for the mcst situation w.
Now, since Γ′ is a mcst of the associated mcst situation w0, there exists an order
π′ ∈ Π(EN∪{0}) such that w0 ∈ K
π′ and such that the corresponding Kruskal’s algo-
rithm constructs first e1, then e2,... and lastly en+1. Clearly, M
π′ equals the matrix ob-








3.4.2 The vertex oriented construct and charge procedure
for mcst situations with two sources
In this section we define voccp for mcst situations with two sources.
We know that since each agent has to be connected to both of the available
sources, the mcst in an mcst situation with two sources has n + 1 edges. Then
the first n iterations of voccp for such an mcst problem will yield a forest which is
composed of two disjoint trees and hence one more edge has to be constructed to
connect these two disjoint trees. Therefore, we modify the voccp so that for any
order of the agents σ ∈ Π(N), after the first n iterations, the last agent in the order,
σ(n) is also responsible for the construction of the (n + 1)th edge which connects the
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tree that he is involved in to the other one. In the following, abusing notation, σ(n)
the last agent in the order will also be denoted by σ(n + 1) for any σ ∈ Π(N).
Voccp for mcst situations with two sources is defined formally as follows:
Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources.
(Step 1) Pick σ ∈ Π(N) .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0T = 0 (∈ R
N).
(Step 3) For k = 1 to n + 1:
Let σ(k) = i. Choose an edge eσk such that
eσk = arg min{w(e)|e ∈ Ai(G
σ,k−1)}.








(Step 4) Set Γσ = Gσ,n+1 and vσT = v
σ,n+1.
We illustrate voccp in mcst situations with two sources in the following example.
Example 3.4.4 Consider the mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) with
N = {1, 2, 3} and w as depicted in Figure 3.5. Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i
for every i ∈ N . The related voccp is described as follows:
(Step 1) Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N .
(Step 2) Set Gσ,0 = (N ′, ∅) and vσ,0 = 0.
(Step 3) Step 3 consists of the following four iterations:
• k = 1: σ(1) = 1. Obviously A1(G
σ,0) = {{1, 01}, {1, 02}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}. Then,
eσ1 = {1, 2}, G
σ,1 = (N ′, {{1, 2}}) and vσ,1 = (4, 0, 0).
• k = 2: σ(2) = 2. Note that 2 and 1 are in the same component of Gσ,1 but 3,
01 and 02 belong to different components. So,
A2(G
σ,1) = {{1, 3}, {1, 01}, {1, 02}, {2, 3}, {2, 01}, {2, 02}} .
Obviously eσ2 = {1, 01}, G
σ,2 = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 01}}) and v
σ,1 = (4, 6, 0).
• k = 3: σ(3) = 3. Note that 1, 2 and 01 are in the same component of G
σ,1 but
3 and 02 belong to different components. Obviously
A3(G
σ,2) = {{3, 1}, {3, 2}, {3, 01}, {3, 02}} .
Then, eσ3 = {3, 02}, G
σ,3 = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 01}, {3, 02}}) and v
σ,3 = (4, 6, 3).
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• k = 4: σ(4) = 3. Note that there are two components in Gσ,3: 1, 2 and 01 are
in one component and 3 and 02 belong to the other component. Then,
A3(G
σ,3) = {{3, 1}, {3, 2}, {3, 01}, {02, 1}, {02, 2}, {02, 01}} .
So, eσ4 = {01, 3}, G
σ,4 = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 01}, {3, 02}, {01, 3}}) and v
σ,3 = (4, 6, 3+
4).
(Step 4) Γσ = (N ′, {{1, 2}, {1, 01}, {3, 02}, {01, 3}}) and v
σ = (8, 6, 3). In Table 3.7
we give the construct and charge results provided by voccp for all orderings of agents.
⋄
Constructed edges by Costs for
σ 1 2 3 1 2 3
(1,2,3) {1, 2} {1, 01} {3, 02},{01, 3} 4 6 7
(1,3,2) {1, 2} {1, 01},{01, 3} {3, 02} 4 10 3
(2,1,3) {1, 01} {1, 2} {3, 02},{01, 3} 6 4 7
(2,3,1) {1, 01},{01, 3} {1, 2} {3, 02} 10 4 3
(3,1,2) {1, 2} {1, 01},{01, 3} {3, 02} 4 10 3
(3,2,1) {1, 01},{01, 3} {1, 2} {3, 02} 10 4 3
Table 3.7: Construct and charge results for the mcst situation in Figure 3.5
We establish in the following theorem that (i) voccp is an efficient algorithm for
mcst situations with two sources and (ii) that every mcst in an mcst situation with
two sources can be obtained by voccp for any order of agents followed.
Theorem 3.4.1 Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources and σ ∈
Π(N). Then,
(i) Γσ is an mcst of (N, {01, 02}, w).
(ii)If T is an mcst of (N, {01, 02}, w), then T can be the result of a vertex oriented
construct and charge procedure for any permutation σ ∈ Π(N).
We omit the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 since it is similar to the proofs of theorems
3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
We consider in Lemma 3.2.3 the structure of graphs Gσ,0, Gσ,1, ..., Gσ,n+1 that are
formed during step 3 of voccp and prove one preliminary result.
Lemma 3.4.2 Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources, σ ∈ Π(N),
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and σ(k) = i. Then, 01 and 02 can not belong to G
σ,k−1
i .
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The proof Lemma 3.4.2 is similar to its counterpart in Lemma 3.2.3 and hence omit-
ted.
In the following lemma we consider voccp related to order σ ∈ Π(N) in a mcst
situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) and voccp related to same order in the
associated mcst situation (N, 0, w0). Let us denote the k
th edge constructed by voccp
related to σ in (N, {01, 02}, w) by e
σ
k for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n + 1} and the k
th edge
constructed by voccp related to σ in (N, 0, w0) by f
σ
k for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. We
show that each of the first n edges constructed by the two algorithms cost the same,
i.e., w(eσk) = w0(f
σ
k ) for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Lemma 3.4.3 Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources , (N, 0, w0)
be the associated mcst situation and σ ∈ Π(N). Then, w(eσk) = w0(f
σ
k ) for every
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Proof. Let σ ∈ Π(N). Consider first the voccp related to order σ in the mcst
situation with two sources. Pick k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and let σ(k) = i. We know by
Lemma 3.4.2 that neither 01 nor 02 belongs to G
σ,k−1
i the component that agent i
belongs in Gσ,k−1. So, both edges {i, 01} and {i, 02} are component reducing for i in
Gσ,k−1. Naturally, the more expensive of the two edges will never be constructed by
i.
So, starting with the first step of both procedures, voccp related to σ in w and
voccp related to σ in the associated mcst situation w0, each agent can select to con-
struct the same edge in both procedures in the following sense: if agent i chooses to
construct an edge e ⊂ N in voccp related to σ in w, then e is also a cheapest com-
ponent reducing edge for agent i in voccp related to σ in w0 and if agent i chooses
to construct the cheaper of the two edges {i, 01} and {i, 02} in voccp related to σ in
w0 then the edge {i, 0} is a cheapest component reducing edge for agent i in voccp
related to σ in w0. Since agents can select the same edges in the first n steps of both
procedures w(eσk) = w0(f
σ
k ). ¤
We know by Lemma 3.4.1 that EROT (w) = ERO(w0). Hence, Lemma 3.4.3 en-
ables us to establish the relationship between the costs of the first n edges constructed
by voccp and EROT (w). In the following lemma, we will establish the relationship
between the cost of the last edge constructed by voccp and EROT (w).
Lemma 3.4.4 Let (N, {01, 02}, w) be an mcst situation with two sources , σ ∈ Π(N)
and π ∈ Π(EN ′) be such that w ∈ K
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Proof. Let Γ be an mcst for the mcst situation with two sources w and Γ′ be an
mcst for the associated mcst situation w0. Now, on the one hand









= w(eσn+1) + w0(Γ









where the first equality follows from the efficiency of voccp in mcst situations with
two sources, the second equality follows from Lemma 3.4.3, the third equality follows
from the efficiency of voccp in mcst situations, the fourth equality follows from the
efficiency of ERO in mcst situations and the last equality follows from Lemma 3.4.1.


















Finally, we prove that EROT can be obtained as the average of the cost allocations
provided by voccp for every order of the agents.








Proof. Let w be an mcst with two sources and w0 be the associated mcst situation,
σ ∈ Π(N), k ∈ {1, ..., n} and σ(k) = i. We know by Lemma 3.4.3 that if i is not the
last agent with respect to σ then







i.e., the cost vσT ,i assigned by voccp related to σ to agent i in w is equal to the cost
vσi (w0) assigned by voccp related to σ to agent i in w0.
We also know by lemmas 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 that if i is the last agent with respect to
σ then
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i.e., the cost vσT ,i assigned by voccp related to σ to agent i in w is equal to the sum of



























































π + e{i}Mπ2 w
π = EROT (w)i,
where the first equality follows from Lemmas 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, the third equality follows
from the equality of ERO and the average of the cost allocations provided by voccp
in mcst situations and the fact that there are n!
n
orders at which i is the last player,
the fourth equality follows from Lemma 3.4.1 and the last equality follows from the
fact that e{j}Mπ2 w
π = e{j
′}Mπ2 w
π for every j, j′ ∈ N . ¤
3.4.3 Voccp and the optimistic game in mcst situations with
two sources
In this section, we define an optimistic transferable utility game for mcst problems
with two sources and show that for every ordering σ of the agents, the vσT value is
equal to the marginal of the optimistic game for the same ordering.
The optimistic game for mcst situations with two sources is defined as follows.
Given an mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) and a nonempty coalition
of agents S ( N , we first obtain an optimistic mcst situation for S assuming that
when the agents in S have to be connected to both of the sources, the agents in
N\S are already connected to sources and the agents in S can connect to sources via
agents in N\S. Formally, for every S ( N , the optimistic mcst situation for S is the
mcst situation (S, 0, wS)T , where wS(e) = w(e) for every e ∈ ES and wS({i, 0}) =
minj∈N ′\S w({i, j}) for every i ∈ S. Naturally, the optimistic mcst situation for N is
the original mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w).
Now the optimistic TU-game (N, v) associated with the mcst situation with two
sources (N, {01, 02}, w) is defined as v(S) = wS(Γ) where Γ is a mcst for the optimistic
game for S for every S ⊂ N with v(∅) = 0.
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Example 3.4.5 Consider the mcst situation with two sources (N, {01, 02}, w) with
N = {1, 2, 3} and w as depicted in Figure 3.5. Consider coalition {1, 2}. In Figure
3.7 we provide the optimistic mcst situation for {1, 2} and a related mcst. Hence the
worth of coalition {1, 2} in the optimistic TU-game associated with (N, {01, 02}, w) is






Figure 3.7: The optimistic mcst situation for {1, 2} (left side) and a related mcst
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
v(S) 4 4 3 10 7 7 17
⋄
In the following, we show that for every ordering of the agents, the cost allocation
provided by the related voccp and the related marginal vector of the optimistic game
are equal to each other. First, we consider in the following lemma two optimistic mcst
games, one derived from an mcst situation with two sources and the other derived
from the associated mcst situation. We show that for proper subsets of N they are
equal to each other
Lemma 3.4.5 Let w ∈ WT
N and let w0 ∈ W
N be the associated mcst situation. Also
let (N, v) be the optimistic TU-game associated with w and (N, v0) be the optimistic
TU-game associated with w0. Then, v(S) = v0(S) for every S ( N .
Proof. Let (S, 0, wS)T be the optimistic mcst situation for S derived from w and let
(S, 0, w0,S) be the optimistic mcst situation for S derived from w0. We want to show
that wS(e) = w0,S(e) for every e ∈ ES∪{0}. Obviously, wS(e) = w0,S(e) = w(e)
for every e ∈ ES. So consider an edge {i, 0} for some i ∈ S. We know that
wS({i, 0}) = minj∈N∪{01,02}\S w({i, j}) and wS,0({i, 0}) = minj∈N∪{0}\S w0({i, j}). We
also know that w0({i, 0}) = min{{i, 01}, {i, 02}}. Hence, wS({i, 0}) = w0,S({i, 0}).
So, we can conclude that wS = w0,S. But, since wS = w0,S, the cost of an mcst of
(S, 0, wS)T is equal to the cost of an mcst of (S, 0, w0,S) and hence v(S) = v0(S). ¤
Proposition 3.4.2 Let w ∈ WT
N . Then vσT (w) = m
σ(v) for every σ ∈ Π(N).
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Proof. Let w ∈ WT
N , w0 ∈ W
N be the associated mcst situation and (N, c) be the
optimistic TU-game associated with w0. Also let σ ∈ Π(N) and denote by Sk the
set of first k agents with respect to order σ, i.e., Sk = {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(k)} for every
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Lastly let S0 = ∅.
Now let k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and σ(k) = i. Then




where the second equality follows from Lemma 3.4.5, the third equality follows from
Proposition 3.2.6 and the last equality follows from Lemma 3.4.3.








for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}.
Now let k = n and consider σ(k) = i the last agent with respect to σ. Then,
mσ(v)i = v(N) − v(Sn−1) = v(N) −
∑
t∈{1,2,...n−1}







where the second equality follows from the fact that v(Sn−1) is equal to the total cost
of first n − 1 edges constructed by voccp related to σ and the third equality follows
from the fact that v(N) is equal to the cost of an mcst of the mcst situation with two
sources w.
Hence, we can conclude that vσT (w) = m
σ(v). ¤
Since the Shapley value of a game is the average of its marginals, Proposition 3.4.2
implies that EROT is equal to the Shapley value of the optimistic game.
Corollary 3.4.1 Let w ∈ WT
N . Then EROT (w) is equal to the Shapley value of the
optimistic game associated with w.
3.5 Highway Games on Weakly Cyclic Graphs
In this section, we study the concavity and the balancedness of highway games on
weakly cyclic graphs. Section 3.5.1 formally introduces highway problems and highway
games. Section 3.5.2 presents the characterization of HG-concave graphs. Section
3.5.3 proves that highway games on weakly cyclic graphs are balanced.
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3.5.1 Highway problems and highway games
A highway problem is defined as a tuple Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w). N = {1, ..., n}
is a nonempty, finite set of players and G=(V,E) is a connected graph. The graph G
determines the possibilities regarding the construction of the highway network. That
is, any constructed highway network has to be a subgraph of G. Note that G need not
be the complete graph, since the construction of some edges may be infeasible due to
geographic or socioeconomic reasons. For each player i ∈ N , si and ti are vertices in
G and they are called the connection vertices of i. The connection vertices of player
i represent the locations (think of entry and exit) that i has to establish a connection
between. Finally, w : E → R+ is a cost function and associates to each edge, e ∈ E,
the nonnegative cost w(e) of constructing e. The total cost of constructing a set of
edges E ′ ⊂ E is abbreviated by w(E ′) =
∑
e∈E′ w(e). In the following we do not
always distinguish strictly between a graph and its edge set. For example, given a
graph G = (V ′, E ′), we may write w(G′) rather than w(E ′).
In a highway problem, a coalition S of cooperating players will construct a cheap-
est set of edges that connects the connection points of every member of S. Therefore,
given a highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w), the corresponding highway
game (N, cΓ) is defined by
cΓ(S) = min
E′⊂E
{w(E ′)|si and ti are connected in (V,E
′) for every i ∈ S} (3.14)
for all S ⊂ N . Clearly, (N, cΓ) is subadditive and monotonic.
Example 3.5.1 Consider the cycle C = v1v2v3v4v1. The construction costs of edges
are given by: w({v1, v2}) = w({v2, v3}) = 2 and w({v3, v4}) = w({v4, v1}) = 3.
Consider N = {1, 2, 3} with s1 = v1, t1 = v3, s2 = v2, t2 = v3, s3 = v4, t3 = v1. The








t3 = = s1
= s2
t1 = = t2
s3 =
Figure 3.8: A highway problem with three players
Consider player 1. There are two paths in C between player 1’s connection vertices
v1 and v3: v1v2v3 and v1v4v3. Since player 1 will not construct any superfluous
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edges, cΓ({1}) is the minimum of w({v1, v2}) + w({v2, v3}) = 4 and w({v1, v4}) +
w({v4, v3}) = 6, i.e., cΓ({1}) = 4.
Next, consider the coalition {1, 3}. Clearly, players 1 and 3 will construct the set
of edges {{v1, v4}, {v3, v4}}. Hence, cΓ({1, 3}) = 6.
The complete corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is given in Table 3.8 below.
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
cΓ(S) 4 2 3 4 6 5 7
Table 3.8: The highway game (N, cΓ) in Example 3.5.1.
Observe that this highway game is not concave:
cΓ({1, 2}) + cΓ({1, 3}) < cΓ({1}) + cΓ({1, 2, 3}).
⋄
The above example illustrates that if there are multiple paths between the con-
nection vertices of players in the underlying graph, then players can select different
paths in different coalitions and this may lead to the violation of concavity conditions
of the associated highway game. When the underlying graph is a tree as it is the case
for the highway problems considered by Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006), the players
use the unique path between their connection vertices independent of the coalition
they belong to. From this, it can readily be derived that the highway games induced
by trees are concave.
3.5.2 HG-Concavity
In this section, we characterize HG-concave graphs. Here, a graph G is called HG-
concave if for every highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w), the correspond-
ing highway game (N, cΓ) is concave. Explicitly, we show that a graph is HG-concave
if and only if it is weakly triangular.
For this aim, we first show that every highway game on a cycle of length 3 is
concave.
Lemma 3.5.1 Let Γ = (N,C, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem where C is
a cycle of length 3. Then, the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is concave.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that si 6= ti for all i ∈ N . It can easily be
observed that
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(i) for every coalition, it is optimal to construct either one edge in C or the two
cheaper edges in C;
(ii) for a coalition S ⊂ N , if it is optimal to construct just one edge {u, v} in C,
then {si, ti} = {u, v} for every i ∈ S;
(iii) for a coalition S ⊂ N , if it is optimal to construct the two cheaper edges in C,
then constructing the two cheaper edges is optimal for any superset of S, too.
Now, we will show that cΓ(S∪T )+ cΓ(S∩T ) ≤ cΓ(S)+ cΓ(T ) for every S, T ⊂ N ,
i.e., that the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is concave. Take S, T ⊂ N and
assume that S ∩ T 6= ∅. For, if S ∩ T = ∅, then the inequality follows directly from
the subadditivity of (N, cΓ).
Firstly, (i) implies that, for any coalition K ⊂ N , cΓ(K) is either equal to the sum
of the costs of the two cheaper edges in C or equal to the cost of one of the three
edges in C.
If both cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) are equal to the sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges
in C, then the inequality follows from the monotonicity of cΓ and (iii). If only one of
cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) is equal to the sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges in C and
the other is equal to the cost of one edge, say e, in C, then (iii) implies that cΓ(S∪T )
is equal to the sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges in C and (ii) implies that
cΓ(S∩T ) is also equal to the cost of e. Hence, cΓ(S∪T )+ cΓ(S∩T ) = cΓ(S)+ cΓ(T ).
Lastly, assume that cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) are equal to the cost of an edge in C. Then,
since S ∩ T 6= ∅, (ii) implies that cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) have to be equal to the cost of the
same edge. Then, both cΓ(S ∪ T ) and cΓ(S ∩ T ) are equal to the cost of the same
edge, too. Hence, cΓ(S ∪ T ) + cΓ(S ∩ T ) = cΓ(S) + cΓ(T ). ¤
We now discuss some properties of weakly cyclic graphs. Let G=(V,E) be a weakly
cyclic graph. Clearly, each edge in G is either a bridge edge or belongs to exactly one
cycle in G. Let C(G) denote the set of cycles in G and BE(G) denote the set of bridge
edges in G. Observe that every path in G which connects two vertices has to pass
through (has a common edge with) the same set of cycles and the same set of bridge
edges in G. More specifically, every path that connects the same two vertices, passes
through the same cycles and the same bridge edges but the edges followed in cycles
may differ. Moreover, every path that connects the same two vertices in G enter and
leave a cycle that they pass through at the same vertices.
Before presenting the main result of this section, we will show that for every
highway problem on a weakly cyclic graph, the corresponding highway game is equal
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to the sum of specific sub-highway games on each cycle and on each bridge edge in
the graph. These sub-highway games are formally defined as follows.
Consider a highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) where G is a weakly
cyclic graph. Let C = v1v2...vkv1 be a cycle in G. Now, the sub-highway problem
with respect to C is defined by ΓC = (N,C, {sCi }i∈N , {t
C
i }i∈N , w|C), where w|C is the
restriction of the cost function w to the edges in C. For each player i ∈ N , if the




i are the vertices in C at
which the paths connecting si and ti enter and leave C. If the paths connecting si





Next, let e = {u, v} be a bridge edge in G. Then, the sub-highway problem with
respect to e is defined by Γe = (N, ({u, v}, {e}), {sei}i∈N , {t
e
i}i∈N , w|e). Set s
e
i = u and





Lemma 3.5.2 Let Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem where G is
a weakly cyclic graph. Then, cΓ(S) =
∑
C∈C(G) cΓC (S) +
∑
e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every
S ⊂ N .
We omit the proof of Lemma 3.5.2 since it is straightforward2.
We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.5.1 A graph G is HG-concave if and only if it is weakly triangular.
Proof. We first show the if-part. Let G=(V,E) be a weakly triangular graph and
consider a highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w). We will show that the
corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is concave.




e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every
S ⊂ N . By Lemma 3.5.1, we have that cΓC is concave for every triangle C ∈ C(G)
and we also know that highway games induced by trees are concave. In particular,
cΓe is concave for every e ∈ BE(G). We may conclude that cΓ is concave, since it is a
non-negative linear combination of concave games.
For the only-if part of the proof, choose a graph G=(V,E) that is not weakly
triangular. Now, we construct a player set N , connection vertices si, ti for each
player i in N and a cost function w such that the highway game corresponding to the
highway problem (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) is not concave.
Since G is not weakly triangular, it contains a cycle C = v1v2...vkv1 with length
k ≥ 4. Let the player set be N = {1, 2, 3} and let s1 = v1, t1 = v3, s2 = v2, t2 = v3
2Lemma 3.5.2 can be extended to decompose a highway game induced by an arbitrary graph into
the sum of sub-highway games associated to the bridge edges and the components obtained after
deleting all bridge edges.
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2, if e ∈ {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}},
0, if e ∈ {{v3, v4}, ..., {vk−2, vk−1}},
3, if e ∈ {{vk, v1}, {vk, vk−1}},
















Figure 3.9: An auxiliary figure for the proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Figure 3.9 depicts a part of the highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w).
Now, it can easily be shown that the highway game corresponding to the highway
problem Γ is equal to the highway game presented in Example 3.5.1, which is not
concave. ¤
3.5.3 Balancedness of Highway Games
on Weakly Cyclic Graphs
In this section, we show that highway games induced by weakly cyclic graphs are
balanced. First we provide an example (cf. Kuipers, 1997) which shows that highway
games in which the underlying graphs allow for multiple paths between vertices need
not be balanced in general.
Example 3.5.2 Let G=(V,E) be the complete graph on V = {v1, v2, ..., v6}. The
construction costs of the edges are given by:
w(e) =
{
5, if e ∈ {{v1, v4}, {v2, v5}, {v3, v6}, {v4, v5}, {v4, v6}, {v5, v6}},
3, otherwise.
Consider N = {1, 2, 3} with s1 = v1, t1 = v4, s2 = v2, t2 = v5, s3 = v3, t3 = v6.
A part of the corresponding highway problem Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w), where
only the edges of cost 3 are drawn, is depicted in Figure 3.10.
It can easily be observed that the cost of any two-player coalition is 9. For
example, the optimal collection of edges for the coalition {1, 2} consists of edges


















Figure 3.10: An auxiliary figure for Example 3.5.2
{{v5, v1}, {v1, v2}, {v2, v4}} with a total cost of 9. There are several possibilities for
the optimal collection of edges for the grand coalition. One of them can be obtained
by adding the edge {v3, v6} to the optimal collection of edges of the coalition {1, 2}.
Hence, cΓ(N) = 14. Suppose that (x1, x2, x3) is a core element of (N, cΓ). Then, it
can be shown by using the core conditions for coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {2, 3} that
2(x1 + x2 + x3) ≤ cΓ({1, 2}) + cΓ({1, 3}) + cΓ({2, 3}) = 27 < 2cΓ(N),
a contradiction with the efficiency of a core allocation. Hence, (N, cΓ) is not balanced.
⋄
In the following, we first focus on highway problems on cycles and prove that the
induced highway games are balanced.
Let (N,C, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem on a cycle C = (V,E). Ob-
serve that each player has two alternative paths between his connection vertices in C.
For player i, we denote an individually optimal path for i by Pi and the alternative
path by Qi. Note that Pi∩Qi = ∅ and Pi∪Qi = E for every player i ∈ N . Let S ⊂ N .
A collection of paths, {Ri}i∈S with Ri ∈ {Pi, Qi}, for all i ∈ S is called a path profile
for S. The set of path profiles for S is denoted by RS. For each path profile R ∈ RS,
the set of edges
⋃
i∈S Ri is called the set of edges corresponding to R and is denoted
by E(R). Ē(R) is defined as the complement of E(R), i.e., Ē(R) = E\E(R). Let
T = {Ti}i∈N ∈ R
N . The restriction of T to S, T|S = {(T|S)i}i∈S, is the path profile
for S defined by (T|S)i = Ti for every i ∈ S.
Every set of edges which connects the connection vertices of every member of a
coalition of players has to contain either the individually optimal path or the alter-
native path of each member of the coalition. Moreover, since a coalition will not
construct any superfluous edges, a cheapest set of edges that connects the connection
vertices of every member of a coalition will be equal to a set of edges corresponding
to a path profile. Hence, the highway game (N, cΓ) corresponding to the highway
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cΓ(S) = w(E) − max
R∈RS
{w(Ē(R))}, (3.16)
for every S ⊂ N .
Lemma 3.5.3 Let Γ = (N,C, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that
C = (V,E) is a cycle and let S ⊂ N .















w(Ē(T )) for every R ∈ RS.
Proof. (i) Let R,R′ ∈ RS with R 6= R′. Clearly, there exists i ∈ S such that Ri 6= R
′
i.
Assume without loss of generality that Ri = Pi and R
′
i = Qi. Then, Ē(R) ⊂ Qi and





Ē(R) ⊂ E. Now, pick e ∈ E. Consider R ∈ RS such that
Ri = Pi if e ∈ Qi and Ri = Qi otherwise. Clearly, e 6∈ Ri for any i ∈ S and hence




(iii) readily follows from (i) and (ii).
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Now pick e ∈ Ē(R). Consider T ∈ RN with T|S = R and for every i ∈ N\S,
Ti = Pi if e ∈ Qi and Ti = Qi otherwise. Obviously, e 6∈ Ti for any i ∈ N and hence




(v) readily follows from (i) and (iv). ¤
Let us denote with R∗S an optimal path profile for S, i.e., cΓ(S) = w(E)−w(Ē(R
∗
S))
(cf. (3.16)) for every S ⊂ N with S 6= ∅. Let S = (S1, S2, ..., Sm) be a sequence
3 of
coalitions in N . For every path profile T for N , we denote by α(T,S) the number of










For every x ∈ R, (x)+ is defined as (x)+ = max{x, 0}.
Lemma 3.5.4 Let Γ = (N,C, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that
C = (V,E) is a cycle. Let S = (S1, S2, ..., Sm) be a sequence of coalitions in N and




(α(T,S) − (m − l))+ > l then there exists j ∈ N such that
|{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| < l.
Proof. The proof will proceed by induction on l.
Let us first prove the assertion for an arbitrary m ∈ {1, 2, ...} and l = 1. Assume
that
∑
T∈RN (α(T,S) − (m − 1))+ > 1. Then there exists R,R
′ ∈ RN with R 6= R′
such that α(R,S) = α(R′,S) = m, i.e., R|St = R
′
|St
= R∗St for every t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}.
Since R 6= R′, there exists j ∈ N such that Rj 6= R
′
j. Hence, j 6∈ St for every
t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i.e., |{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| = 0 < 1.
Let us now prove the assertion for l ≥ 2 and an arbitrary m ≥ l. Assume that the
assertion holds for every l′ < l and arbitrary m′ ≥ l′.
3What we need of the sequence S is the fact that the same coalition S can occur several times,
the precise order of the coalitions is not relevant.
4In Theorem 3.5.2, we will use Lemma 3.5.4 in order to prove the balancedness of highway games
induced by cycles. There l will be taken as the smallest strictly positive integer such that lλS is an
integer for every coalition S in a balanced set B with balancing weights (λS)S∈B and a sequence S
will be constructed by duplicating each S ∈ B lλS times. Hence, m will be equal to
∑
S∈B lλS .
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Case 1: For all i ∈
⋃m









t=1 St, take Ri = Pi.
Consider the path profile R = {Ri}i∈N . Then (α(R,S) − (m− l))+ = (m − (m−
l))+ = l. Assume that
∑
T∈RN (α(T,S) − (m − l))+ > l. Then there exists R
′ 6= R
such that α(R′,S) > m − l. Since R′ 6= R, either there exists j ∈
⋃m
t=1 St such that
R′j 6= Rj or there exists j ∈ N\
⋃m
t=1 St such that R
′
j 6= Pj. If the latter is the case,
then we are automatically finished since |{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| = 0 < l. If the
former is the case, then for every S in sequence S such that R′|S = R
∗
S, j 6∈ S. But,
then
|{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| ≤ m − α(R
′,S) < m − (m − l) = l.
Note that for this case we did not have to use the induction hypothesis.
Case 2: There exists i ∈
⋃m
t=1 St and S, S
′ in the sequence S such that i ∈ S∩S ′,
(R∗S)i = Pi and (R
∗
S′)i = Qi. Choose one such i. If |{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|i ∈ St}| < l,
then we are automatically finished. So assume that |{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|i ∈ St}| ≥ l.
Reorder the coalitions in S so that
S = (S1, ..., Sp, Sp+1, ..., Sl, Sl+1, ..., Sm), where l > p ≥ 1 and
• i ∈ St for every t ≤ l,
• (R∗St)i = Pi for every t ∈ {1, 2, ..., p},
• (R∗St)i = Qi for every t ∈ {p + 1, p + 2, ..., l}.
Define S ′ = (Sp+1, Sp+2, ..., Sl, Sl+1, ..., Sm) and S
′′ = (S1, S2, ..., Sp, Sl+1, ..., Sm).
Assume that
∑




′) − (m − l))+ > l−p. The induction hypothesis implies
that there exists j ∈ N such that |{t ∈ {p + 1, ..., l, l + 1, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| < l− p. But
then




′) − (m − l))+ ≤ l − p. Then
∑
T∈RN




















(α(T,S) − (m − l))
+
≤ l − p. (3.17)

























(α(T,S) − (m − l))
+
≥ l− (l−p) = p, (3.18)
where the second inequality follows by (3.17).
Now we show that
∑
T∈RN (α(T,S




































(α(T,S) − (m − l))+ > p,
where the inequality follows from (3.18).
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, there exists j ∈ N such that
|{t ∈ {1, 2, ..., p, l + 1, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| < p.
But then
|{t ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}|j ∈ St}| ≤ |{t ∈ {1, 2, ..., p, l + 1, ..., m}|j ∈ St}| + (l − p)
< p + (l − p) = l.
¤
Theorem 3.5.2 Let Γ = (N,C, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that
C = (V,E) is a cycle. Then the highway game (N, cΓ) is balanced.
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and
cΓ(N) = w(E) − w(Ē(R
∗
N )),
it is sufficient to show that
































































where the first equality is obtained by using (iii) and (v) in Lemma 3.5.3.















 w(Ē(T )). (3.20)
Let l ∈ {1, 2, ...} be such that lλS ∈ {1, 2, ...} for all S ∈ B and, if l
′ < l, then
there exists S ∈ B such that lλS 6∈ {1, 2, ...}. Let
∑
S∈B lλS = m and define a
sequence of (duplicated) coalitions S = (S1, S2, ..., Sm) by S1 = S2 = ... = SlλB1 = B1,
SlλB1+1=SlλB1+2 = ... = SlλB1+lλB2 = B2 and so on. Observe that for every path profile


























(α(T,S) − (m − l))w(Ē(T )). (3.21)
Note that Lemma 3.5.4 implies that
∑
T∈RN (α(T,S) − (m − l))+ ≤ l. If not,
there would exist a j ∈ N such that |{t ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}|j ∈ St}| < l. However, since B
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(α(T,S) − (m − l))w(Ē(T )),
where the second inequality follows from the fact that w(Ē(R∗N)) ≥ w(Ē(T )) for ev-
ery T ∈ RN . Hence, we can conclude that (N, cΓ) is balanced. ¤
Finally, we show in Corollary 3.5.1 that the highway games induced by the weakly
cyclic graphs are balanced.
Corollary 3.5.1 Let Γ = (N,G, {si}i∈N , {ti}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that
G is a weakly cyclic graph. Then the highway game (N, cΓ) is balanced.
Proof. We know by Lemma 3.5.2 that a highway game on a weakly cyclic graph
is equal to the sum of the sub-highway games with respect to each of its cycles
and with respect to each bridge edge in the graph, i.e., cΓ(S) =
∑
C∈C(G) cΓC (S) +
∑
e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every S ⊂ N . Moreover, we know by Theorem 3.5.2 that highway
games induced by cycles are balanced. Lastly, we know that highway games induced
by trees are balanced. Pick yC ∈ Core(cΓC ) for each C ∈ C(G) and y
e ∈ Core(cΓe)






e. Clearly, x ∈ Core(cΓ). ¤
Chapter 4
Population Monotonic Path
Schemes for Simple Games
In this chapter, which is based on Çiftçi et al. (2009b), we consider the formation
of coalitions through binding bilateral agreements in voting/government formation
situations.
In many real life contexts, ranging from the formation of pre/post-electoral coali-
tions of parties to the formation of mergers and partnerships between firms, coalitions
form through a sequence of binding bilateral agreements. From among the numerous
examples of such coalition formation processes, we may single out the recent mergers
between the banks and between the consultancy firms that are observed in many
countries and the Oslo agreements between Israel and its neighbors. An important
characteristic of such coalition formation processes is the effect of the sequence of
agreements on the future potential agreements. For a coalition formed through bi-
lateral agreements may grow larger because the synergy/commitment obtained by a
coalition may create new agreement opportunities which are profitable both for the
members of the coalition and the agent which will join the coalition. Hence, the
determination of the sequences of binding bilateral agreements which will result in
the exploitation of the greatest possible amount of synergy is of both theoretical and
practical importance.
The coalition formation processes which end up with the formation of the grand
coalition deserve particular interest. Because, first of all, in many situations (e.g.,
situations of increasing returns to size), the grand coalition is the unique efficient
coalition structure. Secondly, the formation of the grand coalition among agents
which have common properties (e.g., the formation of the grand coalition among
leftist parties) has been the focal point of many branches of social sciences.
In this chapter, we will focus on the formation of the grand coalition through
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binding bilateral agreements in voting/government formation situations. We aim to
address two important questions in this context.
(i) Which voting situations allow for the formation of the grand coalition through
binding bilateral agreements?
(ii) In these situations, which agreement sequences must be followed to form the
grand coalition?
We will address these questions by modeling voting situations by simple trans-
ferable utility cooperative games. In voting situations, the voters’ incentive to form
coalitions arises from their will to increase their power to affect the outcome of the
voting process. Modelling of these situations as simple transferable utility games al-
lows us to predict the voters’ power to affect the result of voting by using appropriate
values for transferable utility games. Many values have been offered for simple games
as appropriate measures of voting power and the two most widely used ones are the
Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) power indices. If we assume that each
voter’s voting power is predicted by such an appropriate index, then the sequences
of binding bilateral agreements which result in the formation of the grand coalition
boils down to the notion of population monotonic path schemes. Postponing a precise
definition to the next section, a path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path,
i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed through a sequence of binding bilateral
agreements which result in the formation of the grand coalition and a scheme, i.e., a
power index vector for each coalition in the path based on the associated subgame. A
path scheme is called population monotonic if each player’s index does not decrease
as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on the Shapley-Shubik power
index as an appropriate measure of voting power. Hence, the two questions that we
address can be rephrased as
(i) Which simple games allow for population monotonic Shapley path schemes?
(ii) In these simple games, which Shapley path schemes are population monotonic?
It turns out that existence of veto players, i.e., a subgroup of voters whose unan-
imous agreement is necessary to pass a decision, is required for the existence of pop-
ulation monotonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa. Moreover, a Shapley path
scheme is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed
along the path contains every minimal winning coalition of the game. We also show
that each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if
the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. We further show how to
extend these results to the probabilistic values, generalizations of the Shapley value
introduced by Weber (1988).
The notion of population monotonic (Shapley) path schemes is introduced by
Cruijssen et al. (2005). This study analyzes insinking (the antonym of outsourcing)
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situations in logistics and the transportation sector. In these sectors, shippers often
outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice.
Cruijssen et al. (2005) proposes an insinking procedure in which the logistics service
provider initiates the shift of logistics activities instead of waiting for the shippers
to outsource their activities. To obtain the greatest possible amount of gains, the
service provider has to find an effective way of proposing offers to shippers through
which it can acquire the involvement of each shipper. At this point, Cruijssen et al.
(2005) proposes a sequence of binding bilateral agreements arguing that compared
to the simultaneous comprehensive agreements, by following an appropriate sequence
of binding bilateral agreements, the service provider can attract new customers to
the project by using the level of synergy and commitment already attained in the
sequence.
Our study in particular provides an alternative prediction of what kind of coali-
tions form in voting situations which differs from the mainstream prediction of Riker
(1962). Riker (1962) predicts that only minimal winning coalitions will form in equi-
librium. This idea has been the conclusion of many studies in the general coalition
formation literature based on the seminal noncooperative bargaining approach of
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and also the studies which analyze coalition formation in
voting situations that are modeled by simple TU-games like Shenoy (1979). However,
the empirical data on government/coalition formation shows that among all coalitions
formed after the second world war in European democracies only a third of them is
minimal winning (Laver and Schofield, 1990). Our current study shows that a wide
spectrum of coalitions including the minimal winning ones can form as a result of
binding bilateral agreements providing an alternative point of view for the analysis
and the explanation of the data.
Population monotonic path schemes (PMPS) are in the same spirit as population
monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) for cooperative games, introduced by Spru-
mont (1990) and further analyzed in e.g., Norde and Reijnierse (2002) and Slikker
et al. (2003). An allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to dis-
tribute the worth of every coalition among its members and it is called population
monotonic if the share of any player does not decrease as the coalition he belongs
to grows larger. Clearly, also a PMAS’s main concern is to ensure that no player is
worse off with additional cooperation between players. However, a PMAS compares
the allocations assigned to a coalition of players with every sub-coalition’s allocation
while a PMPS restricts the comparison to the allocations of path coalitions that are
formed previously. In fact, the existence of a PMPS is a weaker condition for a TU-
game than the existence of a PMAS since every path scheme induced by a PMAS
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is population monotonic. Another difference between the two notions is that each
allocation provided by a PMAS has to belong to the core of the associated subgame.
However, this may not be the case for a PMPS as we exemplify in our study.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 recalls some well-known
concepts on simple TU-games. Section 4.2 introduces Shapley path schemes and
presents the main results regarding the characterization of population monotonic
Shapley path schemes of simple games. Section 4.3 discusses extensions of the results
to other probabilistic values.
4.1 Preliminaries
A TU-game v ∈ GN is called simple if v is monotonic, v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for every S ∈ 2N
and v(N) = 1. We denote the set of simple TU-games with player set N by SN .
Given v ∈ SN , a coalition S ∈ 2N is called a winning coalition if v(S) = 1 and is
called a losing coalition if v(S) = 0. A winning coalition S is called minimal winning
if there does not exist a coalition T ( S which is winning. Every simple game v is
characterized by its set of minimal winning coalitions, MWC(v). A player i ∈ N is a
veto player in v ∈ SN if S ⊂ N , v(S) = 1 implies that i ∈ S. The set of veto players
of v is denoted by veto(v). It is readily verified that a simple game v is balanced if
and only if veto(v) 6= ∅.
Voting or decision making situations in committees like parliaments can easily
be modeled into the framework of simple games by representing the coalitions which
possesses the necessary power to pass a decision as the winning coalitions of the game.
This model enables the employment of values for simple games to measure the parties’
power to affect the outcome of the voting situations at hand. Many values have been
offered for simple games and studied in the literature as appropriate measures of
decisional power, i.e., as power indices. We will shortly review the Shapley and
Shubik (1954) power index that arises from the Shapley value.
Shapley and Shubik (1954) proposed to use the Shapley value as a power index
for voting situations in committees. For a simple game v ∈ SN the Shapley-Shubik




|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
. (4.1)
The value assigned to each voter can be interpreted by using the sequential prob-
abilistic interpretation of the Shapley value which stems from a procedure to form
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the grand coalition (which is described also by Shapley, 1953) that yields the Shap-
ley value of the game as an expected payoff of each player. In this procedure, the
grand coalition N is formed by introducing the players one by one and each player
is assigned the marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition formed when she
joins the set of her predecessors. Hence, the value assigned by Shapley-Shubik index
is the probability of turning the coalition of predecessors from losing to winning when
the order of arrival of players is random and all orders are equally likely. For further
discussion of the importance of the Shapley value as an estimator of political power
and several examples of its applications, the reader is referred to Straffin (1994) and
Winter (2002). Lastly, we know (for example by Derks and Haller (1999) that the
Shapley value satisfies the null player out property.
4.2 Population Monotonic Shapley Path Schemes
In this section we introduce and analyze the Shapley path schemes of simple games.
Let v ∈ GN . A path consists of a sequence S = {S1, S2, ..., S|N |} of coalitions such
that |Sk| = k for all k ∈ {1, ..., |N |} and Sm ⊂ Sm+1 for all m ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}.
A path scheme specifies how to distribute the worth of every coalition on the path
among its members. Formally, a path scheme (S, (xS)S∈S) for v consists of a path S




for every coalition S ∈ S.
A path scheme (S, (xS)S∈S) for v ∈ G
N is called population monotonic if it satisfies
the following conditions:
• xSi ≥ v({i}) for all S ∈ S and i ∈ S. (individual rationality)
• xSi ≥ x
T
i for every S, T ∈ S such that T ⊂ S and i ∈ T . (monotonicity)
A path scheme in which the Shapley value is used as an allocation vector is
called a Shapley path scheme. Clearly, the Shapley allocation scheme of a TU-game
is population monotonic if and only if all Shapley path schemes of the game are
population monotonic. We will illustrate the notion of Shapley path schemes and
their properties in the following example.
Example 4.2.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the simple game v ∈ SN with
MWC(v) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. The Shapley allocation scheme of v is provided in Table
4.1 below.
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Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -













Table 4.1: The Shapley allocation scheme of v in Example 4.2.1
It can easily be observed that the Shapley allocation scheme of v is not population
monotonic but that there are exactly two population monotonic Shapley path schemes
on the paths {{1}, {1, 3}, N} and {{3}, {1, 3}, N}, respectively.
Observe also that the game v has a unique core allocation, (0, 1, 0) different from
the Shapley value of v. So, in particular, the allocation prescribed by a (Shapley)
PMPS may not belong to the core of the associated subgame.
⋄
We will begin with presenting a preliminary result which is useful in understanding
the structure of population monotonic Shapley path schemes of simple games.
Lemma 4.2.1 Given a simple game v ∈ SN , let S = {S1, S2, ..., S|N |} be a path of
coalitions such that Sm = {i1, ..., im} for every m ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. Assume that the
first winning coalition along the path S is Sk, i.e., v(S1) = ... = v(Sk−1) = 0 and
v(Sk) = 1. If the Shapley path scheme (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic, then
the following must hold:
(R1) Φim(v|Sp) = 0, for all m ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, ..., |N |}.
(R2) Φi(v|Sk) = Φi(v|Sp), for all p ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |} and for all i ∈ Sk.
(R3) MWC(v|Sk) = MWC(v).
Proof. (R1) and (R2). On the one hand
∑
i∈Sp
Φim(v|Sp) = 1 for all p ∈ {k, ..., |N |} by
the efficiency of the Shapley value. On the other hand, by the population monotonicity
of (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S), Φi(v|Sp) ≥ Φi(v|Sk) for every p ∈ {k+1, ..., |N |} and Φim(v|Sp) ≥ 0,
for all m ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, ..., |N |}. Hence Φim(v|Sp) = 0 for all
m ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, ..., |N |} and Φi(v|Sk) = Φi(v|Sp) for all
p ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |} and for all i ∈ Sk.
(R3). Suppose on the contrary that MWC(v|Sk) 6= MWC(v). Then there exists
a T ∈ MWC(v) such that T\Sk 6= ∅. But then Φj(v) > 0 for every j ∈ T\Sk, a
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contradiction with (R1). ¤
We now provide a characterization of the family of simple games which allow for
population monotonic Shapley path schemes.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let v ∈ SN . Then v has a population monotonic Shapley path
scheme if and only if v is balanced.
Proof. Let v ∈ SN have a population monotonic Shapley path scheme. Also let
(S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) be a population monotonic Shapley path scheme for v such that
S = {S1, S2, ..., S|N |} and Sm = {i1, ..., im} for every m ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. Assume that
the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk. Obviously ik ∈ veto(v|Sk) and hence
veto(v|Sk) 6= ∅. Moreover, we know by (R3) in Lemma 4.2.1 that MWC(v|Sk) =
MWC(v). Hence, veto(v|Sk) = veto(v) and v is balanced.
Now, assume that v is balanced. Then, veto(v) 6= ∅. Let i ∈ veto(v) and consider
a path S = {S1, S2, ..., S|N |} with S|N |−1 = N\{i}. We know that S|N |−1 = N\{i}
is a losing coalition. Then v|N\{i} is a null game and hence Φj(v|St) = 0 for all
t ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1} and j ∈ St. Also, Φj(v) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N , since v is monotonic.
So, the Shapley path scheme (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic. ¤
Theorem 4.2.1 reveals that, in the class of simple games, the existence of veto
players (or, equivalently, a nonempty core) is a must for the existence of population
monotonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa. We can interpret this result as fol-
lows. When a winning coalition is formed through a sequence of binding bilateral
agreements, we know that the restriction of the TU-game to this coalition has veto
players, that is, in this winning coalition, there is a subgroup of agents whose unan-
imous agreement/involvement is necessary to pass a decision. We also know that
the formation of the grand coalition starting from this winning coalition via binding
bilateral agreements requires the remaining players to be null players. But, this in
turn implies that the veto players of the winning coalition are in fact the veto players
of the whole game, i.e., the game is balanced.
Next we turn to our second question of which Shapley path schemes are population
monotonic. We will show in the following theorem that the requirement that the
first winning coalition along a path has to include all minimum winning coalitions
of the game is both necessary and sufficient for the population monotonicity of the
corresponding Shapley path scheme.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let v ∈ SN be balanced. A Shapley path scheme (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) is
population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition along S contains every
minimal winning coalition of v.
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Proof. Let (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) be a population monotonic Shapley path scheme for v
and assume that the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk. We already know
by (R3) in Lemma 4.2.1 that MWC(v|Sk) = MWC(v). Then, clearly, Sk contains
every minimal winning coalition of v.
Let S be a path of coalitions with Sm = {i1, ..., im} for every m ∈ {1, ..., |N |}.
Assume that the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk (k ∈ {1, ..., |N |})
and Sk contains every minimal winning coalition of v. Now, Φj(v|St) = 0 for all
t ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} and j ∈ St since Sk−1 is a losing coalition. Also, Φi(v|Sk) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ Sk since v is monotonic. We know that each player im (m ∈ {k + 1, ..., |N |}) is a
null player in v|Sp (p ∈ {m, ..., |N |}) since Sk contains every minimal winning coalition
of v. Then, firstly, Φim(v|Sp) = 0 for all m ∈ {k+1, ..., |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, ..., |N |}
and secondly, one can easily show that Φi(v|Sk) = Φi(v|Sk+1) = ... = Φi(v) for all i ∈ Sk
by applying the null player out property recursively. So, we conclude that the Shapley
path scheme (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic. ¤
In the light of Theorem 4.2.2, we can answer one other important question in this
context: For which simple games all Shapley path schemes are population monotonic,
i.e., which simple games have a population monotonic Shapley allocation scheme?
Theorem 4.2.3 Let v ∈ SN be a simple game. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) All Shapley path schemes of v are population monotonic.
(ii) The set of veto players of v is a winning coalition.
(iii) The game v is convex.
(iv) The Shapley allocation scheme of v is population monotonic.
Proof. (i) → (ii) Assume that all Shapley path schemes of v are population
monotonic. Suppose that veto(v) is losing. Then there exists a minimum winning
coalition S = {i1, ..., im} with m ∈ {1, ..., |N | − 1}. We know that Φi(v|S) =
1
m
for every i ∈ S since S is a minimal winning coalition. Pick a path of coalitions
S = {S1, S2, ..., S|N |} with Sm = S. The Shapley path scheme (S, (Φ(v|S))S∈S) is
population monotonic by assumption. Consequently, Φi(v) =
1
m
for every i ∈ S.
Observe that there exists i∗ ∈ S such that i∗ /∈ veto(v) since S is a minimal winning
coalition and veto(v) is losing. Then, there exists another minimal winning coalition








|N |} with S
′
|T | = T .
Now, the Shapley path scheme (S′, (Φ(v|S))S∈S′) is also population monotonic by
4.3. Extensions to Probabilistic Values 119
assumption. Then, (R1) implies that Φi∗(v) = 0 since i





(ii) → (iii) Let v ∈ SN be such that veto(v) is a winning coalition. Then, all
players in N\veto(v) are null players in v. Hence, v is the unanimity game on veto(v)
and is convex.
(iii) → (iv) See Sprumont (1990), Corollary 2.
(iv) → (i) Obvious. ¤
Theorem 4.2.3 reveals that, in the class of simple games, the existence of a winning
veto player set is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a population
monotonic Shapley allocation scheme. This result can be interpreted by making use
of our results on population monotonic Shapley path schemes as follows. We know
that the existence of a population monotonic Shapley allocation scheme implies the
population monotonicity of each Shapley path scheme of the game and vice versa.
Then, by Theorem 4.2.2, the existence of a population monotonic Shapley allocation
scheme requires the first winning coalition along each path to include all minimum
winning coalitions of the game. But this is possible only when the game has a unique
minimum winning coalition, i.e., when the set of veto players is winning.
4.3 Extensions to Probabilistic Values
Probabilistic values, introduced and characterized by Weber (1988), are generaliza-
tions of the Shapley value for finite TU-games. These values keep one essential feature
of the Shapley value, they assign each player an average of his marginal contributions.
They, however, fail to satisfy either the efficiency or anonymity property. In fact, the
Shapley value is the unique probabilistic value satisfying both anonymity and effi-
ciency. Probabilistic values can be classified into two groups: Quasi-values which are
efficient probabilistic values and Semi-values, the probabilistic values which satisfy
anonymity (see Weber, 1988). We refer to Monderer and Samet (2002) for a detailed
discussion of probabilistic values.
Probabilistic values are formally defined as follows. Given N and i ∈ N , let
P iN denote the set of probability distributions on 2
N\{i}, the family of coalitions not
containing i. A value F (defined on GN) is called a probabilistic value (Weber, 1988)




pi(T ) (v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )) , (4.2)
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for some pi ∈ P iN and for all i ∈ N . Here p
i ∈ P iN can be interpreted as the player’s
subjective evaluation of the probability of joining different coalitions. For example,






for all i ∈ N is the
Shapley value.
In the following two subsections we will discuss the extensions of the results ob-
tained for the Shapley value on quasi-values and on semi-values, respectively.
4.3.1 Population monotonic path schemes of quasi-values
Let P(Π(N)) denote the set of probability distributions on the set of permutations
of the player set N . Given i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}, we will denote by ΠS,i(N) the set
{τ ∈ Π(N)|τ(j) < τ(i) if and only if j ∈ S}.
If we think of a permutation τ ∈ Π(N) as the order in which players enter the game,
then ΠS,i(N) stands for the set of orders in which exactly all members of S enter the
game before player i enters.
The following characterization of efficient probabilistic values is provided by Weber
(1988).
Theorem 4.3.1 (Weber, 1988) Let F be a probabilistic value as given in (4.2) defined
by p = {pi}i∈N with p
i ∈ P iN for every i ∈ N . Then F is efficient if and only if there





for every i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}.
Observe that probabilistic values are originally defined for a fixed player set. How-
ever, our analysis requires the values to be defined on every subset of the player set
under consideration. Because, for every simple game, we want to be able to compare
the payoffs assigned by a value to the players at every subgame of the game. We now
extend probabilistic values in such a way that the players’ subjective evaluation of the
probability of joining different coalitions will be consistent in the sense defined below.
For this aim we will define the restrictions of a probabilistic value to subgames.





for every i ∈ N . For each S ⊂ N , the restriction of F to GS is denoted by FS and
for each player i ∈ S, his restricted evaluations piS ∈ P
i
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for all T ⊂ S\{i}.
The consistency condition can be interpreted by using the sequential probabilistic
interpretation of the Shapley value (and of the probabilistic values of course). If we let
the players enter a room one by one and assign each player the marginal contribution
created by her, then piN represents player i’s assessment of the probability of different
coalitions to be the set of predecessors of her. Then if one player j leaves N , it is
natural to expect that every player i ∈ N\{j} will update her assessment of joining
a coalition T ⊂ N\{i, j} by merging her previous assessments of T and of T ∪ {j}1.
We illustrate the notion of the restriction of a probabilistic value in the following
example.
Example 4.3.1 Let F be a probabilistic value on N = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that F is








































F satisfies (4.3) by taking the following probability distribution on the set of permu-
tations on the player set:
b(123) = 2
16
, b(132) = 4
16
, b(213) = 1
16
, b(231) = 1
16
, b(312) = 4
16
, and b(321) = 4
16
.
Hence F is efficient.




= p1N({2}) + p
1











= p2N({1}) + p
2





= p2N(∅) + p
2
N({3}).
Notice that FS can be described via (4.3) by taking:
b(12) = 5
8
and b(21) = 3
8
.
So FS is an efficient probabilistic value on G
S. ⋄
In the previous example, we have shown that the specific restriction under consid-
eration is again an efficient probabilistic value. Indeed, every restriction of an efficient
probabilistic value is an efficient probabilistic value for the corresponding subgame as
shown in the following proposition.
1As discussed in the following subsection every semi-value readily satisfies our consistency con-
dition (4.4).
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Proposition 4.3.1 Let F be an efficient probabilistic value defined by {piN}i∈N where
piN ∈ P
i
N for every i ∈ N . Then, FS is an efficient probabilistic value for every S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3.1 there exists b ∈ P(Π(N)) such that piN(T ) =
∑
τ∈ΠT,i(N) b(τ)
for every i ∈ N and T ∈ 2N\{i}. Take S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. Given τ ∈ Π(N), τ|S
denotes the restriction of τ to S, i.e., τ|S = π for some π ∈ Π(S) with π(i) <
π(j) if and only if τ(i) < τ(j), for all i, j ∈ S. We can induce a probability distribu-




b(τ), for all π ∈ Π(S). (4.5)
Let FS be defined by {p
i












′′),i(N) = ∅ for every T ′, T ′′ ⊂ N\S with T ′ 6= T ′′
and
{τ ∈ Π(N)|τ|S = π}∩{τ ∈ Π(N)|τ|S = π





















where the first equality follows from (4.4) and the last but one equality follows from
(4.6) and the remarks below it. Then, Theorem 4.3.1 implies that FS is an efficient
probabilistic value on GS. ¤
Having defined the restrictions of probabilistic values, we can now illustrate the
path schemes associated with these values in the following example.
Example 4.3.2 Consider the probabilistic value F defined in Example 4.3.1 and let
v ∈ SN with N = {1, 2, 3} be defined by MWC(v) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. From Table
4.2 it can easily be observed that this balanced game has two population monotonic
F -path schemes related to the paths {{1},{1,3},N} and {{3},{1,3},N}. ⋄
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Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -













Table 4.2: The restrictions of F for v and its subgames in Example 4.3.2
The following theorem states that the results for population monotonic Shapley
path schemes in fact can be extended to all efficient probabilistic values which are
defined by strictly positive subjective evaluations of joining different coalitions for
each player.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let F : GN → RN be an efficient probabilistic value defined by
{piN}i∈N with p
i
N > 0 for all i ∈ N . Then
(i) A simple game v ∈ SN has a population monotonic F -path scheme if and only
if v is balanced.
(ii) Let v be balanced. Then an F -path scheme (S, (FS(v|S))S∈S) is population mono-
tonic if and only if the first winning coalition along S contains every minimal
winning coalition of v.
(iii) Let v ∈ SN be a simple game. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) All F -path schemes of v are population monotonic.
(b) The set of veto players of v is a winning coalition.
(c) The game v is convex.
(d) The F -allocation scheme of v, (FS(v|S))S∈2N\{∅}) is population monotonic.
The proof of Theorem 4.3.2 is similar to the proofs of Theorems 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and
4.2.3, respectively and is therefore omitted.
It is important at this point to observe that if for an efficient probabilistic value
F , piN(S) = 0 for some i ∈ N and S ∈ 2
N\{i}, then an unbalanced simple game may
have population monotonic F -path schemes. This is illustrated in Example 4.3.3.
124 Chapter 4. Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games





for all S ⊂ N\{1}; p2N(S) =
1
4
for all S ⊂ N\{2} and





, p3N({1}) = p
3
N({2}) = 0.
Consider v ∈ SN defined by MWC(v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Clearly veto(v) = ∅.
But, v has population monotonic F -path schemes related to the paths {{1}, {1, 2}, N}
and {{2}, {1, 2}, N} as can be seen in Table 4.3. ⋄
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -













Table 4.3: The restrictions of F for v and its subgames in Example 4.3.3
4.3.2 Population monotonic path schemes of semi-values
In this section, we will focus on one particular, well-known semi-value, the Banzhaf






(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) .
It can easily be observed that the Banzhaf value is defined for every finite player
set, and in particular also for all subgames of a specific game. In fact, every semi-value
is defined for every finite player set, and hence for all subgames of a specific game.
Moreover, the restriction of a semi-value obtained by using the consistency condi-
tion (4.4) boils down to the definition of the same semi-value for the corresponding
subgame. This can be readily verified from the characterization of semi-values on TU-
games with finite support provided by Dubey et al. (1981). Dubey et al. (1981) show
that, for every semi value, the players’ underlying subjective evaluations {piN}i∈N ,
depend only on the cardinalities of S and N and hence every semi-value is defined for
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all subgames of a particular game. It can also easily be checked that the restriction
of a semi-value by using the consistency condition (4.4) like we did for quasi-values.
But, one can check that every semi-value satisfies the consistency condition (4.4) by
making use of the characterization of semi-values on TU-games with finite support
provided by Dubey et al. (1981).
For population monotonic Banzhaf path schemes the situation essentially differs
from the population monotonic Shapley path schemes. This is illustrated in Examples
4.3.4 and 4.3.5.
Example 4.3.4 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the simple game v ∈ SN defined by
MWC(v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. The Banzhaf value of v and its subgames are
provided in the Table 4.4.
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 - -
{2} - 0 -















Table 4.4: The Banzhaf allocation scheme of v and in Example 4.3.4
Notice that v is not balanced since veto(v) = ∅ but that every Banzhaf path
scheme of v is population monotonic. ⋄
Example 4.3.5 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and consider the simple game v ∈ SN de-
fined by MWC(v) = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. Clearly, v is balanced. The
Banzhaf value of v and its subgames are provided in Table 4.5. The Banzhaf val-
ues of the subgames corresponding to losing coalitions are omitted. Then, every























Table 4.5: The Banzhaf allocation scheme of v in Example 4.3.5
Banzhaf path scheme is population monotonic although the set of veto players of v
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is a losing coalition. Secondly, there are path schemes of v, like the one related to
path {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, which are population monotonic but the first
winning coalition along these paths does not contain the union of minimal winning
coalitions v. ⋄
The results for population monotonic Shapley path schemes can be extended only
partly to the Banzhaf value. This is reflected in Theorem 4.3.3.
Theorem 4.3.3 Let v ∈ SN be balanced.
(1) If the first winning coalition along a path S contains every minimal winning
coalition of v, then the Banzhaf-path scheme (S, (β(v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic
.
(2) If the set of veto players of v is a winning coalition, then all Banzhaf-path
schemes of v are population monotonic.
The proof of Theorem 4.3.3 is similar to the corresponding parts of the proofs of
Theorems 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively and is therefore omitted.
By making use of the characterization of semi-values provided by Dubey et al.
(1981), one can show that Theorem 4.3.3 can be extended to every semi-value.
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Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert allocatieproblemen die samenhangen met een special type
machinevolgorde problemen. In machinevolgorde problemen is er een groep klanten,
die elk precies een taak willen laten uitvoeren op een (of meerdere) machine(s). De
kosten van elke klant hangen af van het tijdstip waarop hun taak door de machine
is uitgevoerd. Als we aannemen dat er een beginvolgorde bestaat op de verschillende
taken dan zijn er twee vragen die beantwoord dienen te worden. “Welke volgorde zorgt
ervoor dat de totale, gezamenlijke kosten geminimaliseerd wordt” en “Hoe dienen de
hiermee corresponderende maximale kostenbesparingen op een eerlijke manier onder
de klanten verdeeld te worden?”. Curiel et al. (1989) introduceerden een spelthe-
oretische aanpak voor het verdelingsvraagstuk binnen de context van specifieke 1-
machinevolgorde problemen met lineaire individuele kostenfuncties door correspon-
derende machinevolgorde spelen te analyseren. Aangetoond werd dat dit soort spelen
convex en derhalve ook gebalanceerd zijn: er bestaat een zogenaamde stabiele verdel-
ing van de maximaal haalbare kostenbesparingen onder alle klanten zodanig dat geen
enkele deelgroep, in totaal, hogere kostenbesparingen kan behalen door toegelaten
onderlinge volgordewisselingen dan wat deze coalitie in totaal volgens het verdel-
ingsvoorstel krijgt toegewezen. Een speciale regel die voor elk 1-machinevolgorde
probleem binnen de bestudeerde klasse een dergelijke stabiele uitkomst voorschrijft
blijkt de zogenaamde EGS-regel te zijn, die bovendien axiomatisch gekarakteriseerd
is. In de literatuur is het elementaire model van Curiel et al (1989) verfijnd door extra
aannames op de taken te beschouwen zoals tijdstippen van beschikbaarheid, uiterli-
jke uitvoeringstijdstippen, andersoortige kostenfuncties etc. In alle studies tot nu
toe wordt aangenomen dat een machine slechts een taak tegelijkertijd kan uitvoeren.
In de praktijk echter bestaan er ook batch machines die in staat zijn tegelijkertijd
meerdere taken uit te voeren.
In paragraaf 2.1 breiden we de speltheoretische aanpak voor machinevolgorde
problemen uit naar batch machines. Eerst beschouwen we 1-batchmachinevolgorde
problemen waarbij de capaciteit van de batchmachine vastligt en het maximaal aan-
tal taken weergeeft dat deze machine tegelijkertijd kan uitvoeren. Aangetoond wordt
136 SAMENVATTING
dat de corresponderende 1-spelen convex zijn. Bovendien wordt een expliciete uit-
drukking voor de Shapley waarde voor dit soort spelen afgeleid. Ook wordt de EGS-
regel doorvertaald naar dit soort situaties en axiomatisch gekarakteriseerd. Vervol-
gens beschouwen we zogenaamde relaxaties waarbij de aannames over toelaatbare
volgordewisselingen voor deelgroepen wordt gevarieerd. Voor deze relaxaties wordt
aangetoond dat stabiele verdelingsvoorstellen bestaan. Tot slot kijken we naar m-
batchmachinevolgorde problemen waarin elke taak dezelfde volgorde door de m batch-
machines dient te doorlopen. In het bijzonder identificeren we hier twee gevallen
zodanig dat het corresponderende m-spel een bijzonder type 1-spel is.
Een andere gemeenschappelijke aanname in de analyse van machinevolgorde spe-
len is dat geen omsteltijden vereist zijn. Deze aanname vereist dat de omsteltijden
verwaarloosbaar zijn of in de verwerkingstijden kunnen worden omvat. Nochtans,
in de praktijk, als een machine verschillende types taken moet uitvoeren, dan is een
significante omsteltijd bijna altijd vereist (zie bijvoorbeeld Pinedo, 2005).
In paragraaf 2.2, analyseren we allocatieproblemen die gerelateerd zijn aan zoge-
naamde familie machinevolgorde problemen. Bij familie machinevolgorde problemen,
zijn de taken verdeeld in families. Er is geen omsteltijd vereist als een andere taak
van dezelfde familie er aan vooraf gaat. Een omsteltijd is echter wel vereist als een
taak een lid van een andere familie volgt. Wij associëren cooperatieve spelen met
familie machinevolgorde problemen door de waarde van een coalitie te definiëren als
de maximumbesparing door middel van een toelaatbare volgordewisselingen. We be-
wijzen dat elk familie machinevolgorde spel een niet-lege core heeft. Dit resultaat
wordt verkregen door aan te tonen dat een specifieke marginale vector van het spel
een core-element is.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we allocatieproblemen die voortkomen uit verbind-
ingsproblemen zoals in een economische omgeving waar agenten willen samenwerken
en gezamenlijk willen investeren in de aanleg/onderhoud van een gemeenschappelijk
netwerk. We bekijken twee speciale klassen van deze verbindingsproblemen: mini-
mum opspannende boom problemen, waarin agenten verbinding willen maken met
een bron, en highway problemen waarin agenten een verbinding leggen tussen een
vertrek- en aankomstpunt.
Neem een aantal inwoners van een dorp dat een netwerk van leidingen wil aan-
leggen van hun huis naar een watervoorziening. Elke inwoner kan een directe verbind-
ing maken met de watervoorziening, maar een dergelijke beslissing zal waarschijnlijk
inefficiënt zijn. In de meeste gevallen zal het goedkoper zijn als enkele inwoners recht-
streeks verbonden zijn met de watervoorziening, terwijl anderen zich aansluiten op
de watervoorziening via andere inwoners. Inderdaad, in deze situatie zal een netwerk
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ontstaan dat de totale verbindingskosten minimaliseert. Een dergelijk netwerk wordt
gevonden door een minimum opspannende boom (mob). Deze situaties worden dan
ook mob situaties genoemd. Indien de agenten het eens zijn over de mob die aangelegd
moet worden, ontstaat het tweede probleem waarbij de gezamenlijke minimale kosten
van de mob op een eerlijke manier verdeeld moeten worden onder de agenten. Deze al-
locatieproblemen zijn voor het eerst geintroduceerd in de economische literatuur door
Claus en Kleitman (1973). Bird (1976) introduceerden een speltheoretische aanpak
voor deze problemen door een cooperatief TU-spel te koppelen aan mob problemen.
Vervolgens zijn voor mob problemen een groot aantal verdeelregels geintroduceerd in
de literatuur die geschikt zijn om toe te passen op mob situaties. Bijvoorbeeld, de
equal remaining obligations regel (Feltkamp et al., 1994) voor mob situaties voldoet
aan een groot aantal aantrekkelijke eigenschappen (bijvoorbeeld monotonie in kosten,
populatie monotonie, gelijke behandeling) en kan op verschillende manieren worden
verkregen. Bovendien tonen Bergantiños en Vidal-Puga (2007a) aan dat andere regels
uit de literatuur sommige eigenschappen niet bezitten die de equal remaining obliga-
tions regel wel heeft.
De oorspronkelijke definitie van de equal remaining obligations regel bestaat uit
een sequentiële procedure: Kruskal’s algoritme (Kruskal, 1956) wordt gebruikt om
een mob te construeren en bij elke stap van het algoritme worden de kosten van de
geconstrueerde verbinding verdeeld tussen de agenten die deze verbinding gebruiken.
In paragraaf 3.2 introduceren we een andere benadering en onderbouwing voor de
equal remaining obligations regel. Om dit te bereiken definiëren we eerst de knoop
georiënteerde aanleg- en betaalprocedure die zowel tot een mob leidt als een verdeel-
regel van de kosten leidt waarin elke agent de verbinding betaalt die hij kiest om
aan te leggen. Vervolgens tonen we aan dat de equal remaining obligations regel
het gemiddelde is van de verdeelregels die verkregen zijn uit de knoop georiënteerde
aanleg- en betaalprocedure voor elke volgorde van agenten. In paragraaf 3.3 en 3.4
tonen we aan dat de resultaten uit paragraaf 3.2 uit te breiden zijn naar de minimum
opspannende bos situaties (cf. Rosenthal, 1987) en mob situaties met twee bronnen.
Het grootste deel van de huidige literatuur op het gebied van de allocatie van de
kosten in verbindingsproblemen richt zich op de mob problemen of varianten daar-
van. Een gemeenschappelijk kenmerk van deze problemen is dat elke persoon in het
probleem een verbinding met een niet-lege deelverzameling van de beschikbare bron-
nen in het netwerk moet maken. Nochtans, in sommige verbindingssituaties is er
geen bepaald punt waarmee elke persoon in het probleem moet worden verbonden.
Bijvoorbeeld, de gebruikers van een highway netwerk hebben slechts een verbinding
nodig tussen hun vertrek- en aankomstpunt in het netwerk.
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Mosquera en Zarzuelo (2006) bestuderen het allocatieprobleem dat samenhangt
met de bouwkosten van een highway netwerk. Voor dit doel, definëren zij formeel
highway problemen en analyseren de bijbehorende cooperatieve kostenspelen, highway
spelen genoemd. In een highway probleem, worden de mogelijkheden betreffende de
bouw van het highway netwerk bepaald door een verbonden graaf. De verzameling
knopen van de graaf vertegenwoordigt de potentiele vertrek- en aankomstpunten en
de zijden in de graaf vertegenwoordigen de mogelijke wegverbindingen die kunnen
worden geconstrueerd. Gegeven een highway probleem wordt een corresponderend
highway spel gedefiniërd als een cooperatief kostenspel dat aan elke coalitie van spelers
de totale kosten van de goedkoopste keuze van zijden in de graaf associërt die het
vertrek- en aankomstpunt van elk lid van de coalitie met elkaar verbindt. Mosquera
en Zarzuelo (2006) beperken zich tot highway problemen waarin de onderliggende
graaf een boom is. In deze context is er slechts één pad tussen een vertrek- en een
aankomstpunt.
In paragraaf 3.5 bestuderen we highway problemen waarin de onderliggende graven
zijn weakly cyclic, d.w.z., verbonden graven waarvoor elke zijde in de graaf in hoog-
stens één cykel bevat is. We bestuderen eerst de klasse van graven waarvoor de
corresponderende spelen altijd concaaf zijn. Voor dit doel, wordt een graaf G als
highway-spel-concaaf gedefinëerd als voor elk highway probleem waarin G de on-
derliggende graaf is, het corresponderende highway spel concaaf is. Wij bewijzen dat
een graaf highway-spel-concaaf is dan en slechts dan als deze weakly triangular is.
Dan richten we ons op de core van highway spelen die door weakly cyclic graven
worden gëınduceerd. Kuipers (1997) laat zien dat de highway spelen die door cy-
clische graven worden gëınduceerd hoeven niet gebalanceerd te zijn in het algemeen.
Nochtans bewijzen we dat de highway spelen op weakly cyclic graven gebalanceerd
zijn.
Wij beschouwen in Hoofdstuk 4 de vorming van coalities door sequentiële bi-
laterale onderhandelingen in stemmensituaties. Wij modelleren deze situaties door
simpele spelen en nemen aan dat de macht van elke kiezer wordt beschrijven via een
machtsindex. Een pad schema voor een simpele spel bestaat uit een pad, d.w.z., een
volgorde van coalities die wordt gevormd tijdens het onderhandelingsproces en een
schema, d.w.z., een allocatievector voor elke coalitie in het pad. Een pad schema
wordt genoemd populatie monotoon als de allocatie van een speler niet afneemt als
de pad-coalitie groeit. In de eerste plaats richten we ons op Shapley pad schemas van
simpele spelen waarin voor elke pad-coalitie de Shapley waarde van het geassociërde
deelspel de allocatie bepaalt. We bewijzen dat het bestaan van veto spelers nodige
en voldoende voorwaarde is voor het bestaan van populatie monotoon Shapley pad
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schemas. Voorts is een Shapley pad schema populatie monotoon is dan en slechts dan
als de eerste winnende coalitie die via het pad wordt gevormd, elke minimale winnende
coalitie van het spel bevat. Wij bewijzen ook dat elke Shapley pad schema populatie
monotoon is dan en slechts dan als de coalitie van veto spelers een winnende coalitie
is. Wij bestuderen verder hoe deze resultaten uit te breiden naar probabilistische
waarden, die de Shapley waarde generaliseren.
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